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Summary 
This thesis examines the late novels of Henry James in the light of a 
distinction between "resolved" and "unresolved" ironies. The first chapter 
aims to clarify this distinction, arguing that in "traditional" ii'onie works 
the dominant irony is characteristically "resolved": that is, such works are 
structured upon the gradual enlightenment of the protagonist, to issue in the 
extinction of irony as such a protagonist achieves equality of insight with 
the reader. Such resolution, it is argued, is dependent on the author's 
access to and acceptance of a stable system of values. Conversely, where such 
stable communal values seem to the writer to be inconsistent with the unstable 
reality he perceives, the dominant irony of the work, in not being based upon 
a clearly defined or implied norm, is likely to remain "unresolved". 
The second chapter approaches the nineteenth-century novel as the product 
of a society generally perceived to be based on firmly established values. 
Resolved irony thus predominates in these novels, but not as the vehicle of a 
complacent view of society: the irony is usually dependent on the perceived 
need for change in society, its resolution being posited on a belief in the 
possibility of such change. As such a belief weakens, an unresolved element 
becomes more evident in these novels, to predominate by the end of the century. 
The third chapter uses James' The Ambassadors to show how unresolved 
irony can result from an author's exploration of his subject beyond the confines 
of his declared intention. In thi's instance, it is argued, the unresolved 
irony is a function of a more complex view of his protagonist than James seems , 
to have foreseen. 
The fourth chapter develops this enquiry by showing that in The Wings of 
the Dove James' subject once again grew beyond the projected outline, but in 
this case with James fully avlare of the development. Unresolved irony, though 
still a product of "unintended" meanings, thus more consciously reflects a 
critical view of its subject. 
• The fifth chapter adduces The Goleen Bowl as James' most sustained work 
of unresolved irony. It is the aim to demonstrate that the novel's meaning 
is entirely a function of this lack of resolution, the controlling vision 
being that of a society in which professed values are hopelessly at odds with 
true motives. 
Joseph Conrad and D.H. Lawrence are consistently used for comparison and 
contrast with James, partly to demonstrate their awareness of the attractions· 
and dangers of irony as a response to perplexity, and partly to claim for 
James a place next to them as a profound commentator on the early twentieth 
century. 
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There, on the mountain and the sky, 
On all the tragic scene they stare. 
One asks for mournful melodies; 
Accomplished fingers begin to play. 
Their eyes mid many wrinkles, their eyes, 
Their ancient, glittering eyes, are gay. 
W.B. Yeats: "Lapis Lazuli" 
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Preface 
The title of this thesis is intended to suggest the weight given to the 
theoretical aspect of an enquiry that is fundamentally a critical one. One 
of its aims is to arrive at an understanding of a particular mode of irony -
what I have called unresolved irony - which occurs, of course, also in works 
other than these novels by Henry James. On the other hand, the study 
attempts to demonstrate that these difficult novels are made more accessible 
by a reconsideration of the nature of their ironic strategy. Thus, although 
the main body of the thesis consists of a fairly detaHed discussion of 
James' last three completed novels, the discussion is preceded by and 
interspersed with more theoretical matter than would have been necessary in 
a more single-minded consideration of James. 
The theoretical bias of the study has also led to the relative isolation 
of these three novels from the rest of James' oeuvre: frequent Early-Middle-
Late comparisons have had to be abandoned as distracting from the argument, 
whatever their intrinsic interest. In so far as this thesis is concerned 
with an evaluation of James' achievement, such an assessment is based on his 
response to a particular era rather than on his development as a novelist. 
I have thus attempted to "place" the late novels in relation to works by 
James' contemporaries and predecessors, rather than in relation to his own 
earlier works. As far as the very limited period covered by this. thesis is 
concerned, chronology has been preserved to the extent of discussing the 
late novels in their order of composition rather than of first publication. 
In preparing this thesis I have generally adopted the recommen~ations 
of the MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations 
(New York: r~LA, 1977). The most important exception to this practice 
concerns punctuation within quotations: I have included within a quotation 
only such punctuation as occurs in the original. Thus full-stops or commas 
belonging to the structure of my sentence rather than to that of the quoted 
sentence have been placed outside the quotation marks. 
Where a work is frequently referred to, I have in general footnoted 
only the first reference, and incorporated furthet' references into the text, 
without announcing my intention of doing so. Where, however, such 
incorporation could have led to confusion, I have resorted to footnotes. 
In this I have allowed considerations of clarity and brevity of reference to 
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outweigh the requirements of absolute consistency. 
I wish to acknowledge most gratefully the guidance of my promoter, 
Prof. J.B. Thompson, whose meticulous supervision of this thesis contributed 
greatly to the clarification of my ideas. He is not, of course, to be held 
responsible for such obscurities as I have persisted in. 
I am also much indebted to Miss E. Oosthuizen for the skill and 
patience with which she deciphered a particularly palimpsestic manuscript. 
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Chapter I 
"What are the Gods?": 
Resolved and Unresolved Irony 
Irony is, as Wayne C. Booth has corrvnented, "a very messy subject."l 
There have been attempts to clear up the mess, notably by Booth himself and 
by D.C. Muecke,2 and this thesis owes much to the terms and distinctions 
made available by such theorists. Unfortunately, however, every ironologist 
has his own ironology, his system naturally varying according to his 
principle of selection. Even a single writer may change his emphasis and 
thus his nomenclature from work to wonk, as Muecke does from The Compass of 
Irony to Irony and the Ironic; indeed, in a single work we may find different 
groupings of irony overlapping with one another. Orientation in relation to 
existing systems can thus at best be a matter of selecting such terms and 
definitions as best suit one's purpose; since the intention of this chapter 
is neither to develop an alternative taxonomy of irony nor to give a complete 
account of existing taxonomies, I shall ignore distinctions that do not bear 
upon the substance of my argument. 
Since this study is by its nature restricted to irony as it occurs in 
literature, it will exclude what Muecke calls "Situational Irony", which, 
according to him, "does not imply an ironist but merely 'a condition of 
affai rs' or 'outcome of events' ~Ihi ch ••. is seen and felt to be iron ic. ,,3 
This is perhaps the loosest form of irony: depending on the observer (or 
reporter), almost any incongruous or even unintentionally apt event can be 
"seen and felt to be ironic", from a library being named after an illiterate 
to a town being washed away after a day of prayer for rain. As Booth remarks, 
"The irony is that such ironies, defined with such ironic indifference to 
precision, multiply on every hand, leaving the ironic critic caught in the 
ironic trap of defining a term that will not stay defined."4 Muecke, writing 
1 A Rhetoric of Irony (London: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 2. 
2 The Compass of Irony (London: Methuen, 1969) and Irony and the Ironic 
(London: Methuen, 1982). 
3 Compass of Irony, p. 42. In Irony and the Ironic he includes this as 
a main type oT"observable irony" (p. 19). 
4 Rhetoric of Irony, p. 2 n. 
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as an ironologist rather than as a literary critic, is more tolerant of this 
type of irony: he merely pOints out that it is a relatively late 
development of the concept, irony up to the end of the eighteenth century 
having been "thought of as essentially intentional and instrumental, someone 
realizing a purpose by using language ironically".5 
Muecke's reference to intention raises more questions than can be 
resolved at this point,6 but the type of irony I shall be concerned with 
can be seen as a variant of this earlier "instrumental" irony in depending 
on the presence of an ironist, that is, "someone ••• using language ironically". 
To narrow this down to language used in a literary work, I shall refer to it 
as "literary irony". Situational irony can, of course, appear in a literary 
work, in which case it becomes a feature of literary irony, since the 
situation is being presented by an ironist: whereas the irony of a man's 
eviction from the house he has given his daughter lies purely in the situation, 
it becomes a literary irony when someone writes a play about it. 
Literary irony can for my purposes be divided into structural and non-
structural, or "local", ironies. Structural irony is, as the name indicates, 
a function of the development of the"work in which it occurs, and can only 
be appreciated in terms of the whole work. The best-known form of such 
irony is dramatic irony. Lady Macbeth's "A little water clears us of this 
deed"? is not self-evidently ironic: its "effect is dependent on its 
complement in the sleep-walking scene. As Muecke puts it, in a slightly 
different context, "Until an ironic message is interpreted as intended it 
has only the sound of one hand clapping"8; and a structural irony can be 
thus interpreted only with knowledge of its context. 
Local irony, on the other hand, inheres in a statement, description or 
situation of which the ironic point is immediately apparent, at any rate to 
the acute reader. The most famous example of this, without which no study 
of irony is complete, is Jane Austen's opening sentence to Pride and 
Prejudice: "It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in 
possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a wife. ,,9 Such local 
5 Irony and the Ironic, p. 19. 
6 I discuss the problem of "Intention" in Chapter III. 
7 Macbeth, II, ii. 67. 
8 Irony and the Ironic, p. 39. 
9 Pride and Prejudice, ed. with introd. Tony Tanner (1813; rpt. 
Harmondsworth: Penguln, 1972), p. 51. 
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irony is sometimes called "verbal irony", but the term is probably best 
avoided, since it can also be used (and is used by Muecke) to refer to any 
form of irony that uses words as its medium, in other words any non-
situational irony. 
3 
For my purposes structural irony can be further divided into "resolved 
irony" and "unresolved irony", a distinction which the rest of this chapter 
will attempt to clarify. Since these types of irony are defined in terms of 
what happens to them, as it were, in the process of the work, they need to 
be demonstrated by reference to certain key works of literature. Such a 
demonstration will occupy most of this chapter, but it may be useful first 
to describe both types in purely theoretical terms. 
The most general quality of all literary irony is the double or multiple 
awareness upon which it is posited: the responsive reader notes the 
apparent meaning of a statement or situation, rejects it as inadequate in 
terms of the total context, and reconstructs a full meaning. This new 
meaning will incorporate the inadequate meaning: it consists more often of 
a tension between two simultaneous meanings than of a simple substitution of 
the "correct" meaning for the "incorrect". It is this pattern, with the 
concomitant pleasure derived by the reader {or spectator) from his 
intellectual command of an ambiguous situation, that has characterised irony 
from its earliest occurrences, even before the word existed, as Muecke 
points out: 
The phenomenon was responded to before it ·was named and 
consequently before there could have been a concept of itl" and 
the word existed before it was applied to the phenomenon. 0 
As for the word itself, its origins in early Greek comedy point to a similar 
delight in the ability to see beyond the apparently simple meaning of a 
situation, a delight shared in Greek comedy by the spectator and the stock 
character of the eiron. The eiron was, of course, 
the natural antagonist of another stock figure, the boastful alazon, 
who sought to achieve his ends by deception through exaggeratlon. 
10 Irony and the Ironic, p. 15. Muecke cites an example of what we 
woul d ca 11 1 rony from the Odyssey. 
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The eiron was an underdog - small and frail, but sly and 
resourceful; he regularly triumphed over the bullying alazon 
by his ingenuity, his skill in dissembling his knowledge and his 
powers. 11 
4 
The "skill in dissembling his knowledge and his powers" has survived in the 
modern eiron, that is, the author who "pretends" to mean something simpler 
than he in fact does: Jane Austen pretending to accept as a "truth" the 
wishful thinking of mothers with marriageable daughters, or Shakespeare 
allowing Lady r·racbeth to believe that a murder is expunged by washing one's 
hands. In both cases, the reader, like the spectator of Greek comedy, shares 
with the author the sense of superior insight. In the case of a local irony 
such as Jane Austen's, however, the alazon becomes a theoretical fiction: 
our pleasure in decoding the irony presumes, in a sense, the existence of 
somebody (Mrs Bennet? A literal-minded reader?) imperceptive enough to be 
misled by Jane Austen's straight face. The alazon of a dramatic irony, on 
the other hand, is readily identifiable; we experience the irony as a 
tension between the ignorance or blindness of the alazon and the insight of 
. the eiron, whose privileged position we are allowed to share. From this it 
will be obvious that the alazon has lost most of his original boastful 
character. An element of it may remain, in some cases, in the form of a 
certain presumptuous confidence, but in general the essential quality of the 
alazon is simply the ignorance that makes him vulnerable to the eiron. 
The distinction between resolved and unresolved irony is based on 
whether or not the alazon eventually overcomes his blindess. In the former 
he moves, in the course of the work, towards the insight which has supplied 
the necessary opposite pole to his ignorance. As he reaches that insight, 
the tension disappears and the irony is extinguished. The name "resolved 
irony" is intended to stress this element of extinction: it implies 
completion, but unlike the word completed, which etymologically contains the 
idea of filling up, resolved has etymological undertones of loosening and 
disintegration. 
been in discord 
The musical meaning of resolved is also appropriate: 
with the values or insights implied by the work, the 
having 
protagonist's actions are resolved into concord. Resolved irony thus 
corresponds closely to Muecke's term Specific Irony, one of the qualities of 
1\ H.M. C[hevalier], "Irony", Dictionary of ~Iorld Literature,ed. 
Joseph T. Shipley, new and rev. ed. (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams and 
Co., 1968), p. 233. 
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which is that "When the victim is dealt with the incident is closed, the 
irony is over."12 It also has much in common with Booth's category of 
·stable irony": 
••• the stable irony with which we shall now wrestle does not 
mock our efforts by making general claims about the ironic 
universe, or the universe of human discourse. It does not say, 
"There is no truth" •..• On the contrary, it delimits a world of 
discourse in which we can say with great security certain things 
that are violated by the overt words of the discourse. 13 
5 
The difference between this and resolved irony is, of course, that stable 
irony need have no structural significance whatsoever: Jane Austen's opening 
sentence and Lady Macbeth's statement are equally stable in that "we can say 
with great security certain things that are violated by the overt words of 
the di scourse." 
The simplest distinction between resolved and unresolved irony is that 
in the latter type the alazon never achieves the insight necessary to defuse 
the irony. In practice this often, though not invariably, means that the 
values which the protagonist transgresses are less overtly defined in the 
work; in extreme cases we may be left with a pervasive irony that denies the 
possibility of any stable value. In such cases the irony is defined not by 
placing the protagonist's aberration against a fixed value, but often by 
undercutting the protagonist's illusion of a fixed value with the depiction 
of a reality incapable of accommodating such a value. In this respect 
unresolved irony approaches Muecke's category of General Irony, which is a 
vision of "life itself or any general aspect of life ..• as fundamentally 
and inescapably an ironic state of affairs" .14 Muecke's General Irony, 
however, is not necessarily a structural or even a literary irony: it 
inheres in a particular "state of affairs", whether or not that state is 
depicted in literature. For Muecke, the "General" nature of the irony is 
partly a matter of its subject matter, its "province" being "not so much the 
manners of men as 'the morals of the Uni verse' " . 15 Unresolved irony, on 
the other hand, is defined by reference to its outcome in the work; "the 
12 Compass of Irony, p. 119. 
13 Rhetoric of Irony, p. 6. 
14 Compass of Irony, p. 120. 
15 Compass of Irony, p. 120. 
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manners of men" may also give 
of Henry James demonstrate. 
rise to unresolved ironies, as the late novels 
Wayne Booth's category of ·unstable 
both General Irony and unresolved irony, 
i roni es" resembles, in many respects, 
but an important difference, for my 
purposes, lies in the indeterminacy of meaning he ascribes to unstable 
ironies: 
••• the truth asserted or implied is that no stable reconstruction 
"can be made out of the ruins revealed through the irony. The 
author - insofar as we can discover him, and he is often very 
remote indeed - refuses to declare himself, however subtly, for any 
stable proposition, even the opposite of whatever proposition-Kis 
irony vigorously denies. The only sure affirmation is that 
negation that begins all ironic play: "this affirmation must be 
rejected," leaving the possibility, and ~nfinite ironies the 
clear implication, that since the universe (or at least the universe 
of discourse) is inherently absurd, all statements are subject to 
ironic undermining. No statement can really "mean what it says. "16 
Whereas certain instances of unresolved irony may well lead to such a denial 
of all stable meaning, it need not produce such a total collapse of meaning 
as is envisaged by Booth. Indeed, it is central to my argument that an 
understanding of unresolved "irony may enable us to extract a clearer meaning 
from certain works than is yielded by expectations of resolution. The 
meaning may well not be as finite as that implied by resolved irony; but it 
is determinate enough to be sho~m to be founded on the text. The most 
notable example of this for me is The Golden Bowl, whose notorious elusiveness 
I believe to be due to the lack of resolution of its ironies, but whose 
meaning similarly resides in that lack of resolution. 
The clearest approach to unresolved irony probably lies through the 
more positively defined area of resolved irony, which has the further 
advantage, for purposes of demonstration, of being represented by some of 
the most famous of "ironical" works. What has come to be regarded as the 
archetypal ironical work, Sophocles' King Oedipus, may serve as the prototype 
of resolved irony. In this play, the famous irony that Oedipus, in seeking 
to escape his destiny, unwittingly fulfils that destiny, is secondary to the 
irony actually enacted in the play: Oedipus, in seeking the cause of the 
16 Rhetoric of Irony. p. 240-41. 
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plague upon Thebes, is unwittingly searching for himself. His discovery of 
the identity of the murderer of Laius constit.utes, in a different sense, his 
discovery of his own identity. I4hat the audience see is a man slowly moving 
towards the knowledge they themselves possess, and the resolution of the 
irony occurs when Oedipus arrives at that knowledge. The irony is 
horrifically emphasized by his blinding of himself at the moment of vision. 
In King Oedipus, then, the pattern of resolved irony may be seen in its 
starkest form: the movement from blindness to insight, with the irony, felt 
as the tension between the knowledge of the audience and the ignorance of 
the alazon, resolved at the moment of insight, as the protagonist achieves 
equality with the audience. 
Related to this achievement of equality is the stable and shared scale 
of values underlying the irony. Oedipus has sinned against a code accepted 
alike by himself, Jocasta,Creon, the citizens of Thebes and the audience; it 
is Oedipus' acceptance of his own guilt in terms of this communal code that 
makes possible the resolution. If we were to question the justice of Oedipus' 
fate on the grounds of his ignorance, the focus of the irony would change 
decisively: instead of a man moving inexorably towards a knowledge we possess 
in advance, the play would present the victim of a cosmic practical joke 
groping towards a revelation of the full horror of the joke and, in assuming 
responsibility for deeds engineered from above, abjectly failing even to see 
his own victimisation. His destiny would become as absurd as that of 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern in Tom Stoppard's play. 
This more "modern" interpretation may of course present itself as the 
obvious one to the modern reader, as anybody will know who has discussed the 
play with students. Such readers may fail to be intimidated even by a 
classical scholar's brisk dismissal of their anachronistic sense of justice: 
The question of acting in ignorance need not detain us, since for 
Sophocles in this play, as for Aeschylus, psycho-physical 
defilement follows the deed without regard to intention. 17 
There will always be readers who reject this kind of scholarship as 
irrelevant to their experience of the play, and maintain that the work means 
more to them as a comment on the absurdity of existence than as a revelation 
17 John Jones, On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy (London: Chatta and 
Windus, 1968), p. 206. 
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of human blindness. This is a privilege one cannot deny them; but it is in my 
interests to dissociate myself from this kind of reversal. lest my tracing of 
unresolved ironies in other works appear equally arbitrary. A truly 
unresolved irony is not simply a resolved irony turned on its head: it needs 
to be supported much more strongly by the text than my hypothethical "modern" 
reading of the Oedipus is. Such a reading. in fact. destroys the shape of 
the tragedy. dependent as that is on the process of enlightenment. and puts 
in its place an interpretation based on nothing more demonstrable than what 
we "feel" about Oedipus' situation. There is no support in the play for the 
view that Oedipus has been unjustly treated. He accepts without question his 
guilt and the enormity of his sin: 
Incestuous sin! Breeding where I was bred! 
Father. brother, and son; bride. wife, and mcther; 
Confounded in one monstrous matrimony! 
All human filthiness in one crime compounded! 18 
Against this is placed no exculpation on the grounds of ignorance. Having 
moved out of line with the values of the community as embodied in the play. 
he moves back into line - or, to exploit the musical meaning of the word 
"resolved", having been in dis.cord with those values, his actions are 
resolved into concord. Oedipus, the once proud and imperious ruler, accepts 
the will of Creon and the citizens with absolute humility. The question of 
the justice of Oedipus' fate is not introduced overtly; in Oedipus at 
Colonus, on the other hand, where the question does serve Sophocles' dramatic 
purpose, it is openly stated: 
Or tell me: if my father was foredoomed 
By the voice of heaven to die by his own son's hand, 
How can you justly cast it against me, 
Who was sti 11 unborn when that decree ~Ias spoken? 
Unborn? Nay, unbegotten, unconceived, 
And if, being born, as I was, for this calamity, 
I chanced to meet my father and to kill him, 
Not knowing who he was or what I did -
How can you hold the unwitting act against me?19 
18 Sophocles, King Oedipus in The Theban Plays, trans. with introd. 
LF. Watling (HarmoMslvorth: Penguin;-l9irn, p. 64,11, 1405-08. 
19 Oedipus at Colonus, The Theban Plays, p. 101,11, 968-76. 
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Even here, Oedipus is not accusing the gods: he is angrily exculpating 
himself to Creon. But the point is that such an exculpation, if inserted 
into King Oedipus, would have deflected the impact of the discovery, and left 
the irony unresolved. In that the resolution is dependent upon our not 
questioning the code by which the protagonist is judged, resolved irony 
resembles Specific Irony, which Muecke describes as involving 
single exposures of aberrancy in a world otherwise safely moving 
on the right track, or at least in a world whose own possible 
aberrancy was, for the purposes of the 1rony, not 1n quest1on ..•. 
When the v1ct1m 1S dealt w1th the 1nc1dent 1S closed, the 1rony is 
over. In these instances of irony the victim is isolated; he is 
'in the wrong' and over against him are the rest of society or 
mankind who are' in the right' and safe .... 
[Specific Irony] is characteristic of, though by no means confined 
to, a society w1th a more or less 'closed ideology', that is a 
society whose values are more or less established~ whose members, 
as a body, are 'assured of certain certainties'.2u 
Thus the possible shortcomings of the "closed ideology" upon which Specific 
or resolved irony is based are "for the purposes of the irony, not in 
question". It is this point that my factitious "modern" interpretation of 
King Oedipus was intended to demonstrate: this type of irony requires 
something for the protagonist to offend agalnst. and somewhere for him to 
return to after his aberration - even if, as in the case of Oedipus, that 
"return" paradoxically consists of banishment. 
The need to accept that the protagonist is isolated by his aberrancy 
from "the rest of society or mankind who are 'in the right' and safe" may 
seem to suggest that resolved irony is based on an unyielding, even smug 
piety. We need go no further than King Oedipus, though. to see that this is 
not necessarily the case: "established" values need not exclude compassion. 
a fact to which Sophocles' plays owe much of their power. Although his plays 
move towards a reconciliation of human suffering with the divine will. he 
never denies the reality of that suffering. The words of Odysseus in the 
Ajax upon seeing his enemy. Ajax. humiliated by a gloating Athena, may serve 
to sum up the quality and source of this compassion: 
20 Compass of Iront. pp. 119-20. My underlining. 
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I think of him, yet also of myself; 
For I see the true state of all us that live -
We are dim shapes, no more, and weightless shadow.21 
Resolved irony. in other words, though it tends towards conformity, need not 
lack complexity. 
It is in Aeschylus, however, that the potential complexities of resolved 
irony are most fully realised. The Oresteia is explicitly concerned with the 
conflict between apparent absolutes: fidelity to one value involves 
transgression of another. Thus every act, unlike the acts of Oedipus, becomes 
susceptible to two scales of value, in such a way as to threaten the stability 
of a community based on "a more or less 'closed ideology'''. Consequently, the 
ironies are not simple dramatic ironies revealing only the ignorance of the 
character uttering them. They are, in other words, based not only on the 
tension between ignorance and knowledge but also on the tension between two 
rival ethical claims. 
One scene from the Agamemnon will serve to demonstrate the involved 
nature of the ironies generated by this conflict. Clytemnestra, triumphant 
in her killing of Agamemnon, answers the concern of the chorus over the lack 
of funeral rites with bitter scarcasm: 
CLYTEMNESTRA: 
But, as is fit, his daughter 
Shall meet him near the porchway 
Of those who perished young; 
His loved Iphigenia 
With loving arms shall greet him, 
And gagged and silent tongue. 
CHORUS: 
Reproach answers reproach; truth darkens still. 
She strikes the striker; he who dared to kill 
Pays the full forfeit. While Zeus holds his throne, 
This maxim holds on earth: the sinner dies. 
That ii god's law. Oh, who can exorcIze 
This breeding curse, this canker that has grown 
Into these walls, to plague them at its will? 
21 Sophocles, Ajax, trans. John Moore, from Sophocles II, ed. David 
Grene and Richard LatITmore (Chicago: University OTL:hicago Proess, 1957), 
p. 13, 11. 124-26. 
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CLYTEMNESTRA: 
The sinner dies: you have reached the truth at last. 
Now to the Powers that persecute 
Our race I offer a sworn pact: 
With this-harsh deed and bitter fact 
I am content; let them forget the past, 
reave us for ever, ana-oppress 
Some other house with murderous wickedness. 
I ask no weight of wealth; 
For me it will suffice 
To purchase, at this price, 
For our long sickness, health. 
Enter AEGISTHUS 
AEGISTHUS: 
o happy day, when Justice comes into her own! 
Now I believe that gods, who dwell above the earth 
See what men suffer, and award a recompense: 
Here, tangled in a net the avenging Furies wove, 
He lies, a sight to warm my heart; and pays his blood 
In full atonement for his father's treacherous crime. 22 
11 
Thus the outrage of the chorus, .not only at the murder of Agamemnon, but also 
at the absence of fitting funeral rites, is mockingly met on both charges: 
Agamemnon has got and will get what is "fit" for a man who has killed .his 
daughter. Accustomed to an unambiguous socio-religious norm, the chorus have 
the double awareness of irony, with its characteristic questioning of 
absol utes, thrust upon them: "Reproach answers reproach; truth darkens 
stil1." They almost instinctively move towards an absolute to assuage their 
perplexity; their heavily reinforced appeals to divine authority are clearly 
intended to ward off the darkness: "Whil e Zeus holds hi s throne ,/Thi s maxim 
holds on earth: the sinner dies./That is God's law." The statement is, like 
all maxims, very general; but Agamemnon's death being the death at issue, 
"God's law" puts them into Clytemnestra's camp; she, at any rate, 
triumphantly seizes upon their maxim to vindicate herself: "the sinner dies: 
you have reached the truth at last." 
This "truth" is defective only in begging the question of who the sinner 
is, and if for strategic reasons Clytemnestra can not afford to admit that 
she real i ses thi s, her offer of a pact with "the Powers that persecute/Our 
race" nevertheless shows an unesasy awareness of her succession to a bloody 
22 Aeschylus, Agamemnon in The Oresteian Trilogy, trans. with introd. 
Philip Vellacott (Harmondsworth: Penguln, 1956), pp. 96-97. 11. 1555-84. 
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inheritance. The pact she offers is almost naively one-sided: "i am content; 
let them forget the past"; and her concession ("I ask no weight of wealth") 
all too evidently an attempt to "purchase, at this price" immunity from the 
principle she has just invoked. 
Her claim to divine sanction is shaken rather than reinforced by the 
triumphant entry of Aegisthus. In essentials they agree, of course: 
Agamemnon's death was ordained by the gods. But he advances a different 
justification: "his father's treacherous crime." And the "net the avenging 
Furies wove" was in fact woven by Clytemnestra for reasons unconnected (i n 
her mind, at least) with that crime. The gods may well have settled two 
scores with one death, of course, and two people may desire the death of the 
same person for different reasons; but the different interpretations, both 
valid as far as they 90,23 by their very vehemence attempt to divert 
attention from the unspoken common motive behind the common purpose: 
Aegisthus' usurpation of Agamemnon's throne and bed. It is this silent 
knowledge that charges his statement, as it does Clytemnestra's self-
vindication, with the main dramatic irony of the scene: 
gods, who dVle 11 above the earth, 
see what men suffer, and award a recompense. 
The stage is set for the entry of Orestes. 
The ironies permeating this scene are resolved on one level when 
Clytemnestra and Aegisthus are killed by Orestes, and the justice of the gods 
whom they have invoked thus descends upon them. The pattern is similar to 
that of King Oedipus, but here the irony is only a local incidence of a deeper 
irony, which remains unresolved until the end of the trilogy: an act can be 
both right and wrong at the same time. 
This is the dilemma confronting Orestes, as appears from his interchange 
with his mother: the stichomythia, a form perfectly adapted to the 
juxtaposing of rival claims, CUlminates in Clytemnestra's desperate threat 
and Orestes' unanswerable rejoinder: 
23 Aegisthus' claim is in fact exactly the same as that of Orestes: 
he is avenging a crime against his father, to which the Furies, as guardians 
of the blood-tie, compel him. 
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CLYTEMNESTRA: 
Beware the hounding Furies of a mother's curse 
ORESTES: 
How shall I escape my father's curse if I relent?24 
The dilemma is embodied in the Furies who will pursue Orestes once he has 
killed his mother - and would have pursued him had he not killed her. 
13 
To the modern mind this seems like a prima facie case against the gods, 
a demonstration of the unresolved absurdity of a universe in which man is a 
stranger, and free only to rebel, however futilely.25 To Aeschylus, however, 
the fate of the individual is secondary to the need to resolve the conflict: 
the deadlock must be broken if the house of Atreus, representative of human 
society, is not to be utterly destroyed. 
Nevertheless, the trilogy is not concerned only with the apparently 
impossible demands of the Furies: against these implacable "old gods" are 
set the Olympian gods, Apollo and Athena, representing what seems to us a 
more humane and rational justice. But again it would be a mistake to see 
them as superseding the Furies, as the New Testament is sometimes seen to 
supersede the Old. The hideous appearance of the Furies does emphasize the 
unattractive aspect of the savage principl~ of justice they pursue ("evil for 
evil"), but they cannot simply be disregarded. They make it clear that 
society ignores them at its peril, and their claim is taken seriously, their 
place in society eventually guaranteed by Athena's offer of a shrine in 
Athens. 
The trial of Orestes is thus not a victory for either side: the human 
jurors are divided, and the deadlock remains. Aeschylus resolves the 
opposition between rationality and 
incorporating the two principles: 
retribution by coming to terms with it and 
society needs the implacable punishment of 
wrongdoers to protect the just, as Athena admits in her entreaty to the Furies: 
Sternly weed out the impious, lest their rankness choke 
The flOlver of goodness. I woul d not have just men's 1 i ves 
Troubled Ivith villainy.26 
24 The Choephori in The Oresteian Trilogy, p. 137, 11. 925-26. 
25 See, for instance, Jean-Paul Sartre's reworking of the Orestes myth, 
Les Mouches, of whose burden this statement is a rough summary. 
26 The Eumenides in The Oresteian Trilogy, p. 177,11. 907-08. 
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The renaming of the Erinyes (Furies) to E.umenides (Kindly Ones) is more than 
an exercise in public relations: it is a recognition of the double aspect 
of the oldest of society's principles, the bond of blood, as celebrated by 
the Furies: 
Let all together find 
Joy in each other; 
And each both love and hate with the same mind 
As his blood-brother; 
For this heals many hurts of humankind. (pp. 179-80, 11. 983-87) 
The trilogy can end on an affirmation of reconciliation, of conflict resolved: 
Thus God and Fate are reconciled. 
Then let every voice 
Crown our song with a shout of joy! (p. 182, 11. 1045-1047) 
Thus, although the acquittal of Orestes does not in itself settle 
anything except his personal fate and that of his house, the subsequent 
reconciliation of "God and Fate" does reassert a stable scheme which had been 
violated by the history of the house of Atreus. The multiple ironies of the 
trilogy can be seen to have derived from this disruption, and to have strained 
towards this unironic celebration. It is necessary, though, to stress the 
word "strained": we feel that the resolution has been achieved against the 
powerful drift towards negation. The "modern" reading so inappropriate to 
King Oedipus becomes a real possibility, though a possibility averted, in the 
Oresteia. 
Of the three extant Greek tragedians, it is of course Euripides who has 
proved most congenial to the modern mind, a phenomenon which Philip Vellacott 
ascribes to 
the differences which divided Euripides from his contemporaries, 
and which similarly in our day separate the radical thinker not 
only from the masses but from many of the more traditional minds 
among his fellow-intellectuals; ... the more significant gulf lies 
not between the ancient world and ours, but between the lonely 
critic of society and the average member of society in any 
century.27 
27 Ironic Drama (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 15. As 
will become apparent, my reading of Euripides has been heavily influenced by 
Vellacott. Controversial as his interpretations are, they seem to me 
consistent and cogent. 
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The circumstances of Euripides' life, to confine myself to those for the 
time being, would seem to support Vellacott's analogy. His self-imposed 
exile from a troubled Athens prefigures the migrations of Conrad, Lawrence, 
Joyce, James and T.S. Eliot - to limit the list to the early and major 
representatives of this displacement. Furthermore, the lack of appreciation 
for Euripides amongst his contemporaries, followed by his great popularity 
after his death, reminds us of the novelists of the turn of our century who 
no longer felt themselves identified with their public to the same extent as 
their immediate predecessors. We are told that Sophocles appeared publicly 
in mourning for Euripides upon report of his death; the fact that this was 
noted and handed down suggests that it was seen as an act of courage, 
something like E.M. Forster's generous tribute to Lawrence upon the latter's 
death. 28 
These parallels, of course, do not "prove" anything, but they do put 
into sharper perspective Euripides' relative estrangement from those communal 
values which we have seen the earlier Greek dramatists to maintain, with 
whatever difficulty. If there is validity in the connection I have suggested 
between the values available to an author and the nature of his irony, we 
can expect Euripides to resort more and more to unresolved irony. 
A useful comparison with the Oresteia is offered by Euripides' handling 
of the same material in his Orestes. Most of the doubts felt by a modern 
reader in the face of Orestes' dilemma are in fact spelled out, in all 
bitterness, by Electra at the beginning of Euripides' play: 
Then Apollo spoke. 
He induced Orestes - was the god wrong? Why should I 
Accuse him? - to perform an action which has not 
Gained universal applause: to kill his own mother. 
And yet he killed her in obedience to Apollo .... 29 
Orestes himself, in his confrontation with Menelaus, has fewer scruples in 
accusing Apollo: 
28 Letter to the Nation and Athenaeum, 29 March 1930, rpt. in 
H. Coombs, ed., D.H. Lawrence: A Critical. Anthology (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1973): " ... no one who ar-fe-nates both 1i1rSGrundy arid Aspasia can hope for 
a good obituary press." (p. 219). 
29 Euripides, Orestes in Orestes and Other Plays, trans. Philip 
Vellacott (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), p. 301, 11. 28-32. 
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ORESTES: 
What are the gods? We don't know - but we are their slaves. 
MENELAUS: 
Well, you obeyed him; doesn't he now come to your help? 
ORESTES [sarcastically]: 
16 
Oh yes - he's going to help me. That's the way of gods. (pp. 314-
15, 11. 418-20) 
From the start then, the command of the god is not, as in Aeschylus, merely 
inscrutable, hiding a larger purpose, but irrational and suspect. Even 
Orestes, in his sane moments, can recognize that the vengeance wrought in his 
father's name was futile: 
I believe my father, had I asked him face to face 
~Jhether I ought to kill her, would have gripped my hand 
And begged, implored me not to lift a sword against 
My mother, since that could not bring him back to life, 
While it doomed me to the agonies I now endure. (p. 310, 11. 287-91) 
The chorus confirm this view, by describing revenge as insanity: 
Pitiful son, what is this agony, 
This blood-hunt, this persecution? 
There is a fi end of vengeance 
That drowns your life in tears, 
Sinks your house in your mother's 
Destroys your mind with madness. 
blood, 
(p. 311, 11. 332-37) 
Later their condemnation of his act and of the whole attitude that underlies 
revenge is even more explicit: 
'Crime in a just cause' is an impious sophistry, 
An insanity breeding in evil hearts. (11. 823-24) 
In Aeschylus this sentiment might have been uttered anxiously, as one of the 
terms of the debate \~hich the trilogy dramatises; here it is an 
uncompromising rejection. In fact, like so much else in Euripides' play, 
this statement ~lOuld seem to be a reply to a question raised by the Oresteia, 
in this case the interchange between Electra and the chorus in The Choephori: 
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CHORUS: 
Pray simply, 'Let one come to shed blood for blood shed.' 
ELECTRA: 
Would not a prayer like that seem impious to the gods? 
CHORUS: 
Why? Evil for evil is no impiety. (p. 108, 11. 124-26) 
17 
The rejection of this view in the Orestes provides such moral guidance as we 
have in a play remarkably destitute of moral positives. It is in the light 
of the chorus' revulsion from the idea of "Crime in a just cause" that we must 
interpret the degeneration of the hitherto pitiable Orestes and Electra, 
under the tutelage of Py1ades, into psychopathic killers. 
Orestes and Electra, having been sentenced to death by an assembly of 
citizens, irrationally turn their resentment on Menelaus, who was not even 
present at the assembly, and who can at most be accused of not giving them 
assistance (which it was arguably not in his power to give). By the logic of 
revenge, it is an easy step from this to the plot to kill the defenceless 
Helen. Neither of the men has ever met her, but they pronounce upon her 
frivolity with a confidence born, presumably, of trust in the kind of 
popular opinion which has just sentenced Orestes and Electra to death: 
PYLADES: 
Let's kill Helen - and send Menelaus raving mad. 
ORESTES: 
How can we do it? I'm ready, if the plan will work. 
PYLADES: 
Why, with a sword. She's here now, hiding in your house. 
ORESTES: 
She is, yes - making a list of all the valuables. 
PYLADES: 
When she gets Hades for a lover, she'll stop that. (p. 339, 11. 
1127-31) 
This salacious moral ising would have been unpleasant enough even if Helen 
had been everything the young men assume her to be; but, as Vellacott points 
out, the only scene in which Helen appears establishes her as a mature and 
compassionate woman, by whose side Electra seems at best strident, at worst 
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deranged. Certainly Electra's refinement upon Py1ades' plan - using the 
gentle Hermione as hostage and if necessary cutting her throat - shows her 
to be in every way the equal of these inventive males. She thus refutes 
Py1ades' chauvinistic generalisation "I've no faith in women" (1. 1125), as 
Orestes points out approvingly: 
Oh, what a manly spirit and resolve shines out 
From your weak woman's body! (p. 342, 11. 1203-04) 
A manly spirit, we remember from the Oresteia, was what Clytemnestra died for; 
here it qual ifies Electra to become Py1ades' prize: 
Py1ades, this is the wife you'll die to lose, 
Or live to win as a rich blessing on your house. (11. 1205-06) 
The "rich blessing" of such a wife is in fact what Apollo bestows upon Py1ades 
when he appears at the end to hand out the prizes. It is not the only element 
of the ostensibly "happy" ending that is dissonant with what has gone before; 
the more important one is Apollo's justification of the ways of gods to man 
(and woman): 
For Helen's beauty was to the gods their instrument 
For setting Greeks and Trojans face to face in war 
And multiplying deaths, to purge the bloated earth 
Of its superfl uous we lter of mortality. (p. 359, 11. 1641-44) 
This strikes the modern ear as appall ingly callous. How it would have struck 
an Athenian audience is open to debate, but Ve1lacott argues convincingly 
that the play should be seen as "the poet's last personal address to the 
Athenians" (p. 53) before leaving for Macedon. Certainly the more 
thoughtful citizens of an Athens sated with the bloodshed of the Pe10ponnesian 
War which, by the time the Orestes was produced in 408 B.C., had lurched on 
for twenty-three years, could hardly have been consoled by an assertion that 
the gods were using war "to purge the bloated earth/Of its superfluous welter 
of mortality" - the less so since the Spartans were within sight of Athens 
and seemed likely to reduce a fair number of the Athenians to such 
superfluity. This they did four years later. 
Given, however, the natural human desire for a happy ending, as well as 
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the reluctance of the majority of citizens, then as now, to question the 
meaning of a war to which they have sacrificed so many lives, it seems likely 
that many members of the original audience would have seen no irony in this 
ending. As Vellacott says, "the nature of irony, as Euripides uses it, 
implies that some will see it and some will not" (p. 81). To those who 
didn't see it, the play was probably a sensational spectacle of bloodshed 
with a happy ending; to those who did see it, the play was an expression of 
profound despair at a society that seemed to have gone mad with the desire 
for revenge and bloodshed. 
The ironic reading has the virtue of making sense of the otherwise 
arbitrary reversal whereby Orestes and Electra turn into cold-blooded 
murderers, and the chorus abandon their own insight into the impiety of 
revenge to enter mindlessly into the blood-lust of the main characters, and 
yearn to see "with [their] own eyes/The dead body of Helen bleeding on the 
palace floor" (p. 348, 11. 1360-61). It is in the capitulation of the chorus 
that Ve11acott finds the conclusive evidence for Euripides' disillusionment: 
We may surmise that what drives the poet from his city is not only 
the degeneracy of the state, the vanishing of public glory, but 
the corruption of ordinary people by the miasma of violence. (p.72) 
In this opening out of the play's implications to include the chorus, 
itself not traditionally a moral agent in Greek tragedy, Euripides extends 
the focus of his irory from individual to communal aberration. In Muecke's 
terminology, the Specific Irony becomes General. From the slightly different 
perspective of unresolved irony, it can be said that whereas in the Oresteia 
the chorus ends the play with an affirmation consonant with the developed 
moral meaning, here the discredited chorus can serve no such purpose. In a 
universe where even the gods are shoddy, the ordinary citizen is not likely 
to possess the truth. 
Unresolved irony will thus always by its very nature be problematic: 
since what it reflects is a perplexity which metaphorically, and sometimes 
literally, "drives the poet from his city", the reader is given 1 ittle overt 
guidance. The characters evolve in apparent freedom from a moral pattern, 
and are often at their most unreliable when they claim to have discovered 
such a mora 1 pattern: 
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How justly divine vengeance 
Has fallen upon Helen! (Orestes, p. 348, 11. 1364-65) 
In their complacent equation of human cruelty with divine justice, the chorus 
may stand as representatives of the eternal alazon of unresolved irony: the 
character who believes that whatever is, is right in being explicable in terms 
of a moral or divine purpose. Such a belief need not be merely obtuse, as in 
the case of the chorus: it may take the form of a crude rationalisation of 
blood-lust, as in Pylades' justification of his "honourable" plan (p. 340, 
11. 1132-53); but it may also be pathetic, as in Iphigenia's dignified 
acceptance, in Iphigenia in Aulis, of her father's reasons for sacrificing 
her - reasons that the rest of the play has shown to be false: 
Greeks were born 
To rule Greeks. 
our blood.30 
to rule barbarians, mother, not barbarians 
They are slaves by nature; we have freedom in 
The "freedom" of the Greeks has in fact proved to be so circumscribed by the 
tactical demands of a dubious war that Iphigenia is about to be sacrificed 
against the wish of every major character; while we admire the dignity of 
her capitulation to the inevitable, 11e note. the hollowness of the ideals which 
she has accepted from her elders. The note of confident piety rings false, as 
it does throughout these plays of Euripides, and as it could not have done 
in the plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles. 
The false note of unfounded piety, that is the note of unresolved irony, 
sounds 11henever the religious, moral or philosophical framework available to 
a character (or hi 5 author) can no longer accommodate the reality drama ti sed 
in the work. It is the note we hear centuries later in Chaucer's The Knight'~ 
Tal~, in Theseus' attempt to ascribe Arcite's death to a rational order of 
things: 
What maketh this but Juppiter the king, 
That is Prince and cause of alle thing, 
30 Iphigenia in Aulis in Orestes and Other Plays, p. 419, 11. 1399-400. 
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Converting al unto his propre welle, 
From which he is derived, sooth to telle?31 
Since Chaucer has taken pains to present Arcite's death as caused not by 
Jupiter, but by the malignant Saturn, in order to settle a squabble amongst 
the gods, Theseus' claim seems like pious nonsense. Even the comprehensive 
framework of Boethius' De Consolatione to which Chaucer allows him access, 
fails to accommodate and resolve the ironies that have been generated. In 
spite of Theseus' elaborate justification of the ways of the gods to man, 
Palamon's simple lament is not disposed of: 
What governance is in this prescience 
That giltelees tormenteth innocence? (p. 48, I, 455-56)32 
Since the ironic mode adopted by an author is a function of his deepest 
beliefs, it would seem safe to assume, as I have been doing, that a single 
author writes in either a "resolved" or an "unresolved" mode. But it is of 
course possible that an author may have found certain questions more amenable 
to resolution than others, or may at different times have responded 
differently to the same questions - as is shown, for instance, by the 
disparity between the attitudes to truth, and thus the very different courses 
run by the ironies in Ibsen's The Pillars of the Community and The Wild Duck. 
It is even possible for a single work to contain two patterns of irony, one 
resolved and one unresolved, leading to almost infinite self-qualifications. 
It is with a certain consciousness of predictability that one offers 
Shakespeare as the terminus of such a preamble; but if a discussion of some 
of his plays is unlikely to reveal hitherto unsuspected aspects of his genius, 
it may neverthel~ss provide insights into the effects of irony that will be 
of value in my discussion of Henry James. The "mixed" nature of Shakespeare's 
ironies, for instance, may shed some light on James' practice in The Wings 
of the Dove, while his mastery of both comedy and tragedy may provide insight 
31 Chaucer 's Poetry: An Anthology for the Modern Reader, 2nd ed., ed. 
E.T. DonaTc!Son, p. 102, 11. 2117-80. 
32 For a strong statement of this view, see Elizabeth Salter, Chaucer: 
The Knight's Tale and The Clerk's Tale (London: Edward Arnold, 1962,-:---ror a 
contrary view, see-cnarles Muscatine, Chaucer and the French Tradition 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957)---p:182l: "The actlons and 
speeches by the central figure are the normative ones ... , it is Theseus who 
expounds the resolutions." 
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into their relation to each other and to irony that will be relevant to a 
discussion of The Golden Bowl. 
Unresolved irony, as we have seen, occurs when the interpretation 
offered of an event appears to be merely an evasion of the complex reality 
it presumes to pronounce upon. What Edgar finds to say about Gloucester's 
suffering in King Lear must stand as a classic of the type: 
The gods are just, and of our pleasant vices 
Make instruments to plague us. (V. iii. 170-70 
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This takes its place readily with the chorus' "How justly divine vengeance/ 
Has fallen upon Helen" in the Orestes, and with Theseus' "What maketh this 
but Juppiter the king ... ?" In all these cases, the speaker ascribes a 
stable pattern to an unstable reality. At best this seems facile, at worst 
callous - and in Edgar's statement, with its sick variant on the "eye for an 
eye" concept of justice, rendered even more unpleasant by the inverted 
salaciousness of puritanism: "The dark and vicious place where thee he got/ 
Cost him his eyes." (V. iii. 172-73). 
By Edgar's philosophy, we get what we.deserve, and the irony lies in our 
blindness to the fate we are preparing for ourselves - a callous version of 
the Oedipus pattern, in short. Whatever the merits of Edgar's motives, his 
reasoning fundamentally resembles the attitude underlying Regan's refusal to 
prevent her father fr~~ venturing out into the storm: 
o sir, to ~Ji lfu 1 men 
The injuries that they themselves procure 
Must be their schoolmasters. Shut up your doors. (II. ii. 301-03) 
In Gloucester's despairing view, on the other hand, no such heuristic 
intention inheres in the scheme of things: man is the victim of malign 
powers, and the irony lies in his blindness to the ultimate meaninglessness 
of the suffering \'Ihich he tries to understand: 
As f1 ies to \'Ianton boys, are we to th' gods, 
They ki 11 us for thei r sport. (IV. i. 36-37) 
The conflict between such statements is not exceptional in itself - the 
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Greek tragedies contain many such - but what distinguishes King Lear is that 
the play seems to drarMtise both these interpretations of human suffering 
impartially, in that it contains a double pattern of irony. It would need a 
full analysis of the play to show with what consistency the double vision is 
sustained; I can here only mention a few of the key terms that in their 
ambiguity express the two-sidedness of the play's universe. 
"Is there any cause in nature that make these hard hearts?" (III. vi. 
75) asks Lear; whereas Edmund, by claiming "Thou, Nature, art my goddess" 
(I. ii. 1) would seem to suggest that making hard hearts is what nature is 
best at. On the other hand, Lear is reminded that he has 
one daughter 
Who redeems nature from the general curse 
Which twain have brought her to. (IV. vi. 208-210) 
In that man is also an animal, it is as "natural" to be cruel as to be kind. 
If he is more than the animals by virtue of his reason, which can restrain 
his cruelty, the same reason also enables him to exercise that cruelty with 
a calculated ingenuity of which animals are incapable. In spite of all 
the animal images in the play, the most telling image of cruelty remains 
that of "wanton boys" killing flies for "sport". The play supplies no clear 
answer to Lear's question "Is man no more than this?" (III. iv. 100-01): 
even "more" is a paradoxical concept in a world where Cordelia's "Nothing" 
(1. i. 86), has been opposed to G oneril 's "more" (1. i. 54), and where it is 
possible to be "most rich, being poor" (1. i. 250). 
These paradoxes are more than word-play: they are the vehicles of two 
sharply differentiated interpretations of human existence. It is this double 
vi s ion that makes it so peri lous to pronounce on Shakespeare's "worl d view". 
Even as great a critic as A.C. Bradley seems to me to attempt the impossible 
in his scrupulous quest for "the substance of a Shakespearean tragedy, taken 
in abstraction both from its form and from the differences in point of 
substance between one tragedy and another. "33 He finds, at the centre of 
the tragedies, a constant affirmation of a "moral power": 
In Shakespearean tragedy the main source of the convulsion which 
produces suffering and death is never good: good contributes to 
this convulsion only fl'om its tragic implication with its opposite 
in one and the same cha ractel'. The ma i n source, on the contra ry, 
33Shakespearean Tragedy (1904; rpt. London: Macmillan, 1965), p. 1. 
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is in every case evil; and what is more ••.• it is in almost every 
case evil in the fullest sense. not mere imperfection but plain 
moral evil .•.• Tragedy. on this view. is the exhibition of that 
convulsive reaction; and the fact that the spectacle does not leave 
us rebellious or desperate is due to a more or less distinct 
perception that the tragic suffering and death arise from collision. 
not with a fate or blank power. but with a moral power. a power akin 
to all that we admire and revere in the characters themselves. 
(pp. 25-26) 
Though Bradley is not concerned with irony here. his view of the moral 
substance of Shakespearean tragedy has something in common with Muecke's 
description of Specific Irony as involving "single exposures of aberrancy in 
a world otherwise safely on the right track". Where. according to Bradley. 
the "convulsive reaction" is presumably designed to expose and expel the 
evil that caused the convulsion. Shakespeare's tragedies. in so far as they 
are ironical. would operate, in my terminology. in terms of resolved irony. 
It is of course true that such irony is to be found in Shakespeare's, 
tragedies, notably in Macbeth, which is the tragedy that conforms most closely 
to Bradley's model in being a process of moral recognition. with Macbeth's 
vision of the ultimate futility of life placed in a larger and morally 
meaningful context. The pattern persists even in King Lear, where it lends 
to Edgar's statement such validity as it po~sesses. The play's main plot 
does up to a point sustain this pattern. Lear's crude soliciting of public 
displays of devotion, the distorted values that lead him to misjudge his 
daughters, his assumption that his humanity guarantees him the dignity 
hitherto accorded his position: all these can in a real sense be seen as 
causes of his suffering, although we would hesitate to call them "evil". 
By this view, the climax of the tragedy, with Lear being sustained by 
the daughter he rejected. is also the moment of enlightenment. As Lear 
discovers himself "most rich, being poor", he sees the emptiness of the 
world he is leaving behind, and envisages himself and Cordel ia as spectators 
of human vanity: 
so we'll 1 i ve, 
And pray, and sing, and tell old tales, and laugh 
At gilded butterflies, and hear poor rogues 
Talk of court news; and we'll talk with them too -
Who loses and who wins; who's in, who's out -
And take upon's the mystery of things 
As if we were God's spies; and we'll wear out 
In a ~Ia 11 'd pri son packs and sects of great ones 
That ebb and flow by th' moon. (V. iii. 11-19) 
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This withdrawal from the vanity of human aspirations into god-like 
serenity and even amusement, would in fact be an assumption of the role of 
ironical observer, as finely described by Muecke: 
25 
The ironist's awareness of himself as the unobserved observer 
tends to enhance his feeling of freedom and induce a mood perhaps 
of serenity, or joyfulness, or even exultation. 34 
As Muecke points out, "[t]he pure or archetypal ironist is God", and those 
who share His elevated position can afford to indulge in "laughter from on 
high at the darkness and misery of a world the laughers have escaped." 
(p. 221) From being the victim of the irony of the gods, then, Lear has 
grown into god-like detachment and insight, which enables him to defy even 
his captors: 
The good years shall devour them, flesh and fell, 
Ere they shall make us weep. (V. iii. 24-25) 
So far the play is consistent with Bradley's model: if the play had 
ended there we would not have been left "rebellious or desperate". But in 
the event Lear re-enters, his detachment shattered: "Howl, howl, nowl, 
howl!" (V. iii. 257) That this entrance with the dead Cordelia should 
immediately follow Albany's "the gods defend her" suggests that Lear is still 
subject to the ironical sport of the gods; for him, as for Gloucester, the 
only escape is in death, as Kent recognizes and Edgar does not: 
KENT: 
Break, heart; I prithee break. 
EDGAR: 
Look up, my Lord. 
KENT: 
Vex not his ghost. 0, let him pass! He hates him 
That would upon the rack of this tough world 
Stretch him out longer. (V. iii. 311-14) 
It would take an Edgar to see in Lear's death, or in Cordelia's, Bradley's 
34 Compass of Irony. p. 218. 
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"moral power, a power akin to all that we admire and revere in the characters 
themselves." These deaths can not be contained in any acceptable 
interpretation of the justice of the gods. The tragedy shifts from that of 
the deluded individual to that of man's existence. 
In what I have called Shakespeare's mixed irony, then, the resolved 
ironies supply answers that are themselves questioned by the unresolved 
ironies. One of the effects of such sceptical subversion is to blur the 
distinction between tragedy and comedy, or to put it more accurately, to 
bring out the intimate connection between tragedy and comedy. As ~luecke 
remarks: 
Of course Othello and Oedipus Rex are not comedies. They are 
however, spectacles of bl1ndness, and calling them tragedies 
cannot take from them what they have in common with bl ind-man' s 
buff: comic pleasure with overtones of sadism and voyeurism. 35 
This may be a rather lurid account of our response to these plays, but it 
does enable us to see that the decisive difference between tragedy and 
comedy lies not in their essential pattern, but in our interpretation of that 
pattern, or rather our orientation in relat;ion to that pattern. In the case 
of King Lear, the spectacle with which Lear intends to divert himself and 
Cordelia is a comic one - from their perspective - and the amusement is 
premised upon their immunity from the illusions they observe. Lear's ironic 
vision, of course, is in turn ironised by our knowledge that he in fact 
possesses no such immunity to illusion as he imagines. Thus Shakespeare 
superimposes a tragic irony upon a comic irony - a reversal of the process 
whereby he has consistently, through the Fool, applied a comic perspective 
to the tragic. 
Thus a situation can be seen as either tragic or comic, depending on 
whether we i denti fy with the eiron or the a 1 azon. ~la 1 vo 1 i 0 is as much the 
victim of irony as Lear; the difference is that we are on the side of the 
ironists. In Gloucester's horrifying vision, the gods enjoy their "sport"; 
who can tell what mirth they derived from their sport with Lear? And 
conversely, who can tell what Malvolio suffered? He, at least, does not feel 
obliged to accept Fabian's interpretation of his humiliation: 
35 ~ony ~nd the Ironic, p. 47. 
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How with a sportful malice it was fo11ow'd 
May rather pluck on laughter than revenge, 
If that the injuries be justly weighed 
That have on both sides pass'd. 
OLIVIA: 
Alas, poor fool, how have they baff1'd thee! 
MAlVOLIO: 
I'll be revenged on the whole pack of you. 
27 
EXIT.36 
The "sportful malice" of a fellow human being may be less devastating than 
the sport of the gods, but it still requires near-inhuman detachment on the 
part of the victim to laugh with the mockers. In short, the irony has not 
as comfortably resolved itself for Malvolio as for the others - which may 
account for the slight awkwardness that remains after his exit. It is 
possible that the joke at Malvolio's expense is pushed beyond the point where 
we identify with the jokers, and we change sides. Of course, the play never 
does enter the realm of tragedy, but nor do we feel particularly comfortable 
in laughing at Malvolio; the unresolved element of the irony disturbs our 
orientation. 
Usually, of course, we are sure enough of whose side we are on to know 
how to react to the blindness of the protagonist. We snigger with Sir Toby 
and Sir Andrew at Ma1volio's delighted "By my life, this is my lady's hand" 
(II. v. 79), but generally refrain from laughing when Duncan says to lady 
Macbeth "Fair and noble hostess/We are your guest tonight." (Macbeth, I. vi. 
24-25). In comedy we look forward to the disillusionment that we know the 
victim will suffer, in tragedy we await it apprehensively; but in either 
case we experience a certain tension which calls for resolution. We are thus 
left troubled if the protagonist's disillusionment is not accommodated within 
a context larger than itself, a context which can transform disillusionment 
into enlightenment. Whereas resolved irony tends to supply such a context in 
the form of the communal values violated by the protagonist, unresolved irony 
charactel'istically gives us no such vantage point from which to judge and 
place the action; consequently the distinction behleen comedy and tragedy 
begins to waver. Our uncertainty may, of course, be merely a result of the 
36 Twelfth Night, V. i. 352-56,363. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
clumsiness of the author, as when a tragically intended effect turns into 
bathos because the values asserted are not adequately supported by the 
presented reality (the death of Little Nell is probably the most famous 
example of this). More interestingly, though, an uncertainty about genre 
can be created by the author's sense that a situation is capable of both a 
comic and a tragic interpretation. 
When consistently executed, this can be a most elusive form of irony. 
28 
The reader who cannot fix the genre of a work finds his confidence in seeing 
a meaning which escapes the characters continually undermined by his sense of 
a further meaning which ironises his meaning, and which cannot be held 
simultaneously with it. As E.D. Hirsch has pointed out, our interpretation 
of a work is likely to be influenced by our assumptions about the genre to 
which it belongs: 
By classifying the text as belonging to a particular genre, the 
interpreter automatically posits a general horizon for its meaning. 
The genre provides a sense of the whole, a notion of typical 
meaning components. 37 
It follows that where the genre is not fixed the "general horizon" shifts 
disconcertingly, changing our own orientation towards it. As readers we have 
been jolted out of the privileged position we share with the eiron, and we 
I 
ourselves become the alazons of a particularly sophisticated form of irony. 
The liveliest example of such inexhaustibly unresolved irony is Chaucer's 
The Nun's Priest's Tale, that mock-tragic, mock-epic, mock-philosophical 
comedy which systematically undermines every conclusion reached by the 
characters or the narrator, except perhaps the conclusion that one should 
keep one's eyes open and one's mouth shut. In Chaucer's tale, however, we 
still have one stable generic convention, that of the fable, to guide us: 
we are unlikely to take Chauntecleer's situation quite as seriously as he 
takes it himself. An even mere tantalising example of ironic undermining, 
where we have no such guidance, is the conclusion of Antony and Cleopatra. 
Our interpretation depends on the degree of our identification with Antony, 
37"Objective Interpretation", P.M.L.A., 75, no. 4, Pt. 1 (September 
1960), 463-79; rpt. in On Literary Intention, ed. David Newton - De Molina 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univel'sity Press,-197n, p. 36. 
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on whether we believe that he has triumphed over his destiny, or is yet again 
a strumpet's fool and the dupe of his own self-image. "Comedy" may seem too 
strong a word for thi s second pass i bil ity, but in fact, once we have adopted 
that perspective, a surprising number of details confirm it. What actually 
happens on stage before and after Antony's death? 
Cleopatra, having "sold" Antony "to the young Roman boy" (IV. xii. 48) 
can yet not bear to lose his love, and tests heY' power over him by having 
Charmian tell him that she has killed herself - "and word it, prithee, 
piteously" (IV. xiii. 9) - and report back "how he takes my death." 
Antony, believing the report somewhat against his better knowledge of 
Cleopatra, imagines walking with her "~Ihere souls do couch on flowers" (IV. 
xiv. 51), while we know that Cleopatra is in fact alive and well and hiding 
in a monument. In an attempt to prove that "I am conqueror of myself" (IV. 
xiv. 62), he orders Eros to perform the conquest. Hhen Eros shows greater 
courage than he, the chastened Antony del ivers a humble speech ("And Eros,/ 
Thy master dies thy scholar: to do thus/[fal1ing on his sword]/I learned of 
thee" - IV. xiv. 101-03), only to prove that the scholar has learnt his 
lesson badly: 
How! not dead? not dead? 
The guard, ho! 0, dispatch me! 
The guards, however, also seem reluctant to deprive Antony of his conquest 
of himself: crying "Alas, and woe!" they promptly flee the scene - all 
except Decretas, who pauses just long enough to filch the sword that will 
"enter" him with Caesar (IV. iv. 112). Upon being summoned by the belatedly 
concerned Cleopatra, Antony delivers a touching farewell to his followers 
which ignores their late desertion of him (IV. xiv. 135-140). Since Cleopatra 
"dare not" descend from the monument "Lest I be taken" (IV. xv. 23), Antony 
is heaved up to her, where he with difficulty wins the privilege of having 
the last word on his own death ( ..... let me speak a little" - "No, let me 
speak ..... - "One word, sweet queen •.. "), and dies believing himself "a 
Roman, by a Roman/Valiantly vanquished." (IV. xv. 57-58). 
~loved by his death, and inspired by his belated patriotism, Cleopatra 
resolves to meet death "after the high Roman fashion" (IV. xv. 86) that has 
just been demonstrated to her. In spite of this resolve she takes pains to 
find out what Caesar intends to do with her. She delivers a hyperbolic 
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eulogy on Antony to Dolabella, which abruptly yields to practical matters 
once Dolabella shows that he has been moved by it: 
DOLABELLA: 
• •• I do feel 
By the rebound of yours, a grief that smites 
-My very heart at root. 
CLEOPATRA: 
I thank you, sir. 
Know you what Caesar means to do with me? (V. ii. 103-06) 
30 
After this it transpires that Cleopatra has reserved "some lady trifles" 
(V. ii. 165) from the list of her possessions given to Caesar - "enough to 
purchase what you have made known." (V. ii. 148) Upon another warning from 
Dolabella about Caesar's intentions, she kills herself, having, we are told 
in the last speech of the play, "pursued conclusions infinite/Of easy ways 
to die." (V. ii. 354-55)38 
Much as such an interpretation offends against our actual experience 
of these scenes, it is based only on what is undeniably present in the play. 
~loreover, it corresponds to the more sceptical view of the lovers' claims 
that has been maintained throughout the play, mainly through the level gaze 
of Enobarbus. 
The point may be that we are not encouraged to detach ourselves in this 
way. It is perhaps significant that there is no Enobarbus-figure in these 
last scenes: Shakespeare allows his lovers some of his most rapturous poetry 
without any overt reminder of the shakiness of its foundations. The irony is 
confirmed rather than resolved: that is, where the normal process of 
resolution starts with blindness and ends in clear-sightedness, we are here 
at the outset given the least flattering view possible of "this dotage of our 
general's" (I. i. 1.), and at the contlusion encouraged to surrender to the 
charmed vision of the lovers. It is as if Shakespeare, having scrupulously 
establ ished the impersonal CI"oss-checks of the total context, can afford to 
proffer a love that val idates itself by the magnificence of its assertions 
rather than by the truth of its claims. Cleopatra's lament on Antony (IV. 
xv. 63-68) remains beautiful in spite of, and oddly because of, our knowledge 
38 The audience is not likely to question at such a moment the nature 
of these expel"iments. Plutarch tells us that Cleopatra tried out various 
poisons on condemned prisoners. 
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of her falsehood to Antony while he was alive: we, like Antony throughout 
the play, gladly believe that this time she is sincere - or otherwise, like 
the "holy priests" reported by Enobarbus, we simply "bless her when she is 
riggish." (II. ii. 245-46) And in admiring Antony's generosity (which 
quite literally vanquishes Enobarbus) we willingly forego the reflection 
that he is as generous in his assessment of himself as of others. 
Both perspectives, remain, however: to believe that love conquers all 
is to ignore the fact that it hardly conquers anything in this play; but to 
believe that conquest is more important than love is to elect Octavius Caesar 
as the moral centre of the play. 
As I am in danger of demonstrating, one could go on forever piling 
qualification upon qualification. The play defies a stable equilibrium: it 
refuses to commit itself finally to anyone scale of values, and leaves the 
reader anxiously examining his own scale of values. Like the drunken Lepidus, 
we try to take the measure of something which "is shaped,Sir, like itself, 
and .•• is as broad as it hath breadth" (I I. vii i. 43-44). And if "the tears 
of it are wet" we may not notice that they are crocodile tears. 
To ascribe such instability of meaning to the play is of course not to 
deny that it has any meaning: it is simply to maintain that the meaning is 
irreducible to the kind of certainty that resolved irony derives from a 
commonly accepted standard of judgement. But if Antony and Cleopatra is a 
dazzling process of ironic undermining, it is also an exhilarating 
demonstration of the potentially liberating effect of unresolved irony. If 
the consciousness of the relativity of all things can, as we shall shortly 
see, lead to barren cynicism, it can also lead to a supreme freedom from 
dogmatism a~d a delight in "infinite variety". It is a reminder that if, as 
Muecke says, the Supreme Ironist is God, then the human ironist can be god-
like in other ways than killing flies for sport. The more humane aspect of 
such god-like irony is presented by E.T. Donaldson in describing the 
qualities Chaucer has in common with his Nun's Priest. Donaldson's 
description of Chaucer inevitably projects a more benign image than we have 
of Shakespeare, but it does convey one aspect of the ironic clear-sightedness 
that Shakespeare has in common with Chaucer. If it leaves out the 
Shakespeare of King Lear, it also leaves out the Chaucer of The Knight's 
Tale. The ironist sublime, according to Donaldson, 
can survey the world as if he were no part of it, as if he were 
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situated comfortably on the moon looking at a human race whom he 
knew and loved wholeheartedly but whose ills he was immune from .... 
It is almost as if the Creator were watching with loving sympathy 
and humorous appreciation the solemn endeavours of His creatures 
to understand the situation in which He placed them. 39 
To wonder what His creatures would make of this would be to cross yet again 
the faint line between comedy and tragedy, and to end where we started, with 
Orestes saying "What are the gods? We don't know - but we are their slaves." 
It will have appeared that unresolved irony has existed for as long as 
man has sensed a discrepancy between his view of himself and the gods' view 
of him, between what the gods seem to promise and what they do. There have 
been, in all periods, individuals whose sense of the complexity of things was 
greater than their belief in the frameworks available to them for the 
ordering of that complexity, and \~ho thus have been aware of ironies that 
could not be resolved. It seems likely, however, that such an awareness was 
more prevalent at certain periods of history than at others: at times when 
the discrepancy between society's professed values and its behaviour seemed 
so strong as to bring into question not only the behaviour but the values 
themselves. Athens towards the end of the -Peloponnesian War may have 
experienced such a time; and so, certainly, did Europe in the fourteenth 
century, ravaged as it was by the Black Death and by interminable wars - wars 
, 
declared Holy by a pope whose authority was being challenged by an antipope 
in Avignon. Few situations can be more conducive to an ironic perspective, 
which is to say more subversive of absolute belief, than the spectacle of 
rival popes. 
At such times the alazon will be less often the person who violates 
communal values, and frequently the person ~Iho tries to live according to 
them. As Conrad shows in Nostrom~, it is Captain Mitchell with his belief 
in "civilised" values, rather than a glorified bandit like Pedrito Montero, 
who is out of touch with reality in the lawlessness of Costaguana. 
Unresolved irony, as we have seen, does not ironise the unstable in terms of 
the stable: it ironises the illusion of stability in terms of manifest 
instability. It is thus likely to thrive in the wake of such an illusion -
39 Editor's notes, Chaucer's Poetry, p. 1108. 
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at times, in other words, when belief at large is still both strong enough 
and ignorant enough to act as alazon. 
33 
The turn of our century was such a time, still floating on the momentum 
of Victorian confidence and Victorian values; while the Great ~Iar was the 
cataclysm that effectively destroyed the belief with the ignorance: 
When the effort was over, illusions and enthusiasms possible up to 
1914 slowly sank beneath a sea of massive disillusionment. For 
the price it had paidA humanity's major gain was a painful view of its own limitations. 4u 
If, as Muecke maintains, all ironic tragedies are "spectacles of b1indness",41 
then the Great War, as arguably the most catastrophic spectacle of blindess 
in history, is also the supreme ironic tragedy. Paul Fussell 'sees such an 
apprehension as decisive in forming this century's way of thinking: 
I am saying that there seems to be one dominating form of modern 
understanding; that it is essentially ironic; and that it 
originates largely in the application of mind and memory to the 
events of the Great War. 42 
As Fussell's interesting book shows, there js a good deal of truth in this. 
An event that shakes man's confidence in himself and the universe so 
violently must make it more difficult for succeeding generations to adopt a 
simple view of human values. Even at the time, the outbreak of the War 
figured, to the few who were not swept along by the national hysteria, as a 
grim refutation of human aspirations. Fussell quotes a letter written by 
Henry James on the day after the oubreak of war: 
The plunge of civilization into this abyss of blood and darkness .•. 
is a thing that so gives away the whole long age during which we 
have supposed the world to be, with whatever abatement, gradually 
bettering, that to take it all now for what the treacherous years 
were all the while really making for and meaning is too tragic for 
any wo rds. 43 
40 Barbara Tuchman, The Proud Tower (London: ~lacmil1an, 1980), p. 463. 
41 Irony and the Ironic, p. 47 
42 The Grea t Wa rand t·10dern i'iemory (London: Oxford Uni vers i ty Press. 
1975), p. 35. 
43 The Letters of Henry James, ed. Percy Lubbock, 2 vo1s. (New York, 
1920), I!,384, quote-oby Fusse-TI, p. 8. 
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We could hardly wish for a clearer statement of the ironic aspect the Har 
presented to a perceptive observer, even before it had revealed its 
unimaginable horrors. After 1918, when it became evident how little had 
been achieved at such tremendous cost, the ironic view certainly became more 
general, as witness, for instance, the recognition of Wilfred Owen, at the 
expense of Rupert Brooke, as the supreme war poet. 
But to limit the origins of the modern ironic habit of thought to the 
Great War is to see the "Edwardian weekend" simply as a time of total 
blindness, in which Victorian confidence (itself a questionable generalisation) 
continued unabated, to be abruptly confronted with a completely unexpected 
war. There are enough cliches and platitudes surrounding fin de siec1e 
pessimism to suggest otherwise; but without resorting to these, it can be 
shown from the literature of the time that the disillusionment of the Har \~as 
the culmination of a progressive disenchantment with the values that had in 
the previous century provided the writer with a frame of moral reference, 
with whatever reservations on the writer's part. In a manner of speaking, 
the Har can even be seen as the resolution of an irony that had been 
operative in the years preceding it; certainly James' letter expresses that 
achievement of insight towards ~Ihich all resolved irony moves. He cannot 
expect the clarity of ironic hindsight from works written before the War, 
amidst involvement in the ironic process itself; but \~e may find evidence 
of disquiet that is, if not exactly prophetic, at least indicative of a 
growing sense of the disparity between society's professed principles and its 
practice. The irony that was finally resolved, for minds like James', in the 
catastrophe of the War may have presented itself as an unreso1vable irony to 
minds 10th to contemplate such a resolution. 
This is a \~ay of saying that the writers of the period may have had an 
increasingly helpless ironic view of their subject matter. The "helpless" 
needs to be qualified, of course; but there is a sense in which irony ceases 
to be a choice and becomes an instinctive way of viewing one's material. The 
point is well made by t1uecke: 
For most 'serious' writer·s, whether poets, novelists, or dramatists, 
irony is now much less of a rhetorical or dramatic strategy which 
they mayor may not decide to employ, and much more often a mode 
. of thought silently imposed upon them by the general tendency of 
the times ..•. They may consciously )"esist it. Or they may find 
it congenial. But whatever their response to this pressure, it is 
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there as it cannot be said to have been even in the eighteenth 
century.44 
35 
This kind of thing is by its nature difficult to demonstrate in operation, 
but there is evidence that authors have been aware of this "imposition" of 
an ironic habit. I am thinking of D.H. Lawrence's creation, in Women in 
Love, of Gudrun, in whom he dramatises exactly this helpless subjection to 
irony: 
But even as she lay in fictitious transport, bathed in the strange, 
false sunshine of hope in life, something seemed to snap in her, 
and a terrible cynicism began to gain upon her, blowing in like a 
wind. Everything turned to irony with her: the last flavour of 
everything was ironical. When she felt her pang of undeniable 
:eality~ this was when she knew the hard irony of hopes and 
ldeas.4~ 
Gudrun's tragedy is that for her, irony has turned into cynicism - that is, 
the characteristic scepticism of irony has degenerated into a total denial of 
all traditional values. She observes herself trying on the possibilities of 
fulfilment in traditional terms, "the strange, false sunshine of hope in 
life", while knowing that "undeniable reality" renders this vision laughable. 
Similarly, after Gerald's death she observes herself going through the 
motions of grief: 
Gudrun hid her face on Ursula's shoulder, but still she could not 
escape the cold devil of irony that froze her soul. 
'Ha, ha!' she thought, 'this is the right behaviour.' (p. 577) 
Gudrun never does escape the "cold devil of irony": it is her fate to 
"always see and know and never escape. She could never escape." (p. 565) 
Gudrun is of course a character in a novel, and is not to be confused 
with her author. Lawrence's novel impl icitly rejects Gudrun' s barren 
cynicism; but what makes Gudrun such a disquieting figure is exactly that 
so many of her insights are so valid. Her "hard irony of hopes and ideas" 
merges naturally with Lawrence's own reflections on the state of society: 
44 Compass of Irony, p. 10. 
45 Women in Love, ed. with introd. Charles L. Ross (1921; rpt. 
Harmondsworth: Pengu 1 n, 1982), p. 511. 
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Young as she was, Gudrun had touched the whole pulse of social 
England. She had no ideas of rising in the world. She knew, with 
the perfect cynicism of cruel youth, that to rise in the world 
meant to have one outside show instead of another, the advance was 
like having a spurious half-crown instead of a spurious penny. 
(511 -12) 
The "perfect cynicism of cruel youth" is recognised as such, but its insights 
are not questioned: the image of the half-crown and the penny is as much 
lawrence's as Gudrun's. 
lawrence's novel, though set before the War, was of course written in 
the midst of it, and in his own words, "actually does contain the results in 
one's soul of the war".46 It may thus be said to have had its ironic vision 
sharpened by hindsight; but its relevance to my argument lies in its 
dramatisation of that withdrawal into irony 11hich can become the last refuge 
of an acute mind confronted with a reality that makes all beliefs suspect: 
at best naive, at worst dishonest. 
It is, of course, Conrad who gives us the most sustained exploration of 
the dangers of such clear-sightedness, but also our sharpest recognition that 
it is clear-sightedness. This balance is finely maintained in Sophia 
Antonovna's words in Under Western Eyes: 
'Remember, Razumov, that women, children, and revolutionists hate 
irony, which is the negation of all saving instincts, of all faith, 
of all devotion, of all action •••• '47 
The novel upho1 ds Sophi a Antonovna' s judgement. whereas Razumov' s habitual 
irony is seen to be an evasion of self-knowledge; but the unironical vision 
is ascribed to "women, children, and revolutionists", that is, people who are 
unaware of the complexities surrounding their enthusiasms, people like Kurtz's 
deluded Intended or poor Stevie. Similarly, in Victory, Axel Heyst's ironic 
withdrawal is ultimately seen to be a barren evasion; but it is impossible 
not to feel the weight of authorial support behind statements 1 ike this: 
Great achievements are accomplished in a blessed, I~arm mental fog, 
which the pitiless cold blast of the father's analysis had blOlm 
46 Letter to Haldo Frank, 27 July 1917; rpt. in D.H. Lawrence: The 
Rainbow and Women in Love: A Casebook, ed. Colin Clarke-(Lonaon: Macmillan, 
1 969), p --:--10. 
47 Under Western Eyes (1911; rpt. Harmondsl1orth: Penguin, 1957), p. 233. 
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The pitilessness is recognised as such, and "the infernal mistrust of all 
life" is finally placed against the need "to hope, to love - and to put 
one's trust in life" (pp. 324, 326); but the "blessed, warm mental fog" 
lingers on as an unflattering image of the unironical mind. 
37 
This is to say that if irony is, in Muecke's words, "imposed upon" the 
modern writer, then Lawrence and Conrad, at least, "consciously resist it" 
by impersonally dramatising it. But the need to resist it is itself 
indicative of the distance we have come from the comic self-effacing 
dissembling of the original eiron of Greek comedy to this "negation of all 
saving instincts, of all faith, of all devotion, of all action". Not that 
the element of pleasure has disappeared completely: in spite of their agony, 
both Gudrun and Razumov derive a sardonic satisfaction from their 
consciousness of being, at least, not deluded, the barren consolation of the 
self-consciously superior mind - "cultured minds", in the words of Conrad's 
Decoud, "to whom the narrowness of every bel ief in odious". 49 It is a 
consolation and a fate they share with some of the most disturbing figures 
of thei r era: Decoud ,Ibsen's Hedda Gabler, Joyce's Stephen Deda 1 us. What 
is said of Decoud can be said of all of them: each in his or her way is a 
"victim of the disillusioned weariness which is the retribution meted out to 
intellectual audacity" (p. 501). 
I intend to study the late novels of Henry James against this background, 
in order to determine to what extent these novels are shaped by such an 
unresolved ironic vision, how this can help us to understand these novels, 
and how it influences our assessment of James' achievement. That achievement, 
however, needs to be measured not only against James' contemporaries but also 
against his predecessors of the Victorian age. This was, by common consent, 
the great age of the novel - an age of which James and his contemporaries may 
be seen as representing either the final splendid flol'/ering or the decadent 
offshoot. 
There may be no such simple choice of alternatives; but if we bel ieve 
that the "Great Tradition" of the English novel is a living institution rather 
48 Victory (1915; rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963), p. 87. 
49 Nostromo (1904; rpt. London: J.M. Dent, 1947), p. 187. 
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than an exclusive club which remains unchanged while its members come and go, 
we shall expect to find our sense of the common concerns of these novelists 
enriched by a recognition of their differences. Since irony is so much a 
matter of the writer's relation to the values of his society, a study of the 
nature of irony should enable us to locate both the common ground and the 
differences, and to locate them where they matter most to the literary critic 
- that is, in the structure of the novels themselves. It would be a simple 
matter to abstract statements from, say, Middlemarch and The Wings of the 
Dove to demonstrate that George Eliot was less sceptical about society than 
Henry James, but "this would account for little in our experience of these 
novels. A consideration of the resolution or lack of resolution of irony, on 
the other "hand, may help us to see how these novels are shaped by the beliefs 
or lack of belief underlying them. 
Very broadly speaking, I believe that the Victorian novelist's 
commitment to communal values is strong enough to .al10w for a predominance of 
resolved irony. Since "the Victorian Novelist" is an aggregate of some of 
the most acute and original minds of the time, such a commitment is unlikely 
to be at all uniform either in its intensity or its manifestations; but some 
central belief may be posited, with whatever tentativeness, to serve as a 
basis for the enquiry. Such a basis is in .fact provided by Henry James' 
reference to "the whole long age during which we have supposed the world to 
be, with wha tever abatement, gradua 11y betteri ng" . Fussell sees James' 
statement as embodying "the prevailing Melior"ist myth which h~d dominated the 
public consciousness for a century.,,50 To talk of a "r~eliorist myth" is to 
reduce a complex and varied process to a catch-phrase; but, while bearing 
in mind the over-simplification it entails, I shall adopt the phrase as a 
useful short reference to that aspect of Victorian belief which shapes so 
many of these novels: the belief that society can - and should - change. 
50 The Great \<Jar and ~1odern I~emory, p. 8. 
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Chapter II 
"I Want You to Change": 
Meliorism and Irony in the Nineteenth-Century Novel 
It would be ludicrous to imagine a sudden change of ironic mode at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, as if all novelists were overwhelmed by 
the solemnity of the occasion and stopped resolving their ironies. At most 
we can expect to find a gradual shift in values, reflected through subtle 
changes in ironic technique; and even then such a shift is highly unlikely 
to be an orderly, chronologically determined progression from novelist to 
novelis't, or from novel to novel. 
It is nevertheless self-evident that the novel did change from Jane 
Austen to Henry James, and that the change was in some sense a function of 
the novelist's attitude to society. To approach these novelists through the 
"Meliorist myth" is not to attempt to isolate a monolithic ideology underlying 
their novels: at most the phrase provides a focus for an enquiry that is 
intended to go further than their pol itical or social preconceptions, towards 
a consideration of the means by which a novelist embodies, consciously or 
unconsciously, such preconceptions in the novel. 
In technical terms, this is a matter of the nature of the irony emp loyed. 
the 5i nce resolved irony, as ~Ie have seen, traces a process of change on 
basis of certain implied or explicitly stated values, we can expect a 
Meliorist tendency to be manifested in the dominance of such a resolved 
pattern. Unresolved irony, on the other hand, would suggest either a failure 
on the part of the author to reconcile his material with a stable value 
system, or a belief on his part that such reconciliation is impossible. 
The first point to made about Meliorism is that, whatever bland optimism 
has come to be associated with it, it is in the first place based on the far 
from complacent conviction that society is in need of improvement, and only 
in the second place on the belief that it is capable of such improvement. 
To generalise broadly. I think that the attitude underlying the great 
Victorian novels can be bluntly summed up in Fel ix Holt's presumptuous 
statement to Esther Lyon: "I want you to change."l This is to say that the 
attitude is the reverse of convervative; but its radicalism is of the kind 
precisely defined by George Eliot in Felix Holt the Radical: a desire for 
1 George Eliot, Felix Holt the Radical, ed. with introd. Peter Coveney 
(1866; rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), p. 211. 
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change that yet does not sever society's connection with its "roots" in the 
past. As Felix Holt insists that Esther should change, but appeals to her 
in the name of ideals which he hopes they have in common, so the Victorian 
novel characteristically addresses, even harangues, its readers on the basis 
of values that the novelist assumes he shares with his readers. 
These shared values enable the novelist to employ irony as a moral 
instrument: the readers are taken to be capable of "reading" the moral 
content of the irony. But nor is the reader invited merely to observe 
detachedly or with amusement the spectacle of blindness beneath him: the 
ironies are seldom quite settled enough for that. Although the ironic pattern 
is generally resolved in terms of the values implicit in the novel, a certain 
tension between what is and what should be remains in the form of a more or 
less unresolved element. As the novelist loses confidence in the community 
or beliefs which united him with his reader, this unresolve'd element becomes 
more prevalent, until by the end of the century it predominates. 
At one end, the far end, of this development is Jane Austen, who, even 
in terms of my somewhat tolerant abstractions, can hardly be regarded as a 
Meliorist. To say that she did not regard the wOt'ld as capable of improvement 
would be to give an unduly sombre emphasis to her wry acceptance of the 
knaves, fools and snobs she sees everywhere'; and to say that she did not 
think it in need of improvement would be to ignore the sharp critical edge 
of that acceptance. And yet, there is something of both pessimism and 
tolerance in her attitude: since the world is not likely to change, and 
since, imperfect as it is, it contains much that is to be valued, the mature 
individual will learn to adapt to this world, not sacrificing integrity. and 
hoping for the companionship of other sensible people to make tolerance 
tolerable. There is no suggestion that society should or could reorganize 
itself to accorrmodate the exceptional individual. This is what El inor 
Dash\10od knows. and \~hat Marianne has to learn in the course of Sense and 
Sensib,j_l.!...!1:. This may explain \'ihy we, who believe that a compromise with 
society entails a sacrifice of integrity. tend to prefer f1arianne; and 
Marianne's attractiveness suggests that there was nothing facile in Jane 
Austen's nevel'theless vindicating Elinor. 
It may be that Jane Austen would not have understood the word ~ociet~ 
in OUl' sense. Although in her time thp. word had already acquired its modern 
meaning of "the body of institutions and relationships within which a 
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relatively large group of people live",2 in her novels no such abstraction 
is to be found. Society there still seems to consist of the four and twenty 
families with whom Mrs Bennet claims to dine, in spirited refutation of Mr 
Darcy's condescending "In a country neighbourhood you move in a very confined 
and unvarying society."3 The point of this is that society did not present 
itself to Jane Austen as the monolithic abstraction to which we pay 
theoretical obeisance: to her it was simply the aggregate of the often 
disconcerting individuals that it was necessary to live with from day to day: 
Miss Bates, Mr Woodhouse, Mrs Allen, Mrs Jennings, Sir John Middleton - beyond 
improvement, above rejection. The amused acceptance shows in the static 
quality of the irony applied to such characters: it is based on a pattern of 
repetition, not modulation. Mrs Bennet breathlessly delighting in Mr Darcy 
as prospective son-in-law - "Oh, my dear Lizzy! pray apologize for my having 
disliked him so much before" (p. 386) - is exactly the same as the ~lrs Bennet 
who decided not very long before this that "he is such a disagreeable man 
that it would be quite a misfortune to be 1 iked by him." (p. 66) Mrs Bennet 
has not reached an insight; all that has changed is the occasion that 
reveals her magnificently consistent stupidity and her undeviating allegiance 
to the one norm by which she judges every man: whether or not he is likely 
to marry one of her daughters. Mr Woodhouse sighing "Ah! poor Miss Taylor! 
'tis a sad business" on the occasion of the latter's marriage, does not 
undergo any conversion in order to give a "much more voluntary, cheerful 
consent [to Emma's marriage] than his daughter had ever presumed to hope for"4: 
matrimony only comes to seem less of a threat to the status quo than poultry-
thieves. Jane Austen creates these characters complete and incorrigible. 
It does not necessarily follow from this that she prefers them like that, 
but the ironic strategy of t.he novels is to leave no scope for development. 
Each irony at the expense of these characters is local, self-contained, 
independent of the movement of the plot. This completeness of the errant 
characters has led Virginia Woolf to see Jane Austen as in fact revelling in 
2 Raymond Williams "Society", Keywords (Glasgow: Fontana, 1976), p. 243. 
Williams notes that "[tjhe tendency towards the general and abstract sense ... 
seems inherent, but unt.il [the late eighteenth century] the more active and 
inmlediate senses were common." (p. 244) 
3 Pride and Preju~ice, p. 88. 
4 Emma, rev. ed. vlith introd. by Mary Lascelles (1816; rpt. London: 
Dent Everyman, 1964), pp. 6 and 426. 
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their aberrations: 
She encircles them with the lash of a whip-like phrase which, as 
it runs around them, cuts out their silhouettes for ever ... , 
Sometimes it seems as if her creatures were born merely to give 
Jane Austen the supreme delight of slicing their heads off. She 
is satisfied; she is content; she would not alter a hair on 
anybody's head, or move one brick or one blade of grass in a world 
which provides her with such exquisite delight. 5 
This is an attractive reading, deficient only, when taken out of context, in 
not discriminating sufficiently between the artist delighting in her creations 
and the moralist realising that such delight is founded on the violation of 
values she holds sacred. My point is that Jane Austen's irony enables the 
artist to accommodate the moralist, and to meet her readers on the common 
ground of shared values. As Reuben Brower says of the ironies in Pride and 
Prejudice, they are "linked by vibrant reference to basic certainties."6 
In the essay referred to above, Virginia Woolf spells out these "certainties": 
It is against the disc of an unerring heart, an unfailing good 
taste, an almost stern morality, that she shows up those deviations 
from kindness, truth, and sincerity which are among the most 
delightful things in English literature. (p. 177) 
But the delight does not lie in anticipating the disillusionment of the 
ironised character: it consists of catching Jane Austen's eye behind the 
stolidly unsuspecting back of the victim. 
In his influential essay on Jane Austen, D.W. Harding maintains that 
the perceptive reader will at times discern a glint of hatred in the eye that 
, 
he catches, a hatred that Jane Austen takes some pains to hide from her more 
obtuse readers: 
... how easy it is made for them to forget or never observe that 
Jane Austen, none the less for seeing how funny [Mrs Bennet] is, 
goes on detesting her. The •.. ruling standards of our soc1al 
group leave a perfectly comfortable niche for det,stable people 
and give them sufficient sanction to persist ..•. 
5 The Common Reader, 3rd ed. (London: Hogarth Press, 1929), pp. 176-77. 
6 The Fields of Light (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 164. 
7 "Regulated Hatred", Scrutiny, 8, No.4 (1940), 352. 
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Harding would seem to find a more subversive implication in Jane Austen's 
humour than I have done, a profounder dissatisfaction with "the ruling 
standards of our social group", and thus less common ground with her reader: 
••• she is a literary classic of the society which attitudes like 
hers, held widely enough, would undermine. (p. 347) 
My argument does not essentially take issue with Harding on this point: 
the apparent disagreement stems from two different uses of the word society. 
Harding uses it in Jane Austen's own sense of "the relationships of everyday 
social life", and concedes that she had "a genuine respect for the ordered, 
decent civilization that they upheld." (p. 351) This larger context of 
"ordered ••• civilization" which contains "everyday social life" is closer 
to our sense of society, "the modern notion, in which the laws of society are 
not so much laws for getting on with other people but more abstract and more 
impersonal la\'ls which determine social institutions."a My argument is that 
society and social laws in this sense are not stringently challenged by Jane 
Austen's irony. 
It is true that, as Harding implies, Jane Austen's "attitudes ... , held 
wi de ly enough, woul d undermine" the soci a 1 promi nence of, say, Mrs Elton: she 
would not be invited to any picnics. But even Emma realises that there are 
considerations which override her impulse to express her dismay at Mr Heston's 
inclusion of Mt'S Elton in the outing to Box Hill: 
•.. it could not be done without a reproof to him, which would be 
giving pain to his wife; and she found herself therefore obliged to 
consent to an al'rangement whi ch she woul d have done a great deal to 
avoid .... (p. 310) 
Admittedly this "outward submission" hides "secret severity" (p. 310) and, in 
Hardings's words, leaves "a perfectly comfortable niche for detestable people"; 
but Jane Austen, as Harding also recognises, would not tear down the wall to 
destroy the niche: 
Her object is not missionary; it is the more desperate one of 
merely finding some mode of existence for her critical attitudes. 
(p. 351) 
a Keywords, p. 244. 
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However different this desperation is from the "supreme delight" Woolf 
ascribes to Jane Austen, the two critics would seem to agree that Jane Austen's 
humour provides "some mode of existence for her critical attitudes." My only 
contribution to this is to suggest that in the covert-yet-shared nature of 
irony she found this refuge, much as Mr Bennet escapes from Mrs Bennet through 
irony - with this difference that Mr Bennet does not need to share his irony. 
Furthennore, Jane Aus ten, un 1 ike Mr Bennet, does not escape into mora 1 
irresponsibility, and does not allow her heroines to do so. 
The heroine has to come to terms with this imperfect, unchanging society; 
and where her own imperfections, rather than society's, prevent this, the 
static, non-structural irony encapsulating the comic monsters is complemented 
by a structural irony at the expense of the heroine, premised upon her ability 
to change. 
Thus there is nothing ironical, on the face of it, in Emma's exclamation 
"Mr. Knightley and Jane Fairfax! ..• - Mr Knightley must not marry! - You 
would not have little Henry cut out from Donwell? - Oil! no, no, Henry must 
have Don~lell. ••• ,,9 There is no internal inconsistency, as in the case of 
Mrs Bennet's comments on Darcy, to alert us to the character's mistake: the 
irony is only revealed, simultaneously with its extinction, as the heroine 
achieves the insight from which to look back and smile, with the reader, at 
her former self: 10 
It is remarkable, that Emma, in the many, very many, points of view 
in which she was now beginning to consider Domlell Abbey, was never 
struck with any sense of injury to her nephew Henry, whose rights 
as heir expectant had formerly been so tenaciously regarded. Think 
she must of the possible difference to the poor 1 ittle boy; and 
yet she only gave herself a saucy conscious smile about it, and 
found amusement in detecting the real cause of that violent dislike 
of Mr. Knightley's marrying Jane Fairfax, or any body else, which 
at the time she had wholly imputed to the amiable solicitude of 
the sister and the aunt. (p. 396) 
9 Emma, p. 196. 
10 Edwin 14uir, though not explicitly concerned with irony, has made a 
similar point as the basis of a distinction behleen the structure of Pride 
and Prejudice and that of a novel like Vanity Fair: 
.•. Jane Austen's scene can only be completed by other scenes 
tO~lard5 which it is leading up; while Thackeray's is in a sense 
complete in itself. 
(The Structure of the Novel, new ed. [1928; rpt. London: Hogarth Press, 
1"9"57J, p. 56.) . 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
45 
This humorous appreciation of the finer ironies of the situation is made 
possible only by Emma's release from the pain of the first "undeception", as 
C.S. Lewis calls it. 11 The comic outcome of the pattern should not blind 
us to its tragic potential, its similarity, in short, to the Oedipus pattern. 
This is simply another way of saying that these are dramatic ironies, but it 
is also a way of stressing the moral component of the irony: the "mistakes" 
of Jane Austen's heroines are not just errors of fact, but are often 
potentially disruptive moral misjudgements. 
This differs, of course, from novel to novel. In the first place, the 
"perfect" heroines are obviously, by virtue of their perfection, immune to 
this kind of irony. Anne Elliot makes her mistake outside the novel, as it 
were, and even then under the persuasion of Lady Russell; Elinor simply 
makes no mistake; and Fanny Price is Fanny Price, which is to say that she 
is a problem heroine who requires a discussion all to herself. 
As for the flawed heroines, it follows from the moral basis of the irony 
that the quality and intensity of the irony will vary with the degree and 
seriousness of the heroine's mistake. It would be a stringent moralist, for 
instance, who could declare Catherine Morland's naive misconceptions culpable; 
but they are potentially harmful, to herself if not to others. She thus needs 
to be instructed, if not in the basic questions of good and evil, then at 
least in their probable distribution in ordinary life. She is as mistaken 
about human beings as King Lear himself, but since she lacks both the power 
and the arrogance to manifest her judgement in action, the conseqlJences are 
minimal, and do not thl'eaten her 1 ittle world for long. The irony is 
directed as much at her choice of reading matter as at her moral discrimination; 
in fact, it is part of the novel's point that they often amount to the same 
thing. The effect is to weaken the structural significance of irony in the 
novel; it is richly present in individual scenes, but it cannot really be 
said to propel the novel. 
Elizabeth Bennet's misjudgement of Darcy, though certainly less grotesque 
than some of poor Catherine's imaginings, is taken more seriously. Because 
she is more confident, more intelligent and more articulate than Catherine, 
she can be more thoroughly mistaken. A strong mind on the wrong track causes 
more damage than a \-Ieak one, and certainly takes longer to get back onto the 
right track. 
11 "A Note on Jane Austen", Essays in Criticism, 4, No 4 (1954), 362. 
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This is most consistently, most comically and most seriously demonstrated 
in Emma: scene after scene shows Emma floundering, not like poor Catherine 
through naivety, but because she uses her formidable mental powers to 
rationalise her emotional promptings. Thus, while poor Harriet is fluttering 
on about mermaids and sharks, Emma briskly solves Mr Elton's charade, only to 
miss its real point, its application to herself: 
' .•• Thy ready wit the word will soon supply. 
Humph - Harriet's ready wit! All the better. A man must be very 
much in love indeed, to describe her so .•.. ' (p. 62) 
This ability to twist a valid observation to promote a false 
interpretation is what makes Emma's quickwittedness more dangerous than 
Harriet's befuddlements: "A mind like her's, once opening to suspicion, made 
rapid progress." (p. 360) This statement in fact applies to her realisation 
that she is in love with Mr Knightley, but it could equally have applied to 
any of the misconceptions engendered by the rapid progress of her mind. 
Emma's persistence in error sustains the irony of the novel for longer than 
Elizabeth's mistaken judgement propels her novel; but ultimately, like 
Elizabeth, she survives to pass judgement on her mistakes. Both heroines 
have developed beyond their author's irony; but the comic monsters 
surrounding them are going about their business as usual: 
... [Lady Catherine] condescended to wait on them at Pemberley, in 
spite of that pollution which its \~oods had received, not merely 
from the presence of such a mi stress, but the vis its of her unel e 
and aunt from the city. 
With the Gardiners, they were always on the most intimate terms. 
(Pride and Prejudice, pp. 395-96) 
••. Mrs. Elton, from the particulars detailed by her husband, 
thought it all extremely shabby, and very inferior to her own 
wedding .... But, in spite of these deficiencies, the wishes, the 
hopes, the confidence, the predictions of the small band of true 
fri ends who wi tnessed the ceremony, were fu lly ans~lered in the 
perfect happiness of the union. (Emma, p. 427) 
The Gardiners, the "small band of true friends": stronger perhaps than 
the famolls "regulated hatred" is Jane Austen's barely concealed dream of a 
small circle of sympathetic friends that car. leave Lady Catherine and Mrs. 
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Elton to rampage harmlessly outside. 12 The "niche" is ultimately provided 
not for the "detestable people", but for the heroine: the detestables 
invariably take up plenty of social space. And yet the heroine's niche is 
firmly place inside a larger structure; it is very different, for instance, 
from the "some few other people - a little freedom of people" that Birkin 
posits as an escape from the lost civilisation of Women in Love (p. 452). 
Jane Austen's vast assembly of fools still inhabit a rational universe: the 
values implicit in the .novel supply us with a standard to measure them by. 
The resolution of irony is consequently the reaffirmation of these implied 
values by the outcome of the novel. It is this, as much as the marriage of 
the hero and heroine, that makes the endings of Pride and Prejudice and 
Emma so satisfying. 
It may be an absence of this sense of the fitness of things that prevents 
most readers from rejoicing in the marriage of Fanny Price and Edmund Bertram. 
We are likely to agree (even with a touch of vindictiveness) that they deserve 
each other and vii" no doubt be very happy in their way, but we do not feel, 
as we do with the marriage of Elizabeth and Darcy, that the energies of the 
novel have been brought to a stable equilibrium. 
The problem is, of course, Fanny. It is fairly commonly agreed that she 
is Jane Austen's least attractive heroine (though such critics differ in the 
degree of vehemence with which they maintain this l3 ), but it is difficult to 
be sure whether our displeasure is directed merely at Fanny or at her author 
as vie": do we simply get impatient with Fanny, or do we resent Jane Austen's 
apparent expectation that we should admire Fanny? It seems to me that there 
is something of both: we feel that our irritation with Fanny is imperfectly 
shared by an author whom we normally trust to be on our side. This creates 
12 D.W. Harding, in his introduction to Persuasion (1818; rpt. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965) discusses "Jane Austen is concern with the 
survival of the sensitive and penetrating individual in a society of 
conforming mediocrity." (p. 17) He rightly stresses the value of romantic 
love in this, but seems to me to neglect the invariable adjunct of "a small 
band of true friends". 
13 Lionel Trilling says flatly "Nobody, I believe, has ever found it 
possible to like the heroine of Mansfield Park." (The Opposing Self [London: 
Secker and Harburg, 1955], p. 212; Tony Tanne·r finds her "a poor sort of 
heroine" (Introd., Mansfield Park [1814; rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966], 
p. 9); C.S. Lewis calls her "lnsipid (yet not a prig)" ("A Note on Jane 
Austen", p. 367); and Kingsley Amis uninhibitedly describes her as "a monster 
of complacency and pride" (nHhat Became of Jane Austen?", The Spectator, 
October 4, 1957; rpt. in Jane Austen: A Collection of Critlcal Essays, ed. 
Ian Hatt [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1903"]. p. 140). 
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an interesting exception to the pattern of resolved irony in the novels I 
have discussed: all the ironies at Fanny's expense remain unresolved, and 
disrupt the novel's moral scheme. 
To talk of ironies at Fanny's expense is to take issue with Lionel 
Trilling's influential view that 
one might say of this novel that it undertakes to discredit irony 
and to affirm literalness) that it demonstrates that there are no 
two ways about anything. 1q 
Trilling in fact builds a persuasive case on this premise, as does Tony Tanner 
in what is in effect an elaboration of Trilling's reading. If we grant their 
assumption that "Jane Austen, usually so ironic about her heroines, in this 
instance vindicates Fanny Price without qualification",15 we have to admit 
that what the novel affirms are "the stoic values of control, stability, 
endurance." (p. 35) Even as it is, whatever we think of Fanny, the ending 
of the novel would seem to suggest that Jane Austen intended the sober 
orthodoxies that Trilling and Tanner ascribe to the novel. 
But I do not believe that the dissatisfaction of most readers with the 
novel is solely due to the fact that, as Trilling says, "[t]here is scarcely 
one of our modern pieties that it does not ~ffend." (p. 210) The vindication 
of Fanny Price offends us not merely because we get impatient with her 
headaches and can't see the harm in home theatricals; it is not even only 
that the values upheld in the novel are antipathetic to the values we 
delighted in in Pride and Prejudice: our disappointment stems from our sense 
that Fanny Price fails even in terms of her ovm novel. More damagingly, we 
suspect that Jane Austen realises this, but allows Fanny to get away with it, 
as no other heroine of hers does. Fanny is in fact quite often treated 
ironically by her author, but never achieves insight into the shortcomings 
that have made that irony possible; in other words, the irony is not 
resol ved. 
The most explicit irony at Fanny's expense occurs in relation to her 
gloomy reflections that Edmund and Mary Crawford are likely soon to reach 
an understanding, since "the scruples of his integrity" and "the doubts and 
hesitations of her ambition were equally got over": "His good and her bad 
14 Opposing Self, p. 208. 
15 Introduction, Mansfield Park, p. 8. 
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feel ings yielded to love, and such love must unite them." Of course, if 
. Mary's "bad feelings" really did yield to love, Edmund's "good" feelings 
would not be unduly compromised by the marriage; thus the suspicion that 
Mary may just redeem herself has to be resisted with all Fanny's moral 
earnestness: 
Her acceptance must be as certain as his offer; and yet, there 
were bad feelings still remaining which made the prospect of it 
most sorrowful to her, independently - she' believed independently 
of sel f. 
In their very last conversation, Miss Crawford, in spite of 
some amiable sensations, and much personal kindness, had still 
been Miss Crawford, still shewn a mind let astray and bewildered, 
and without any suspicion of being so; darkened, yet fancying 
itself light. She might love, but she did not deserve Edmund by 
any other sentiment. Fanny believed there was scarcely a second 
feeling in common between them; and she may be forgiven by older 
sages, for looking on the chance of Miss Crawford's future 
improvement as nearly desperate .... 
Experience might have hoped more for any young people, so 
circumstanced, and impartiality would not have denied to Miss 
Crawford's nature, that participation of the general nature of 
women, which would lead her to adopt the opinions of the man she 
loved and respected, as her own. - But as such were Fanny's 
persuasions, she suffered very much from them, and would never 
speak of Miss Crawford without pain. 16 
The irony is gentle, and the emphasis is on the reality of Fanny's suffering. 
Nevertheless, the tell-tale stumble on "independently - she believed 
independently of self" alerts us to Fanny's half-suppressed consciousness of 
one source of her "sorrow" which has nothing to do vlith Mary's imperfections. 
Certainly the fact that she derives so little comfort from Mary's improvement 
suggests that Edmund's happiness is not her only or even her main concern. 
She has in fact demonstrated that she is not averse to seeing him suffer as 
long as his suffering stems from disagreement with Miss Crawford: 
It was barbarous to be happy when Edmund was suffering. Yet some 
happiness must and would arise, from the very conviction, that he 
did suffer. (p. 284) 
This only means that Fanny is human after all; but in her musings on Mary's 
benightedness she is less clear-sighted about the cause of her misery than 
16 Mansfield Park, p. 362. 
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she is here about the source of her happiness. Jane Austen is clearly 
counting on the indulgence of "older sages" with their detachment born of 
"experience"; the implication is that Fanny is simply young, inexperienced, 
and more involved than she can admit to being. Her lack of insight is 
offered to us as of the same order as Catherine Morland's misinterpretations 
or Emma's anxiety for her nephew's inheritance. But the irony is more 
damaging than this. Neither Catherine's misconceptions nor even Emma's 
rationalisations are premised on the moral superiority of the heroine, 
whereas Fanny's self-deception rests entirely on her "sorrowful" consciousness 
of Mary's "mind led astray and bewildered, and without any suspicion of being 
so". The applicability of this to herself again could have been taken in the 
same humorous spirit in which we accept Emma's violent objection, in Mrs 
Elton, to what are in essence her own faults writ large; but in Fanny's case, 
the ending of the novel asks us to accept this youthful fumbling as mature 
moral judgement. 
The fact that Fanny is shown to have been "right" about the Crawfords 
tends to obscure the extent to which her moral judger.1ent was assist.ed by her 
love for Edmund. This is perhaps a fortunate alternative to love's more 
usual habit of blindness to the fault of the beloved, but such sharp-
sightedness can seem unattractively like a readiness to make the most of 
small occasions. 
In the case of Henry Crawford, Fanny's conscience, untrained to deal 
with anything as presumptuous as a personal preference, has to transform 
her indifference to him, based largely on her impermissible love for Edmund, 
into disinterested moral disapproval. Thus "the dignity of angry virtue" 
(p. 327), which his undeniable imperfections have enabled her hitherto to 
maintain, finds itself challenged by his procurement of William's commission. 
It may be only to a modern distl'ust of nepotism that this act of Crawford's 
seems at least as dubious as flirting with the Miss Bertrams; in any case, 
we do not expect Fanny, emotionally based as her judgements ay·e, to question 
anything that ministers to the happiness of William. The point is that 
Fanny now finds it more difficult to sustain the disapproval she needs to 
sanction her ,'efllsal of him, and seems almost relieved to conclude that he 
is as bad as ever: 
Here was again a want of delicacy and regard for others which 
had formerly so struck and disgusted her, Here was again a 
something of the same Mr Crawford whom she had so reprobated 
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before. How evidently was there a gross want of feeling and 
humanity where his own pleasure was concerned - And, alas! how 
always known no principle to supply as a duty what the heart was 
deficient in. Had her own affections been as free - as perhaps 
they ought to have been - he never could have engaged them. 
(p. 327) 
The moral fervour of this seems disproportionate to its occasion: Crawford's 
"gross want of feeling and humanity" consists of his having assured her that 
he does not intend to stop loving her. Jane Austen seems quite consciously 
to present Fanny as anxious to condemn Crawford : the rhetoric of the passage, 
and possibly the lapse of syntax, belong to Fanny herself rather than to her 
author. Furthermore, Jane Austen makes a point of contradicting Fanny's 
conviction that she never could love Crawford, by telling us later that 
"there ~lOuld have been every probabil ity of success and fel icity for him" if 
Edmund had married Mary and he had "persevered, and uprightly" (p. 451). 
As a more succinct demonstration of Fanny's bias, we have Fanny's release 
from "so horrible an evil" as having Crawford witness her family's table 
manners (which are apparently of such a nature as to put Fanny herself off 
her food): 
She was nice only from natural delicacy, but he had been brought 
up in a school of luxury and epicurism. (p. 19"9) 
This sentence, tellingly placed at the end of a chapter, trenchantly sums up 
the double standards Fanny consistently brings to bear on the Crawfords. 
This is so characteristically the kind of moral obliquity that Jane Austen 
delights in, and delights in exposing, that it is disconcerting to find her 
in this instance rescuing Fanny from exposure by sinking Cra\vford, Mary and 
all. It is as if Catherine Morland were to discover that General Tilney had 
murdered his wife after all. 
Fanny's reaction to the "horrible evil" (p. 429) of Maria and Henry's 
elopement is yet another example of a "correct" judgement warped by emotion 
(it may be noted that "horrible evil" has been slightly devalued by its 
previous occurence in reference to the possibility of Crawford's "taking his 
mutton" with the Prices - p. 398): 
... it was too horrible a confusion of guilt, too gross a 
complication of evil, for human nature, not in a state of utter 
barbarism, to be capable of! (p. 430) 
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Fanny thought it scarcely possible for them to support life and 
reason under such disgrace; and it appeared to her, that as far 
as this world alone was concerned, the greatest blessing to every 
one of kindred with Mrs Rushworth would be instant annihilation. 
(p. 430) 
These are not rational judgements; they are the emotional reactions of a 
very earnest young girl. This is not to say that Jane Austen thought Maria's 
adultery of 1 ittle consequence; but her characteristic tone is surely to be 
found in her famous "Let other pens dwell on guilt and misery" (p. 446), 
rather than in such effusions of moral outrage as she dwells on for two 
chapters. In fact. there is plenty of evidence of high amusement at all the 
"shock" and "horror", brought into relief by the total unconcern of the 
Prices (Fanny's missing her breakfast through a combination of the household's 
dilatoriness and Edmund's agitation - "He had already ate" - is a 
representative touch - p. 433). 
Fanny's horror is of cour'se not to be held aga inst her; but in the 
light of the irony ~Iith which such an extreme reaction is treated, it is 
difficult to see Mary's failure to express a similar horror as quite meriting 
Edmund's revulsion: 
' •.• To hear the woman whom - no harsher name than folly given! -
so voluntarily, so freely, so coolly to canvass it! - No reluctance, 
no horror, no feminine - shall I say? no modest loathings! ... ' 
(p. 441) ~ 
Since Mary's crime consists partly of "coolly" broaching a subject which has 
occupied two chapters of the novel, Edmund's delicacy would seem to exceed 
that of his author. Jane Austen certainly shows few "modest loathings" in 
pronouncing, quite as coolly as Hary, on what is, in effect, Crawford's 
"folly": 
Had he done as he intended ... he might have been deciding his own 
happy destiny. (p. 451) 
In short, in feeling himself" [e]quallY in brother and sister deceived" 
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(p. 445), Edmund is succumbing to the moral hysteria afflicting all of 
Mansfield (even Lady Bertram, "guided by Sir Thomas" saw "in all its enormity, 
what had happened" - p. 436). With such encouragement, it is not surprising 
that Fanny should enter into the spirit of things and show a bit of modest 
loathing where she most feels it: "'Cruel!' said Fanny - 'quite cruel!'" 
(p. 442) Her own tenderness for Edmund's feelings nevertheless does not 
prevent her, "now at liberty to speak openly", from giving him "some hint of 
what share his brother's state of health might be supposed to have in Mary's 
wish for a complete reconciliation." (p. 445) Since the "hint" amounts to 
telling him that Mary wanted him for a title and an estate, it seems 
considerably crueller than Mary's unthinking shallowness. Since, furthermore, 
it badly misrepresents the fact that, much as Tom's illness had enhanced 
Edmund's advantages in Mary's eyes, she had fallen in love with him long 
before that, Fanny's hint shows a surprising elasticity of principle. 
The disturbing fact is that all this is simply ignored in the ending 
that Jane Austen, "impatient to restore every body, not greatly in fault 
themselves, to tolerable comfort" (p. 446), contrives. That formulation 
leaves room, of course, for Fanny's immaturity of judgement, but nothing else 
in the final chapter suggests any qualification of Fanny's vindication. Sir 
Thomas sees in her an illustration of the '~terling good of principle and 
temper" (p. 455) and of "the advantages of early hardship and discipline, 
and the consciousness of being born to struggle and endure." (p. 456) Jane 
Austen restricts her own endorsement of the marriage to a mention of "true 
merit and true love" (p. 456), but her lack of rapture is less unusual than 
the unilluminated state in which she leaves her heroine. One would not 
necessarily want to see Fanny driven from Mansfield Park like Catherine from 
Northanger Abbey; but where the t4iss Bertrams are so severely treated for 
their lack of "self-knowledge, generosity, and humility" (p. 55), one would 
not have expected Fanny's equal lack of at least tvlO of these qualities to 
escape comment. 
self-knowledge; 
Fanny is unique amongst Jane Austen's heroines in escaping 
and Mansfield Park is unique amongst her novels in leaving 
a major irony unresolved. 
Mansfield Park remains interesting as a great writer's attempt to 
straitjacket her moral imagination, arguably 
that did not engage her creative sympathies. 
in the interests of an orthodoxy 
The point is stated strongly 
by ~larvin ~ludrick, perhaps the severest of Jane Austen's admirers: 
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Mansfield Park was to be a novel vindicating the ethical foundation 
of Jane Austen's world. 
Mansfield Park itself is the symbol of stabil ity, 
discipline, order: universal catchwords of theology.17 
Mudrick sees this as leading to a renunciation of irony: "the current of 
irony has failed" (p. 106). Though agreeing with Mudrick about the apparent 
intentions of the novel, I have tried to show that irony does assert itself 
- that is, that Jane Austen's ironic habit creates a perspective on Fanny 
that she may not have foreseen. As I shall argue more fully in the next 
chapter, the creative process, especially in the hands of an habitually 
ironic \~riter, may generate ironies not necessarily intended by the author, 
if only the unresolved irony of a disjunction between professed and 
instinctive values. The numerous questions begged by this formulation will 
be more fully considered in that discussion; for the time being, Mansfield 
Park serves as an instructive aberration not only from the rest of Jane 
Austen's novels, but also from that conjunction of belief and imagination 
that gives the nineteenth-century novel its poise and energy. 
At the risk of qualifying that general isabon out of existence, it 
should be mentioned that Mansfield Park is by no means the only exception to 
this model. Vanity Fair, for instance, represents a much more extreme 
failure of belief than Jane Austen's novel. In the figure of Amelia, 
Thackeray tries, and quite consciously fails, to oppose the vanity of his 
world with a vital alternative. Losing faith in Amelia, not daring to commit 
himself to the dangerously alive Becky, he shrugs it all off in a totally 
ironic ending that collapses upon itself in flat disillusionment. It is not 
a novel that can be dismissed in a paragraph; but its unappeased spirit will 
hover over the discussion of The Wings of the Dove, which is where it belongs. 
If it is true tha t the A.verage Man is an abstract ion of whi ch no 
individual example exists, it may also be true that the Victorian Novel is a 
similar abstraction, to which all Victorian novels approximate to a gl"eate)" 
or lesser degree. Nevertheless, one novel comes close to being the essential 
Victorian Novel: Elizabeth Gaskell's North and South. 
17 "The Triumph of Gentility: Mansfield Park", from Jilne Austen 
(University of California Press, 1968); rpt. in The NineteenfF. Cenfury Novel, 
ed. Ar'nold Kettle (London: Heinemann, 1972), p. Hm. . 
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The novel confronts, through the experience of its central figure, the 
profound social change of its era, the transition from the settled, rural 
existence associated with the South to the clamorous, restless industrial 
world of the North. Its heroine has retained enough of the breeding and 
propriety of her forebears not to offend against the sensibilities of readers 
schooled in Jane Austen, but she has independence of spirit enough not to 
look feeble next to Jane Eyre. In Margaret Hale we are given the prototype 
of the heroi ne who takes res pons i b il ity for her own 1 i fe, and who sees that 
responsibility in the wider context of a changing society: no longer Jane 
Austen's four and twenty families, but an alien, at times hostile mass, 
impossible to patronise or ignore. In other words, the individual's relation 
to society, which has become such a cliche in relation to the nineteenth-
century novel, is in North and South still an anxiously pondered question, 
with nothing of the formulaic "social-problem" air about it. It is a question 
that George Eliot was to ponder with greater profundity, Dickens with greater 
originality, and, ultimately, Lawrence with greater incisiveness; but 
nowhere is the question approached with greater concern and sincerity. 
The note of concern, the evident desire to inform her readers and to 
appeal to them on the basis of shared principles of fairness, is part of what 
makes Mrs Gaskell so representative of the .Meliorist strain in Victorian 
fiction: there is a strong belief that social conditions could be improved 
through mutual understanding, but an equally strong insistence on the 
imperfections of those conditions. It is in its Meliorist aspect, of course, 
that North and South differs most decisively from the novels of Jane Austen 
- say, from Pride and Prejudice, with which it has much in common in other 
respects. r"n both novels mutua 1 mi sunderstand i ng ari sing from pri de and 
prejudice forms the basis of the plot, and the resolution of the irony 
depends on the clearing up of that misunderstanding. In North and South, 
however, the central relationship is mOl"e dynamically linked with its social 
context: the initial antipathy between Margaret and Mr Thornton is part of 
a larger antipathy in society - in its broadest terms between North and 
South, but also between "masters and men" and between men and women. 
The novel is as closely structured around a central theme as Pride and 
Prejudice, but in this case the secondary characters do not statically 
represent simp 1 ifi ed vers ions of the concerns of the ma i n characters: they 
are actively engaged \-lith the same problems as the ma i n characters, and are 
as subject to change - or where they are not, as in the case of Mrs Hale, 
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Dixon and Edith, their very resistance or immunity to change makes a point 
about them. This is to say that the structural ironies are not confined to 
the main characters. 
The novel's central concern is with authority; and the extension of 
this to all the relationships, personal and social, sexual and industrial, 
anticipates the similar, if more complex, patterns of George Eliot and 
ultimately of lawrence. In this case, the relationships in the novel present 
variants on the strugg1 e for authority between Margaret and ThoY'nton: Mr 
Hale's weak overruling of his wife, Edith's conventional submission to her 
husband (to liberate his ego into letting her have her way), ~lrs Thornton's 
assumption of the dominant position in her marriage (only to yield to the 
greater strength of her son), Margaret's struggle of wills with Dixon. On 
a less personal level, Mr Hale's religious doubts and Frederick's mutiny 
become peripheral examples of the revolt against authority represented by 
the strike and subsequent riot. 
Margaret's calm assumption of social superiority is set against 
Thornton's personal assertiveness and position as a "master": in both cases, 
the naturally forceful personality is reinforced by a social structure not 
recognised by the other. To Thornton, who tends to see life as a series of 
battles, this presents a challenge. At their first meeting, as he tells his 
mother, she "held herself aloof from [h im] as if she had been a queen, and 
[he] her humble, unvlashed vassal."18 This leads him, on their second 
meeting, to imagine a reversal of these roles: 
She had a bracelet on one tape;- arm, which would fall down over 
her round vwist. Mr Thomton watched the re-placing of this 
troublesome ornament with far more attention than he listened to 
her father. It seemed as if it fascinated him to see her push it 
up impatiently, until it tightened her soft flesh •... She handed 
him his cup of tea with the proud air of an unwilling slave; ... 
and he almost longed to ask her to do for him what he saw her 
compelled to do for her father, who took her 1 ittle finger and 
thumb in his masculine hand, and made them serve as sugar-tongs. 
(p. 120) 
The erotic overtones of this scene clearly arise from Thornton's fantasy of 
the subjection of the queenly Margaret. In the same scene he talks to Mr' 
Hale about "tile war which compels, and shall compel, all material power to 
18 North and South, ed. Dorothy Collin, intl'od. Martin Dodsworth 
(1854-55; rpt. HarmoniIsworth: Penguin, 1970), p. 117. 
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Against this background, t~r Thornton's proposal presents itself as an 
affront, a threat to Margaret's self-sufficiency: reflecting that "their 
intercourse had been one continued series of opposition" (p. 256), she sees 
his declaration of love as a continuation of this battle: 
And she shrank and shuddered as under the fascination of some great 
power, repugnant to her whole previous life. She crept away, and 
hid from his idea ...• She disliked him the more for having 
mastered her inner will. .., 
And so she shuddered away from the threat of hi s enduring love. 
What did he mean? Had she not the power to daunt him? She would 
see. It was more daring than became a man to threaten her so. 
(p. 257) 
The presentation of Mr Thornton and Margaret's relationship is similar enough 
to Lawrence's depiction of Gerald Crich and Gudrun to suggest that North and 
South is as much a Victorian Women in Love as a Victorian Pride and 
Prejudice. 19 But to draw the comparison is to note the decisive difference 
in emphasis: Lawrence sees in the confrontation of his lovers the will to 
power and the will to self-destruction that culminated in the Great War; 
Mrs Gaskell sees a conflict that can be resolved with understanding and 
compromi se. Between these two acute observers of i ndustri ali sa ti on lie a 11 
the lessons of the Industrial Revolution. Lawrence's Gudrun starts with the 
conviction "I shall know more of that man" (p. 62), and ends by destroying 
him because "knowing him finally she was the Alexander seeking new worlds." 
(p. 550). In Lawrence, the search for knowledge is a search for power, and 
can become destructive. In Mrs Gaskell, knowledge of others and of oneself 
resolves antipathy. 
Like Elizabeth Bennet, Margaret Hale has to be enlightened as to the 
real nature of her feeling for the mar. she abhors: she cannot see that the 
violence of hel' reaction to his proposal is a tribute to his power over her. 
The main structural irony of North and South is that Margaret has to submit 
19 The similarities extend to the whole relationship, but there is a 
particularly striking correspondence between Thornton's view of man's battle 
against "material power" and Gerald's: "This was the sole idea, to turn lIpon 
the inanimate matter of the underground, and reduce it to his will." (Women 
~ Love, p. 301). 
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to the humiliating recognition that the opinion of the man to whom she had 
assumed a natural superiority matters supremely to her, that moral 
distinctions are more important than class distinctions: "nothing but chaos 
and night surrounded the one lurid fact that, in Mr Thornton's eyes, she was 
degraded." (p. 355) In turn Thornton, who has achieved and measured his 
independence by money, must submit to receiving financial aid from her. 
The resolution of this conflict is as much a resolution of irony on the 
basis of achieved insight as the ending of Pride and Prejudice. In the 
nature of things, this resolution cannot be paralleled by a similarly complete 
resolution of industrial tension. Nevertheless, the terms in which Thornton 
describes his proposed scheme to bring employers and employees together, 
transfer to that sphere the principles upheld in the personal relationship: 
"'We should understand each other better, and I'll venture to say we should 
1 i ke each other more. '" (p. 525) 
With the ~Iisdom of hindsight, it may be possible to reject this 
tentative optimism as facile, and in the lurid 1 ight of revolutionary theory 
we may, like John Lucas, find "Mrs Gaskell's grey dream of reconciliation" 
unexciting. 20 It is no doubt true, as Raymond Williams maintains, that her 
novels reveal a "feal" of violence which was widespread among the upper and 
middle classes at the time"21 (and which, apparently, the twentieth-century 
intellectual has now overcome). This, however, can be seen as a literary 
weakness only if we accept that the political views implicit in a novel 
determine its literary value, as Arnold Kettle seems to do: 
That intensity of indignation which breaks through in Dickens and 
adds an artistic dimension to his novels is muffled in Mrs Gaskell 
by her Christian resignation and her passive acceptance of the 
eternal laws of the economists. 22 
By this criterion, the "intensity of indignation" of, say, Pollen Ginsberg's 
20 "Mrs Gaskell and Brotherhood" in Tradition and Tolerance in 
Nineteenth-Century Fiction, eds. David Howard, John Lucas ailClJOhn-Goode 
\Lon-don: Routledge and Regan Paul, 1966), p. 205. 
21 "The Industrial Novels" in Culture and Society (1958; rpt. 
Ha rmondsl'lOrth: Pengui n, 1963), p. 1 02. HITllams I empnas is. 
22 "The Early Victorian Social-Problem Novel" in From Dickens to Hardy, 
ed. BOI"is Ford (Harmonds\vorth: Penguin, 1960), p. 182-r-"Myui1clerlliiTng-.-
Kettle is here I"eferr-ing to ~lary Barton, but he applies the same cl"iticism 
to North and South. 
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"Howl" would be more "artistic" than the "Christian resignation" of the Four 
Quartets; but more to my purpose than these priorities is Kettle's use of 
terms like "muffled" and "passive resignation" to refer to what I would call 
the "resolved" element of Mrs Gaskell's novels. The terms demonstrate 
exactly what resolution is not: the suppression of a vital response to a 
presented situation. The energies of North and South- are indeed directed at 
resolution in terms of values like rationality and good faith; but if a 
belief in these values makes possible that hope of "reconciliation" that seems 
so tame to modern critics, it also forms the basis of Mrs Gaskell's reminder 
to her readers that the society they inhabit is not perfect. There is -indeed 
little "intensity of indignation" in this reminder; but "I want you to 
change" can be said in a variety of tones of voice. 
To draw a distinction between Mrs Gaskell and Dickens, as Arnold Kettle 
does, on the grounds of "that intensity of indignation" which "adds an 
artistic dimension to his novels" is to be as unfair to Dickens as to Mrs 
Gaskell: if it disregards the nature of her artistry in an insistence on a 
particular emotional quality, it also reduces Dickens' genius to the passion 
of the soapbox orator. 
There ~ indignation in Dickens, of course, as there is not in Mrs 
Gaskell, but it forms only one aspect of his complex art. It is that aspect 
that is often called caricature, and that led E.M. Forster to pronounce 
Dickens' characters "nearly all flat".23 It is what Raymond Williams, in 
comparing Hard Times with Mrs Gaskell's novels, more helpfully calls "less 
imaginative observation than imaginative judgement".24 
Williams' term "imaginative judgement" defines by implication the aim 
of serious caricature, and aptly characterises the technique whereby Dickens 
presents a figure or setting in terms that contain as much moral assessment 
as description. It is impossible, for instance, to judge Mr Bounderby 
independently of Dickens' description of him: he is presented to us 
prejudged: 
He was a rich man: banker, merchant, manufacturer, and what not. 
23 Aspects of the Novel (1927; rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962), p. 
79. In context-fliTs judgement is of course much less dismissive than my 
truncation makes it seem. 
24 Culture and Society, p.104. 
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A big, loud man, with a stare, and a metallic laugh. A man made 
out of a coarse material, which seemed to have been stretched to 
make so much of him • .•• A man who was always proclaiming, through 
that brassy speaking-trumpet of a voice of his, his old ignorance 
and his old poverty. A man who was the Bully of humility.25 
We need only compare this with the presentation of Mr Thornton to see how 
little interested Dickens is in fairness: Bounderby's wealth and position 
and even his moral qualities simply become conflated with his physical 
properties, so that in hating him we hate all that Dickens makes him stand 
for. This is to say that he is a member of the gallery of Dickens villains 
who exist by virtue of their vices and would disappear if they had to 
reform: Mr Pecksniff, Pumblechook, Uriah Heep, Podsnap ••• The fact that 
the list could be extended considerably, and would include some of the best-
known figures in English fiction, still does not make this type of 
characterisation the mainspring of Dickens' art. 
Against such "imaginative judgements" may be set, for instance, the 
apparently very similar presentation of Mr Gradgrind: 
Thomas Gradgrind, Sir. A man of realities. A man of facts and 
calculations. A man who proceeds on the principle that two and 
two are four, and nothing over, and who is not to be talked into 
allow'jng for anything over. (p. Z) 
Again the character seems eternally fixed, judged irrevocably upon 
i ntroduct i on. I n the event, of course, thi s proves not to be the case: Mr 
Gradgrind changes as Mr Bounderby does not. The difference, obvious as it 
is, points to two conflicting impulses in the novel, each proceeding from a 
different assumption about the society depicted. r~r Bounderby and his kind 
imply a static society, or, as John Lucas puts it, "the system he serves is 
seen as a fixity rather than a process so that any attempt to change it is 
doomed to failure".26 This assumption affects the nature of the irony 
directed at Bounderby. The main irony at his expense is, of course, that 
the man "who could never sufficiently vaunt himself a self-made man" (p. 12) 
has been bribing his mother for years not to reveal his respectable origins. 
25 Hard Times (1854; rpt. London: J.t1. Dent, 1907), p. 12. 
26 The Helancholy ~lan, 2nd ed. (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), 
p. 242. 
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The irony is structurally based in that this fact onlY,comes to light at the 
end of the novel, but it remains, as it were, an extended local irony in that 
it involves neither moral discovery on the part of the character nor real 
enlightenment on the part of the reader: it merely confirms and reinforces 
our unfavourable judgement of Mr Bounderby. This is similar to Jane Austen's 
technique of presenting, say, Mrs Bennet; but in Dickens the static secondary 
character is supplemented not only by the dynamic central character, but also 
by other secondary characters who are capable of change. 
In Gradgrind's case, the irony is, of course, that his "realities" prove 
to be woefully inadequate to the task of bringing up children: Sissy Jupe 
turns out to have had an essentially sounder education than either Louisa or 
Tom Gradgrind. In this instance the revelation of the irony does entail moral 
discovery on the part of Mr Gradgrind: 
And he 1 aid [hi s daughter] down there, and saw the pri de of hi s 
heart and the triumph of his system, lying, an insensible heap, at 
his feet. (p. 196) 
Here the irony is fully resolved, in that Gradgrirjd achieves equality of 
insight with reader and author; from this point on he can only do the 1 ittle 
that is in his power to undo the effects of' his system. 
On the one hand, then, the fi gure of Mr Bounderby seems to imply that 
things are what they are and are likely to remain so. On the other hand, the 
treatment of Mr Gradgrind seems to suggest that things are as they are because 
people are misguided: where there is good faith, people and things may change. 
I am not putting this forward as an untenable contradiction: we do not expect 
of a novelist to project a single and simple conviction on such matters. The 
coexistence of the two impulses clearly distinguishes this novel from the 
more single-minded North and South; but it also distinguishes it from the 
sort of political tract that is so often read - and criticised - as. 
The history of James Harthouse represents yet another impul se: the 
impulse towards ironic withdrawal. Like Decoud after him, he believes that 
he alone is cleal'-sighted enough to see through the hollowness of the ideals 
and professed ideals surrounding him. Although Dickens clearly shares some 
of his views, his I'/ithdrawal into cynicism and moral irresponsibility is 
unsparingly dealt with, and symbolically defeated by Sissy Jupe's "blending 
of gentleness and steadiness" (p. 209). The irony of this "defeat" is 
compounded by the further irony that Harthouse is incapable of seeing it as the 
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nearest he has ever come to a moral victory: 
A secret sense of having failed and been ridiculous - a dread of 
what other fellows who went in for similar sorts of things, would 
say at his expense if they knew it - so oppressed him, that what 
was about the very best passage in his life was the one of all 
others he woul d not have owned to on any account, and the on ly one 
that made him ashamed of himself. (p. 211) 
This irony remains unresolved; unlike the very similar Eugene Wrayburn in 
Our r~utua 1 Fri ene!., Harthouse is not redeemed by love. But Harthouse' s cyni ca 1 
clear-sightedness is·nevertheless placed against a much more overt value 
structure than Conrad, for instance, feels able to provide for Decoud. 
Industrial relations may remain, in Stephen Blackpool's dying words, "Awa 
muddle!" (p. 244), and Dickens does not propose any solution to it. But in 
Sissy Jupe and in Mr Sleary, whom F.R. Leavis describes as figuring as "a 
humane, anti-Utilitarian positive",27 Dickens does overtly, even didactically, 
introduce a stable, if unspecific, scale of values: 
" that there ith a love in the world, not all Thelf-intereth 
after all, but thomething very different; ... that it hath a way 
of ith own of calculating or not calculating .... " (p. 262) 
The adequacy of this, which has been much debated, is not at issue here. My 
point is that the novel's structure depends wholly on its presence: it is 
the insight towards which the novel's central irony develops. 
The part played by such an apparently simple positive in the structure 
of a novel can be more fully appreciated in Dickens' most perfect novel, 
Great Expectations. This novel is unswervingly directed bya central, fully 
resolved irony: it is as deliberate an exposure of human blindness and 
eventual enlightenment as King Oedipus. Just as Oedipus tries to flee his 
origins and identity and by so do·jng discovers them anew, so Pip has to learn 
tha t his trues t i dent i ty is the one he di seavers as the novels tarts: "50, 
I called myself Pip, and came to be called Pip."28 This self-elected 
identity becomes submerged in the various identities bestowed upon him by 
other people ("Iloy!"; "Hr Pip"; "Handel"; "Sir"; "Pip ... Sir"; "Young 
27 Dickens the Novelist (1970; rpt. Harmondworth: Penguin, 1972), 
p. 261. 
28 GI'eat Expectations, ed. and introd. Angus Calder (1860-61; rpt. 
Harmondlvorth: Penguin, 1965), p. 35. 
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man"), only to be reaffirmed at the end of the novel, as ·Pip once again 
"comes to be called Pip" - or "dear old Pip, old chap" (po 488) to be precise. 
To put it differently, Pip discovers that he was closest to being a 
"gentleman", in the special sense established 
merely Pip and took pity on a hungry convict. 
by the novel, when he was 
All the related ironies - and 
there can be few novels that rely so heavily on irony for moral definition -
ultimately derive from this 'central "mistaken identity". 
One example of this will have to stand for the many. In stipulating 
that Pip is to retain his name after being elevated to a "gentleman", 
Magwitch presumably tries to fix the identity of the boy who has remained 
constant in his memory. The fact that, as gentleman, Pip is called "Mr Pip" 
signals Magwitch's mistake and failure: his own misplaced values have 
temporarily obscured the Pip whom he ~Ias trying both to retain and to reward. 
There are elements in the novel of a more fatalistic irony, suggesting 
that Pip is at the mercy of forces beyond his control. The most explicit 
statement of such an interpretation is contained in the ironic fable with 
which Pip introduces Magwitch's disconcerting return. In the tale, "the 
heavy slab that was to fall on the bed of state in the flush of conquest" is 
prepared meticulously years in advance, all the machinery put into place to 
effect its fall, and "the hour come", it crashes down on the unsuspecting 
victim: 
So, in my case; all the work, near and far, that tended to the 
end, had been accomplished; and in an instant the blow was struck, 
and the roof of my stronghold dropped upon me. (po 330) 
This does conform to that aspect' of the work's irony that hinges on Pip's 
innocent unawareness of the destiny being shaped for him independently of his 
own hopes and illusions. But it leaves out of account Pip's own actions which 
have, as it were, made him vulnerable to the blow. The fable, in other words, 
conveys Pip's own feelings at this stage, but not the later sense of his own 
complicity which most of the subtler ironies in the novel enforce. The most 
important point about the present irony, in fact, is that it is itself 
ironically reversed: Magwitch's return heralds not Pip's death, but his 
rebirth. This is to say that the relatively amoral irony of fate is qualified 
by an intricate network of morally based ironies. 
The pattern of the novel is very complex, but, as in Hard Times, the 
ironies come to rest on relatively simple values, those values from which 
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Pip has deviated in his career as a gentleman. As all Pip's expectations 
are stripped away, so are the ironies, until his last and, he thinks, most 
modest expectation - to marry Biddy - ends in his final lesson that in this 
instance too he can never, never undo what he has done. All that he can do 
is ask Joe and Biddy for that forgiveness that offers, in this novel as in 
Little Dorrit, liberation from the chain of transgression-retribution -
remorse that binds so many of the characters: 
Dear Joe, I hope you will have children to love, and that 
some little fellow will sit in this chimney corner of a winter 
night, who may remind you of another little fellow gone out of 
it for ever. Don't tell him, Joe, that I was thankless; don't 
tell him, Biddy, that I was ungenerous and unjust; only tell him 
that I honoured you both, because you were both so good and true, 
and that, as your child, I said it would be natural to him to grow 
up a much better man than I did.' (p. 488) 
This apparently simple plea derives its force from the fact that it draws on 
values that have been defined through Pip's upbringing by Joe, and implied 
through Miss Havisham's warped education of Estella: ·in short, the positives 
have been created by the novel. Against Pip's owri education as gentleman is 
set the ideal of education through love: "to grow up a much better man" is 
seen as more "natural", gi ven the natural goodness of the parents, than 
growing up a "gentleman". The qualities invoked here, such as lov~,gratitude, 
generosity and constancy have been part of the novel's design from the start, 
but they have been brought into rel ief by the insight that comes to Pip as he 
looks at the shackled Magwitch: 
I only saw a man who had meant to be my benefactor, and who had 
felt affectionately, gratefully, and geney'ously, towards me with 
great constancy through a series of years. I only saw in him a 
much better man than I had been to Joe. ,( pp. 456-57) 
With such precise definition as is provided by the complex interlinking of the 
plot, Pip's apparently broad "so good and true" has nothing vague or unfocused 
about it: we know exactly what it means, even though its r-ichness escapes 
formulation. 
Perhaps because it is more exclusively concerned with the growth of a 
single individual, Great Expectations is more strongly dominated than Dickens' 
other novels by a redemptive movement. The capacity for change, in terms of 
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values common to Dickens and his readers, is inherent in the design of the 
novel and implicit in its fully resolved ironies. In the other novels, we 
more generally have,as in Hard Times, the coordination of static and 
dynamic patterns. The patterns are, of course, part of the fabric of the 
novels, but can conveniently be isolated in the conclusions of the major 
nove 1 s. 
The two narratives of Bleak House embody these two principles most 
clearly. The novel ends twice, as it were: once on the Dedlock estate, 
"with so little change under the summer shining or the wintry lowering", on 
the words "dull repose"; and once on the rather overpoweri ng bri skness of 
Esther's narrative, concluding on the unfinished phrase" - even supposing -", 
implying an ongoing development. 29 
In other novels Dickens contrives to contain both impulses in a single 
concluding sentence. Thus Little Dorrit and Arthur Clennam, having 
escaped from the prison Mr Dorrit and so many other characters never leave, 
went quietly down into the roaring streets, inseparable and 
blessed; and as they passed along in sunshine and shade, the 
noisy and the eager, and the arrogant and the froward and the vain, 
fretted and chafed, and made their usual uproar. 3D 
This contrast is repeated in Our Mutual Friend. ~lortimer L ightwood, 
having been enlightened by Wrayburn's experience, once again confronts 
Society - a Society totally unchanged, since our first view of its 
representatives around the bran-new dinner-table of the Veneerings, except 
for Twemlow, who has at last broken out of his subservience: 
When the company disperse - by which time Nr and Mrs Veneering 
have had quite as much as they Vlant of the honour, and the guests 
have had quite as much as they Vlant of the other honour - ~Iortimer 
sees Tlvemlow home, shakes nanas with him cordially at parting, and ~ 
fares to the Temple, gaily.31 
The equilibrium of the two impulses is very delicate, the lightest 
29 Bleak House, ed. Norman Page, introd. J. Hillis Miller (1853; rpt. 
Penguin HarmondsVlorth: Penguin, 1971), pp. 931-32, 935. 
30 Little Dorrit, ed. and introd. John Holloway (1856-57; rpt. 
Ha rmonds\"Iorth: PengiJl n, 1967), p. 895. 
31 Our Mutual Friend, ed. and introd. Stephen Gill (1864-65; rpt. 
Harmondsl'lorth: PengUin, 1971), p. 892. 
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pressure on either of them tending to disturb the balance. Thus H.M. Da1eski, 
in hi s i 11 umina t i ng account of Our Mutua 1 Fri end, ca 11 s the novel a "sus ta i ned 
plea for life" - a life, though, that is threatened by Podsnappery: "and it 
is to Podsnap that Dickens very nearly gives the last word in the novel. "32 
In most other novels "very nearly" would have been near enough, but in this 
case the actual "last word in the novel" is very deliberately arranged, at some 
inconvenience to the syntax, to be "gaily". This does not, of course, 
invalidate Da1eski's main point, which is that the presence of Podsnap on the 
last page "places the stories of individual regeneration in perspective" 
(p. 336); it merely stresses mine, which is that these complex concluding 
sentences, like the double ending of Bleak House, are very consciously 
designed to incorporate two visions at the same time. What is very nearly the 
last word and what is in fact the last word may stand diametrically opposed. 
What John Lucas says of Bleak HO!Jse applies to all these novels: 
'" Bleak House denies the possibility of freedom, either from 
history, society or the self. But in forcing us to accept this, 
Dickens also forces us to accept the truth that human beings are 
not inevitably crushed by the social forces they encounter and that 
despair is therefore ill-judged or an improper and Dedlock-like 
declaration of preferences. 33 
One cannot altogether escape the impression, however, that Dickens spent 
much of his writing energy keeping at bay the darker forces, what Lucas calls 
"the social pressures which surround and threaten the individual." (p. 253) 
Ultimately nothing in Little Dorrit really dispels the powerful prison-image: 
if Arthur Clennam is redeemed, Mr Dorrit, Mrs Clennam and Mr Merd1e are not, 
except by death. In Bleak House much of Esther's narrative rings so false 
that vie find the Dedlocks a relief, ~Jhich is presumably the exact opposite of 
Dickens' intention. In Our Mutual Friend Bella Hilfer's better nature turns 
out to be disturbingly like simpering idiocy, and Mr Boffin's decline is fal' 
more consistent with the novel's implication of the corrupting influence of 
money than his rehabilitation. 
But the significant fact remains that such hope as there is in the novels 
32 Dickens and the Art of Analogy (London: Faber, 1970), p. 336. 
33 The Melancholy Man, p. 243. 
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is not tacked on, but part of the total vision: as we have seen, it is an 
inextricable part of the design of the novels, the point towards which the 
action moves - or at least one point towards which it moves. If this proves 
nothing else, it proves the intensity of Dickens' desire to believe in the 
possibility of redemption; and in the dramatisation of this desire he still 
has available to him a set of simple absolutes on the basis of which to 
address his audience and upon which to construct his ironies. 
In George Eliot's novels "the social pressures which surround and 
threaten the individual" are as strongly present as in those of Dickens, but 
in her case these pressures are seen also as potential supports or 
inspirations. In her works there is a general irony in the individual's 
aspiration towards self-fulfilment in a society that is indifferent, if not 
actively hostile, to that aspiration; but a deeper irony subsides in the 
fact that self-fulfilment is possible only in relation to that community. 
Paradoxically, the ironic tension between the individual's aspiration and 
his social destiny is resolvable only through his acceptance of his part in 
the common lot. Thus individual destiny is determined partly by external 
circumstances, and partly by moral choice. This duality, so central to 
George Eliot's thinking, is most explicitly stated in a famous passage from 
The Millon the Floss: 
For the tragedy of our lives is not created entirely from within. 
"Character," says Nova1is, in one of his questionable aphorisms, 
"character is destiny." But not the whole of our destiny. Hamlet, 
Prince of Denmark, was speculative and irresolute, and we have a 
great tragedy in consequence. But if his father had 1 ived to a 
good old age, and his uncle had died an early death, we can 
conceive Hamlet's having married Ophelia, and got through life with 
a reputation of sanity notwithstanding many soliloquies .... 34 
To Eliot, as to Dickens, there is thus a.n element of human destiny that is 
socially determined, a tragic element in the individual's subjection to forces 
larger than himself. We knOl'/ that George E1 iot was reading Greek tragedy 
while she was planning Felix Ho1t,35 and this element" in her fiction clearly 
34 Th~.ill.-0n the Flos~ (1860; rpt. London: Dent, 1908), p. 378 
35 Peter Coveney, Introduction to Fe1i~01t, p. 37. 
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owes something to the Greek dramatists. But whereas in Greek tragedy the 
externa 1 force takes the form of the wi 11 of the gods, in George E1 iot' s 
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novels it is often as mundane 
extensive exploration of this 
through most of her fiction. 
again, as in The Millon the 
as the whims of one's neighbours. The most 
theme is of course in Middlemarch, but it runs 
In Felix Holt, for instance, the theme is once 
Floss, stated explicitly: 
... this history is chiefly concerned with the private lot of a 
few men and women; but there is no private life which has not 
been determined by a wider public life, from the time when the 
primeval milkmaid had to wander with the wanderings of her clan, 
because the CO~I she mil ked was one of a herd whi ch had made the 
pastures bare. (p. 129) 
Since the statement is intended to correct a bias, its formulation is weighted 
rather heavily towards "public life": the word "determined" and the example 
of the milkmaid may seem to ascribe an absolute power to public life, against 
which individual will is helpless. Felix Holt itself, however, supports no 
such determinism. 
Esther Lyon's destiny is indeed affected, in a sense "determined", by the 
"wanderings of her clan", influenced as those are by events as public as the 
Napoleonic wars. Ultimately, hO\~ever, Esther has to choose her own fate: 
deciding between Felix Holt and Harold Transome means choosing between two 
very different destinies that seem to have been prepared for her, on the one 
hand by her mother's "wanderings", on the other by the legal convolutions that 
make her heir to Transome Court. Thus moral choice takes precedence ovel' 
passive submission to a predetermined pattern of events. The classically 
inexorable ironies of Mrs Transome's subjection to the past, like a 
Clytemnestra destroyed by the return of her son, are supplemented by the less 
deterministic irony that Esther, granted all that she ever desired of leisure 
and riches, chooses to return to the humble surroundings she used to despise. 
,Esther's moral recognition constitutes that change that Felix insisted 
upon ("I want you to change"): it is the private aspect of the Me1iorism of 
which Felix is the far-from-optimistic spokesman. If society by the end of 
the novel does not seem much nearer true reform than at the beginning, the 
possibility of change in the individual, as dramatised in Esther, at least 
does not seem like an implausible exception to a general rule. The obvious 
comparison here is with Bella Wi1fer in Our Mutual Friend, who also is brought 
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to choose her own destiny, rather than to submit to that deus ex machina of 
Victorian fiction, the unforeseen bequest. It is a measure of George El iot' s 
fuller commitment to Meliorism that Esther's history should not, 'like Bella's 
en 1 i ghtenment, seem to be at odds wi th the energi es of the nove 1. In both 
cases, the irony based on the heroine's blindness to her own truest nature is 
fully resolved by her recognition of non-material values; but in George Eliot 
the process of moral discovery seems 1 ess mechan i ca lly contri ved. She seems, 
as it were, to think more naturally in terms of moral regeneration than 
Dickens does. 
Paradoxically, the greater plausibility of Esther's moral growth may 
derive from George Eliot's profounder insight into the opposite case, the 
example from which the heroine learns. Mrs Transome is a more instructive, 
because more convincing, exemplum of moral atrophy than Mr Boffin. This may 
be another way of demonstrating the point that a belief in the possibility 
of change is based on a deep understanding of the need for change, on a 
profound analysis of what it is that must change. 
It is, of course, in Middlemarch that the tension between the freely 
chosen and the socially determined is most fully explored, to form the basis 
of the dominant irony of the novel. In its_simplest form, that irony 
proceeds from the individual's blithe unawareness of what Destiny has in 
store: 
But anyone watching keenly the stealthy' convergence of human lots, 
sees a slow preparation of effects from one life on another, which 
tells like a calculated irony on the indifference or the frozen 
stare with which we look at our unintroduced neighbour. Destiny 
stands by sarcastic with our dramatis personae folded in her 
hand.36 
This "stealthy convergence of human lots" may, of course, be no more than the 
"calculated irony" of plot contrivance, serving mainly to demonstrate the 
"sarcastic" omniscience of the author. The sarcastic aspect of George Eliot's 
Dest i ny bears a strong resemblance to Di ckens' ~li ss Wade, portentously 
addressing a mystified Mr Meagles and a shrinking Pet Meagles: 
36 Middlemarch, ed. and introd. 14.J. Harvey (1871-72; rpt. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin,1965), p. 122. 
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'In our course through life we shall meet the people who are 
coming to meet us, from many strange places and by many strange 
roads, •.• and wnat it is set to us to do to them, and what it 
is set to them to do to us, will all be done.' (Little Dorrit, 
p. 63) 
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This element of predestined convergence, which in itself has little more 
moral significance than Rigaud's "destiny's dice-box" (Little Dorrit, p. 47), 
is indeed present in Middlemarch, as it is in Felix Holt and Little Dorrit, 
and in each case is the least admired aspect of the novel in which it occurs: 
the manipulations which reveal Bulstrode's connection with Ladislaw, the 
impossibly contrived legal tangle which makes Esther heir to Transome Court, 
the bewildering convolutions that link Little Dorrit to Mrs Clennam. 
But in all these novels, the apparently arbitrary interweaving of human 
destinies serves a larger vision: what John Holloway calls "one of the 
greatest i nte 11 ectua 1 di scoveri es of the earl i er nineteenth century the 
emergence of the whole idea of society as a great unified fabric" .37 Geoffrey 
Hemstedt goes so far as to ascribe the vitality of the Victorian novel to the 
discovery of the novel's "epic" capacity for "the comprehensive unfolding of 
interrelated destinies";38 by this theory, the novel proved to be the form 
best adapted to reflecting society's emet'ging view of itself. Such 
generalisations are, in the nature of things, easier to criticise than to 
prove; suffice it to say that in r~iddlemarch, at any rate, this "idea of 
society as a great unified fabric" is indeed the vitalising principle and 
the key to the organisation of the novel. 
The "stea lthy convergence of human lots" thus bri ngs with it a vi s i on 
of the individual as sharing responsibility for the common lot, linked to it 
not only by a I'lhim of Destiny, but also by moral choice. Individual 
aspiration is only meaningful in so far as it aims to serve and to alleviate 
the cornman lot, as all the relationships in the novel are designed to 
demonstrate. In Lydgate's case, for instance, this recognition quite 
consciously, even self-consciously, takes the shape of "the ambition of 
making his life recognized as a factor in the better life of mankind" (p.195) 
- "mankind" perhaps being less real to him than the ambition to be 
"recognized". In Dorothea I s case, allegiance with the common lot takes many 
37 Introduction, Little Dorit, p. 16. 
38 "The Novel" in The Victorians, ed. Laurence Lerner (London: 
Hethuen, 1978), p. 3. 
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exalted shapes (notably the unprepossessing and tragically inappropriate one 
of Mr Casaubon), but she does finally arrive at the humbler, if less 
definite, perception of the need to accept her part in a larger whole: 
She opened her curtains, and looked out towards the bit of road 
that lay in view, with fields beyond, outside the entrance-gates. 
On the road there was a man with a bundle on his back and a woman 
carrying"her baby; in the field she could see figures moving -
perhaps the shepherd with his dog. Far off in the bending sky was 
the pearly light; and she felt the largeness of the world and the 
manifold wakings of men to labour and endurance. She was a part 
of that involuntary palpitating life, and could neither look out 
on it from her luxurious shelter as a mere spectator, nor hide her 
eyes in selfish complaining. (p. 846) 
Thus Dorothea escapes Casaubon' s fate, "to be present at thi s great 
spectacle of life and never to be liberated from a small hungry shivering 
self" (p. 314). It could be Dbjected that the liberation is facile: the 
man with the bundle, the woman 11ith the baby, are so extraneous to 
Dorothea's concerns that they might seen to have been trundled on merely 
for the sake of an Illumination. But that would be unfair: these figures 
are merely focused on as extensions of Dorothea's realisation, after a 
night of wrestling with her disappointment and jealousy at finding Ladislaw 
and Rosamond together in apparent intimacy, that her grief should not be 
a11m"led to enclose her "in the narrow cell of her calamity, in the besotted 
misery of a consciousness that only sees another's lot as an accident of 
its own." (p. 845) In other words, Dorothea's renewed awareness of "the 
largeness of the world" is not miraculously awakened by seeing a man with 
a bundle on hi s back: she can see and reg is ter the man (and guess at the 
shepherd: she is short-sighted) because she has escaped from "the narrow 
cell of her calamity". 
It is Dorothea's liberation from "a consciousness that only sees 
another's lot as an accident of her own" that sets her apart from so many 
of "the other characters in the novel. For complementary to the vision of 
the interconnectedness of human destinies is the recognition that each 
individual sees himself as the centre of that intricate web, and others 
merely as the dramatis personae of his drama: 
Your pier-glass or extensive surface of polished steel made to be 
rubbed by a housemaid, will be minutely and multitudinously 
scratched in all directions; but place now against it a lighted 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
72 
candle as a centre of illumination, and lo! the scratches will seem 
to arr'ange themselves in a fine series of concentric circles round 
that little sun. It is demonstrable that the scratches are going 
everywhere impartially, and it is only your candle which produces 
the flattering illusion of a concentric arrangement, its light 
falling with an exclusive optical selection. These things are a 
parable. The scratches are events, and the candle is the egoism of 
any person now absent •. ,. (p. 297) 
Laboured as it may be, this statement sums up the principle underlying 
the most vital ironies of the novel: no longer the "calculated irony" of a 
sarcastic Destiny, but the common, pervasive irony of the individual's 
blindness to the limits of his own importance. It is the main source of 
tragedy in the novel - and as we shall see, to George Eliot it is a tragedy 
in a very precise, if untraditional, sense. 
The clearest example of this ironic tragedy is the history of Tertius 
Lydga te, as determi ned by the purposes of the cha rmi ng Rosamond Vi ncy, 
"entirely occupied not exactly with Tertius Lydgate as he was in himself, 
but with his relation to her" (p. 196). It is central to the design of the 
novel that this egocentricity draws into its little vortex not the noble 
selflessness of the disinterested man of science, but his correspondingly 
egocentric expectations: 
... Lydgate thought that ..• he had found perfect womanhood - felt 
as if already breathed upon by exquisite wedded affection such as 
would be bestowed by an accomplished creature who venerated his 
high musings and momentous labours and would never interfere with 
them .... (p. 387) 
Hhatever George Eliot's later sympathy with Lydgate, in the sharp irony of 
this passage she clearly prepares his Nemesis for him with some relish. It 
is consistent with the novel's concern with "moral stupidity" of this sort 
(p. 243) that Nemesis is not a transformation of Rosamond into a Becky Sharp 
or an Arabe 11 a Donn. She rema i ns the Rosamond whom Lydga te fe 11 in love 
with; he merely gets to know her better, under circumstances that no longer 
permit. the illusion of the compatibility of their egoisms. In the early days 
of their courtship, her "I never give up anything that I choose to do" struck 
him as an "adorable" "constancy of purpose" (p. 385); as he grows into "an 
amazed sense of his powerlessness over Rosamond", he finds himself ~efeated 
by this constancy of purpose - or, as he now calls it, "the terrible tenacity 
of this mild creature." (p. 631) 
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Rosamond effectively destroys Lydgate, but in this she is aided by 
almost all of Middlemarch, who, we are told, "counted on swallowing Lydgate 
and assimilating him very comfortably." (p. 183) In the event he is not so 
much swallowed as spat out; but this is merely another way of discovering 
the dependence of one's destiny on the purposes of others. In this 
dependence, the organic nature of society assumes its most ironical and, in 
George Eliot's sense of the word, tragic aspect. 
To become a fashionable physician and to write a treatise on Gout lacks, 
we should say, the true tragic dimension; but for George El iot the tragedy 
of this fate lies exactly in its banality:· 
... we do not expect people to be deeply moved by what is not 
unusual. That element of tragedy which lies in the very fact of 
frequency, has not yet wrought itself into the coarse emotion of 
mankind •.• (p. 226) 
In spite of the implied disclaimer, it is of course exactly "that element of 
tragedy which 1 ies in the very fact of frequency" that El iot uncovers, in 
keeping with her awareness that each person is the main actor in the drama 
of his own life. By this perspective, even as ordinary a lot as heal't 
disease becomes tragic exactly because it falls so far short of the grandeur 
with which the sufferer invests his own role. There is thus a certain irony 
in the limitedness of Lydgate's sympathy with Casaubon: 
Lydgate ... felt a little amusement mingling with his pity. He was 
at present too ill acquainted with disaster to enter into the pathos 
of a lot where everything is below the level of tragedy except the 
passionate egoism of the sufferer. (p. 460) 
George Eliot is of course as well aware as any tragic theorist that pathos 
is not a tragic emotion: the "amusement" of detachment takes the place of 
the·"terror" of identification. And yet to Casaubon the dashing of his life's 
ambition, misplaced as that ambition may seem to others, is as absolute a 
catastrophe as the coming of 
absolute measure of tragedy: 
protagonist. If Lydgate had 
Birnam Wood to Dunsinane. Thus there is no 
it is a function of the aspiration of the 
not set himself the ideal of arriving at the 
nature of the Primitive Tissue, his treatise on Gout might have given him the 
same pleasUl'e as Fred Viney derives from his work on the Cultivation of Green 
Crops - "but [Lydgate] always regarded himself as a fai lure: he had not done 
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what he once meant to do." (p. 893) 
It is because the tragic is often a matter of a discrepancy between 
intention and achievement that Dorothea's destiny remains so ambiguous. By 
Lydgate's criterion, she is a failure: she also does not do what she once 
meant to do. But in accepting an alternative criterion, whereby the meaning 
of one's life is not measured only by one's own aspirations, but also by 
one's contribution to the aspirations of others, Dorothea frees herself from 
the narrow egoism that may attend greater achievements and blight similarly 
modest ones. She frees herself, as it were, from the arbitrary irony that 
all our aspirations are, in the eyes of our neighbours, merely adjuncts to 
theirs. This liberation involves the acceptance of a humble role in the 
drama of life - and, in Mary Garth's case, even the acceptance that one may 
be acting in a comedy rather than a tragedy: 
having early had strong reason to believe that things were not 
likely to be arranged for her peculiar satisfaction, she wasted no 
time in astonishment and annoyance at that fact. And she had 
already come to take life very much as a comedy in which she had 
a proud, nay, a generous resolution not to act the mean or 
treacherous part. She had learned not to make unreasonable 
claims. (p. 349) 
David Da"iches, seeing this as a final judgement on Dorothea's aspirations, 
asks: 
In the light of it, what becomes of the Saint Theresa concept with 
which the novel opened? Surely it is nOl'I seen as a form of 
unreasonable claim on life, which it is the part of moral maturity 
to forego. 39 
This, however, is to contract the novel to the limits of Mary's comic v"ision, 
and to ignore the tragic vision that informs so much of the novel. Mary's 
realism does indeed show great moral maturity, but to elevate her attitude 
to" a moral imperative is, for instance, to strip Lydgate's history of its 
significance. If Dorothea also comes to accept that her earlier idealism 
was "a form of unreasonable claim on life", this does not neutralise our 
sense of loss. Nor do we forget that such idealism is only "unreasonable" 
in 
39 George El iot: Hiddlemarch (London: Edward Arnold, 1963), p. 57. 
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an imperfect social state, in which great feelings will often take 
the aspect of error, and great faith the aspect of illusion. 
(Middlemarch, p. 896) 
Thus, in an "imperfect social state", an unresolved irony remains in the 
form of a discrepancy between the potential value of the individual and the 
scope offered to him by that society. Nevertheless, an acceptance of the 
smaller role assigned to the individual, on the basis of his common humanity 
rather than of his exceptionality, may resolve the irony of our universal 
"moral stupidity, taking the world as an udder to feed our supreme selves" 
(p. 243). Such an acceptance may then, in George Eliot's world, enable the 
individual to achieve the humbler aspiration of making things "not so ill 
with you and me as they might have been" (p. 896). 
It seems facile to say that for Thomas Hardy, if things are "not so ill 
with you and me as they might have been", then you and I are extraordinarily 
lucky; and yet that is exactly the burden, or at any rate the conclusio~of 
The Mayor of Casterbridge: 
Her position was, indeed, to a marked degree one that, in common 
phrase, afforded much to be thankful for. That she was not 
demonstratively thankful was no f~ult of hers. Her experience had 
been of a kind to teach her, rightly or wrongly, that the doubtful 
honour a f a bri ef trans it through a sorry worl d hardl y called faY' 
effusiveness, even when the path was suddenly irradiated at some 
half-way point by daybeams rich as hers. 40 
But there is little point in once again demonstrating Hardy's gloom. 
A more fruitful comparison with George Eliot and Dickens, and a way tovlards 
analysing this "gloom", may be found in the fact that for him, too, 
individual fate presents itself in the double aspect of the freely chosen 
and the socially determined. In his case, of course, the latter predominates, 
but not always so strongly as to obscure the former - although the tvlO often 
stand in an uncomfortable relation to each other that in Hardy is invariably 
called clumsiness. 
It is something like this that Robert ~eilman refers to as a "pervasive 
two-tone effect" in Hardy's three last novels: 
40 The Mayor of Casterbridge, ed. and introd. Martin Seymour-Smith 
(1886; rpt. Harmonds\'Iorth: PengU1I1, 1978), pp. 410-11. 
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The bitonality reflects •.. a duality in Hardy's feeling about the 
sources of misfortune; one kind of feeling leads him into a formal 
theory, the other rests on his artistic intuition. On the one hand 
he nags, on the other he perceives and records; on the one hand he 
blames cosmos and society, on the other he apprehends character as 
fate. 41 
The "duality" may not be quite as clear-cut as this, but it does exist, and 
it may serve as a basis for a consideration of Hardy, as long as we give due 
emphasis to Heilman's paradox that it is a "feeling" that "leads him into a 
formal theory". In othel' words, we cannot think in terms of a simple 
opposition between what Hardy thinks he should think and what he feels: the 
pessimism, which at times does seem rather theoretical, is clearly not 
extraneous to the energy of the novels. 
The obvious comparison to be drawn here is with George Eliot, more 
specifically with her idea of tragedy. As we have seen, her central concept 
of the "stealthy convergence of human lots" is much more than a matter of 
plot mechanics: it is the expression of a deep"ly felt moral principle, the 
belief in the power of the individual for good or bad in h"is interaction 
with his fellow-individuals. The fortuitous element of this convergence is 
stY'ictly subordinated to the element of responsibility and choice. This 
belief prevents the tragic pattern from becoming an absolute principle in 
these novels. 
Jeannette King makes this the basis of her distinction bet~leen the 
relative weight given to the tragic in the works of Eliot and Hardy: 
... the novel for her reflects the unending connections of human 
life, framing the tragic; Hardy's novels are dominated by the 
form of tragedy, which isolates the tragic pattern. 42 
This does justice, in broad terms, to the difference we feel between these 
two novelists, but it oversimplifies Hardy somewhat, in not taking into 
account the "duality" Heilman refers to. This is to say that the "tragic 
pattern" in Hardy's novels ~ at times dominant, but has to contend ~Iith a 
sti 11 essentia 11y nineteenth-century, morally-based "character is fate" 
41 "Two-Tone Fictions" in The Theory of the Novel, ed. John Halperin 
(New York: Oxford University Press, f97II), p. 313. -
42 TraJedy in the Victorian Novel (Cambridge: Cambt'idge University 
Press, E17E" , pp. 89-90. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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1 ife" . 
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The interaction of these two elements may best be observed in The Mayor 
of Casterbridge, in which they are perhaps more coherently related than in 
the two later novels. In the unfolding of Henchard's history, the standards 
by which the novel judges him undergo a gradual alienation from the standards 
of the community as presented in the novel, until by the end of the novel, if 
we are to identify with Henchard (and there seems to be no alternative to 
doing so), we have to accept his total repudiation of society. To put it 
more simply: whereas in the early stages of the novel we feel that 
Henchard's fate is brought about by his violation of what we regard as normal 
civilised values, as the novel progresses our assessment of him entails an 
increasingly critical view of those values. The tragic pattern may, as 
Jeannette King says, dominate the novel, but the pattern changes: from a 
relatively simple "character is fate" principle, by ~Jhich Henchard's own 
actions determine his destiny, the novel moves to the implication that 
Henchard is the victim of the morality which passes judgement on him. 
Laurence Lerner presents the case for a more static interpretation of 
the role played by Henchard's character in his downfall: 
What binds the episodes together is what they all have in common -
the fact that they show what kind of man Henchard was. How can 
we fail, as we read the book, to see him as a man who makes his 
own destiny?43 
Lerner admits that Henchard is "disastrously unlucky" (p. 20), but argues 
that even in mischance it is Henchard's response which determines the 
outcome, and for which responsibility accrues to him: circumstances only 
"permit the consequences of his own rashness to take place when with common 
good luck they might have been avoided." (p. 57) 
This is clearly true of much of the novel: even the return of the 
furmity woman and of Newson, perversely unlucky and ill-timed as these events 
are, derive their catastrophic potential from Henchard's own earlier actions. 
But I cannot see that they "show what kind of man Henchard was", except in a 
sense that Lerner cannot intend: by showing that Henchard is no longer the 
same man who comrni tted the offence now vi sited upon him. Henchard reacts 
43 Thomas Hardy's The Mayor of Casterbridge: Tragedy or Social History? 
(London:Lfiatto ana1llTndus for Sussex University Press, 1975), p. 1"9-.-----
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completely honourably both to the furmity woman's denunciation and to 
Newson's return. He start to feel more and more that Henchard is denied a 
chance to rehabilitate himself, in other \~ords that his fate is no longer 
a function of his character. 
Robert Schweik has argued this case most persuasively. He divides the 
novel into four "structurally similar 'movements' of progressively 
diminishing lengths".44 In each of th2se movements, a hopeful situation 
is follo~led by a series of events that culminates in catastrophe. Schweik 
sees a progressive development in these lIIovements which has "the effect of 
repeatedly shifting our perception of Henchard's character, of the kind of 
world he inhabits, and of the meaning of the catastrophes which he suffers." 
(pp. 134-35) Thus the long first lIIovement, culminating in the denunciation 
of the furmity woman, "does seem to exemplify the di ctum tha t 'character is 
fate'; it does so largely because Hardy maintains a general correspondence 
between the changes in Henchard's apparent moral stature and the changes in 
his for'tune;." (p. 137) Crudely speaking, there seems to be a moral 
justification for what befalls Henchard. In the second movement, according 
to Schweik, we al'e still aware of the capa,city for reckless violence, but 
this is checked by a counter-impulse: thus Henchard does not disclose the 
identity of the writer of the letters he reads to Farfrae; through an 
"unaccountable impulse" gives way when Farfrae intervenes in his intended 
greeting of the Royal personage (p. 340); and refrains from killing Fal'frae 
in the wrestling match he arranges to avenge himself. Furthermol'B, the 
catastrophe of this section, Lucetta's death, occurs in spite of Henchard's 
pathetic attempt, "in a state of bitter anxiety and contrition" (p. 358), 
to prevent it. In the third cycle of the novel, Henchard's dependence on 
Elizabeth-Jane is stressed, as well as his conscientious struggles against 
promptings which earlier would have precipitated him to destructive action. 
In this repentant mood he accepts the prospect of beco~ing "an inoffensive 
old man, tendet'ly smiled on by Elizabeth, and good-naturedly tolerated by 
her husband" for the sake of the "privi leoe of being in the hOllse she 
occupied" (pp. 384-85). When even this is denied him, he leaves 
Casterbridge in a "state of hopelessness" (388). The modulation of the 
pattern is completed by the final section, in which Henchard's attempt to 
44 "Character and Fate in The Mayor of Casterbridge", Nineteenth-
Century fiction, 21 (1966-67). Rpt. in -Har·d}i-:i~he-tra91c NOveE'~e(C 
lr:-P:-Dr'a~oe-r(Iondon: Macmillan, 1975), p. 134. ---- . --
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obtain Elizabeth-Jane's forgiveness is repelled, leading to his lonely 
death. 
From this Sweik concludes that 
79 
There is, then, a marked contrast between that image of a morally 
ordered world,.projected by the long opening movement of The Mayor 
of Casterbridge and the more sombre, disenchanted vision of man's 
predlcament with which the novel closes .... (pp. 144-45) 
Schweik speculates that this apparent inconsistency helped Hardy "to avoid 
confronting many of his readers with a view of life which would have sharply 
conflicted with their own assumptions and attitudes." (p. 145) He concedes 
that this was probably not deliberate: the changes in the novel "came 
about in the process of composition and were the results of Hardy's efforts 
These to develop his subject and to work out its impl ications." (p. 146) 
changes then reflect Hardy's shift from "the traditional belief in an 
ethically ordered universe" to "his consciously considered views on man's 
place in a Darwinian world." (p. 146) 
Schweik's reading thus accounts for the "duality" that Heilman finds 
in Hardy's novels, and incorporates it, in the case of The Mayor at least, 
into the novel's moral meaning. That meanyng is, of course, different to 
George Eliot's - a point not taken into account by W.J. Harvey in his 
unfavourable comparison of Hardy's use of the Novalis "aphorism" ("Character 
is fate") with that of George El i ot: 
... The Mayor of Casterbridge as a whole contradicts Hardy's 
acceptance of Novalis. Granted that a great deal depends upon the 
character of Henchard, nevertheless the twists and turns of the 
plot, with its manifold coincidences, suggest some external Fate 
or Destiny working upon hilll. 45 
Schweik's reading does not deny this "contradiction", but makes it seem 
like more than sheer clumsiness. 
I have given such prominence to Schweik' s argument because it is so 
relevant to the line I have been trying to trace from the early nineteenth 
to the early twentieth century. Schweik's interpretation is consistent 
with my view of Hardy as a transitional figure between the certainties still 
45 "Idea and Image in the Novels of George Eliot", in Critical Essays on 
George El iot, ed. Barbara Hardy, p. 195. 
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possible to Dickens and George Eliot (albeit certainties held onto with some 
grimness at times) and the much more radical scepticism of the novelists of 
the new century. This is not a particularly original view, but it can still, 
I believe, yield some insight into that relation between structure and 
belief which inheres in an author's mode of irony. Schweik's analysis shows 
the change in this relation taking place within the course of a single novel. 
To put it simply, Henchard's history proceeds in "movements" of diminishingly 
resolved ironies: the first movement is constructed on a resolved irony 
based on Henchard's selling of his wife; after that, the ironies gradually 
lose resolution, until in the final movement it is impossible to ascribe 
positive moral significance to Henchard's rejection. He becomes the victim 
of a disguised version of the compassionless "virtue" which destroys Lucetta. 
Elizabeth-Jane, having stoically, not to say stolidly, survived the vag~ries 
of destiny, becomes the agent of the pitiless "justice" society exacts: 
and then when he, my warm-hearted real father, came to find 
me, ryou] cruelly sent him away with a wicked invention of my death, 
whic~ nearly broke his heart. 0 how can I love as lance did a 
man who has served us like this!' (p. 402) 
Elizabeth-Jane's little harangue demonstrates how unfeeling sentimentality 
can be when it assumes the cloak of righteousness. Newson himself has called 
Henchard's trick a "good joke" (having "failed to perceive the enormity of 
Henchard's crime") (p. 391) and furthermore is not prevented by sentimental 
considerations from leaving his long-lost daughter three days after her 
marriage; there \'Iould thus seem to be little call for Elizabeth-Jane to be 
so outraged on his account. But he is her "warm-hearted real father", so it 
must follow, in defiance of the probabilities, that Henchard's trick "nearly 
broke his heart". She does not ask herself why the man whom she has come to 
"love" as her father should "cruelly" tell a "wicked" lie: her moral 
imagination has exhausted itself in taking these ready-made judgements off 
the shel f. 
Elizabeth-Jane is, in her small way, a descendant of those exponents of 
official morality that we have seen pronouncing on the murder of Helen and 
the blindness of Gloucester; and her unimaginative conventionality points 
fOr'Ylard to the implacable piety that destroys Tess and Jude. 
In Tess and Jude the disenchantment with conventional values is not, 
as in Ihe_iiayor, arrived at in the course of the novel: it is there from 
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the start, and may account for the overtly polemical tone of sections of 
these novels. The "two-tone effect" mentioned by Heilman becomes more 
insistent, and results in awkward lapses of narrative tone. Thus Angel 
Clare's discovery that he likes outdoor life for its own sake, and that it 
is a relief from his indecisiveness about his career, is seen to make him 
"wonderfully free from the chronic melancholy which is taking hold of the 
civilized races with the decline of belief in a beneficent Power". With 
similar implausibility Tess' description of "the aspect of things to her" -
"And you seem to see numbers of to-morrows just all in a line" - is 
interpreted by her author as "expressing in her own native phrases - assisted 
a little by her sixth standard training - feelings which might have been 
called those of the age - the ache of modernism."46 Slightly less 
obtrusively, Jude's reflections on matrimony also bear the mark of Hardy's 
sponsorship: 
There seemed to him, vaguely and dimly, something wrong in a social 
ritual which made necessary a cancell ing of well-formed schemes 
involving years of thought and labour, of foregoing a man's one 
opportunity of showing himself superior to the lower animals, and 
of contributing his units of work to the general progress of his 
generation, because of a momeotary surprise by a new and transitory 
instinct which had nothing in it of the nature of vice, and could 
be only at the most called weakne~s.47 
If it is true, as Schweikmaintains, that in The Mayor Hardy tries to "avoid 
confronting many of his readers", it would seem that in Tess and Jude no 
such circumspection restrains him. The assertiveness of some of his 
statements suggests, in fact, that Hardy is consciously defying the 
complacency of his readers. R.P. Draper, maintaining that Hardy "wished to 
be on good terms with his readers yet felt he could not trust the moral 
judgement of many of them", cites the subtitle of Tess ("A Pure Woman") as 
one such defiance of "conventional opinion".48 Clearly by Hardy's time 
serial publication no longer "induced [that] close relationship between 
author and reader" that Kathleen Tillotson maintains existed between the 
46 Tess of the D'urbervilles, ed. David Skilton (lB9l; rpt. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), pp. 174, 180. 
47 Jud_e the Obscure, Introd. Terry Eagleton (1896; rpt. London: 
~tacmi 11 an, 1974), p. 82. 
48 Introduction to The Tragic Novels, p. 15. 
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writers of the eighteen-forties and their audience: Thackeray's description 
of Dickens' relationship with his readers as "something like personal 
affection,,49, must have provided Hardy with some bitter mirth as he supplied 
a wheelbarrow for Angel Clare to transport the dairymaids across the flooded 
lane without offending the magazine readers. 50 
Hardy's uneasy relationship with his readers is consistent with my 
contention that unresolved irony reflects a dissonance between the values 
implied by the work and a communal body of values. In this respect, as in 
so many others, he can be contrasted with George Eliot, of whom Isobel 
Armstrong remarks: 
George Eliot's procedure depends upon the constant corroboration 
and assent of the reader to her sayings .. ,. 
Her success depends ••. upon her capacity ... to invoke a 
general body of moral and psychological knowledge or, rather 
experience, which can be the corporate possession of both writer 
and reader. 51 
Hardy clearly does not have the same faith in the "corporate possession". 
And yet, it could be argued that the very deliberateness of Hardy's defiant 
statements represents a hope, however desperate, of bringing his readers to 
better insights - a hope, for instance, of correcting their false notions 
of purity. In so far as this hope is present, Hardy could be assimilated 
with the heuristic tradition of the nineteenth-century novel, the main 
difference between him and his predecessors being then not so much in his 
aim as in his tone. 
There is something in this argument: those aspects of Hardy's novels 
that are concerned with the imperfections of human institutions do imply, 
however obliquely, the perfectibility of those institutions. But ultimately 
Hardy's novels do not really confirm that implication: they are dominated 
by an inexorable pattern that shapes all events to its pessimistic conclusion. 
Tess~ purity would not have been an issue in a more enlightened age; but 
we feel that the President of the Immortals would have got her anyway. 
Nowadays Jude could be admitted to Oxford, and his landlady would probably 
49 Novels of the Eighteen-Forties (London: Oxford University Press, 
1954), p. 33. 
50 Draper, p. 14. 
51 "'~liddlemarch': A Note on George Eliot's Wisdom", in Barbara Hardy, 
pp. 118-20. 
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not enquire very closely into the legality of his union with Sue; but it 
is difficult to believe that he or Sue would have been much happier. The 
lamentation from the Book of Job on which Jude ends his life pronounces on 
the blight of existence, not on an imperfect social order. In his 
Postscript to the novel, Hardy seems to confirm this in referring to the 
marriage laws as "a good foundation for the fable of a tragedy, told for its 
own sake as a presentation of particular.s containing a good deal that was 
universal".52 
Terry Eagleton limits himself to "particulars" in maintaining that 
Jude's "failure to attain [Christminster] has no 'cosmic' significance 
whatsoever" and that "the true ki ller of [Sue's] chil dren [i s] the soc i ety 
which turned the family from its lodging-houses." The element of truth in 
this is nevertheless only one element of the novel; and Eagleton's attempt 
to explain away the fatalistic aspect - for instance, by asserting that 
Father Time kills himself and the other children "on the basis of what is 
really a mistake" - remains unconvincing as an attempt to show that "Jude 
the Obscure, like all of Hardy's novels, proclaims no inexorable 
determinism".53 Hardy remains, in spite of Eagleton, as uncomfortable 
in the Marxist canon as in the Great Tradition. 
This is to say that what remains of the "Meliorist myth" in Hardy is 
heavily qualified by a contrary bent, implying that all change is illusory, 
the temporary variations within a tragic pattern. George Eliot, though by 
no means a bland optimist, can still refer, in the closing paragraph of 
Middlemarch, to "the growing good of the world"; at the end of Jude the 
Obscure we have only a man totally unreconciled to his fate - and an author 
who, in the bitter irony of "the joyous throb of a waltz ... from the ball-
room at Cardinal" (p. 427), seems to deny the possibility of reconciliation 
between man's aspiration and his destiny. 
What distinguishes Hardy's tragedy from his classical models is that 
the "tragic machinery" consists not of the inscrutable will of the gods, 
bu't, for the most part, of human institutions and systems of belief. 54 
52 Postscript, Jude the Obscure, p. 25. 
53 Introduction, Jude the Obscure, pp. 10, 19, 20. 
54 Post~cript, p. 25: "The marriage laws being used in great part as 
the tragic machinery of the tale .... " 
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In a different direction, this also serves to distinguish him from the 
novelists who preceded him; that human community which in George Eliot was 
seen to restrict and even destroy the individual, but also to form the 
necessary theatre of his meaningful action, in Hardy becomes more 
exclusively restrictive. In other words, the "unending connections of human 
life" reflected in George Eliot's novels, may still be present, but usually 
to remind us that connections are also bonds which the individual cannot 
escape, even if he should want to. In this, as in so many other ways, Hardy 
brings us to the verge of the twentieth century. 
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Chapter II I 
The Abandoned Fi ce 11 e: 
Technique and Intention in The Ambassadors 
A writer's relation to his time is 
generalisation tries to make it seem. 
readily than others to the simplifying 
never as simple as historical 
Yet some writers conform much less 
abstraction. Thomas Hardy, with his 
ambivalence towards the late nineteenth century, is one such writer: as we 
have seen, his angry rejection of much of his society stems not from 
alienation from that society, but from a troubled attachment. In Henry James 
we have what could be called, perhaps too glibly, the reverse of this 
ambivalence: instead of an indignant surface overlaying a sense of 
attachment, an urbane, unruffled surface conceals a radical questioning. 
In James the ambivalence relates in the first place, of course, to 
America and Europe, and in that form sho~ls itself as early as Roderick Hudson, 
The American and The Europeans. This ambivalence has often enough been 
analysed in terms of the International Theme. But in the late novels, 
although the "International" element persists, the old America-Europe 
distinction, while still accounting for the main plot-line, is less central 
to the enquiry than in earlier novels. It·seems likely that James, having 
made his own choice by settling in England, found the contrast between the 
Old World and the New less pressing; certainly we feel that the analysis is 
going beyond cultural differences: what is being examined is a new 
cosmopolitan society, in which "American" commercialism is no longer confined 
to America, nor "European" manipulativeness to Europe. The ambivalence thus 
takes a modified form: an appreciation of the society which James has found 
more congenial than any other, qualified by deep misgivings about the moral 
basis of that society. 
The depth of those misgivings has been questioned by critics who feel 
that James was too much part of the society he was depicting to be truly 
critical of it. Thus John Goode can, in discussing The Wings of the Dove, 
declare almost in passing: 
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I don't think necessarily that James made moral judgments on the 
world he was depicting, unless it was to endorse its structure by 
seeing in it the potential of aesthetic contemplation. 1 
This uncertainty seems not unduly to affect Goode's admiration for the novel; 
John Holloway, however, sees such doubt as central to our assessment of the 
late novels: 
His genuineness is completely and splendidly reassuring in the ... 
Portrait of a Lady (1881). The work of his closing years, however, 
cannot be seen 1n quite the same light. He saw deficiencies in the 
kind of complexity and refinement which characterized this later 
period; yet these very things seem to colour his later work. As 
his world becomes more multitudinously self-reflecting and 
variegated, a doubt more and more preoccupies the reader. The 
doubt is, whether James's many-dimensional kaleidoscope of surfaces 
is after all a true revelation of deeper life in the characters, or 
only a wonderful simulacrum of deeper life. Nor can that doubt but 
be strengthened by James's gl'owi ng tendency to i nves t his 
interplaying surfaces with all the grandiosity of Edwardian 
opulence; ... and this not as part of a total view, admire-but-judge, but rather of characters ~Ihom he endorses out and out. In 
the end, one is inclined to conclude that James and Sargent were 
not near neighbours quite for nothing. 2 
This implies that ,James performed for the society he depicted a role analogous 
to that of a painter of society portraits, the kind of flattery-by-analysis 
that has been ascribed to Sargent's portraiture: 
His greatest activity in portrait painting coincided (and ended) 
with the Edwardian age and he was to depict it at once glittering 
and prosaic .... his skill was of that easy and unerring kind which, 
while conveying at the time an impression of remorseless truth, 
rarely failed to please the sitter by its revelations; so that 
those who went to him because it was the thing to be 'painted by 
Sargent', dreading the psychological scrutiny, more often than not 
were relieved to find that they ~lere more interesting than they 
thought. 3 
1 "The Pervasive Mystery of Style" in The Air of Reality, ed. John Goode 
(London: Methuen, 1972), p. 297. 
2 "The Literary Scene" in The ~lodern Age, ed. Boris Ford (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1963), p. 56. 
3 William Gaunt, The Aesthetic Adventure, rev. ed. (1945; rpt. London: 
Sphere Books, 1975), p. 181. 
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Perhaps if James was read at all by the kind of people who invited him so 
relentlessly to dinner, that was the impression they had of his novels: one 
can imagine ~'rs Brookenham, for instance, feeling vaguely flattered by The 
Awkward Age. James' novels were not calculated, any more than Jane Austen's, 
to give offence to the society they depicted. It could be argued that they 
were not calculated to give anything at all, least of all a resentable 
meaning, to the society they depicted. In his last novels there is a subl ime 
disregard of the reader at large \~hich serves as much as anything else to set 
him apart from Hardy, and to demonstrate the ambivalence I have referred to. 
Where Hardy's involvement with his readers shows itself in provocative 
statements which served to al ienate those they Ivere to enl ighten, James' 
serene aplomb, which offended nobody, perhaps hides a more thorough despair 
of ever being understood by those who lionised him. Though never indifferent 
to public recognition, he would not have suppressed a single subordinate 
clause in order to achieve it; and he was as little interested in edifying 
his public as in pandering to it. 
This is to say that direct moral purpose, as manifested variously by 
Gaskell, Dickens, Eliot and Hardy is not likely to be found in James' late 
novels, if indeed it was ever a component of his fiction. As early as 1884 
he was making gentle fun of Walter Besant'i assertion that the English novel 
contains "a conscious moral purpose": 
Will you not define your terms and explain how (a novel being a 
picture) a picture can be either moral or immoral? You wish to 
paint a moral picture or carve a moral statue: will you not tell 
us how you would set about it? We are discussing the Art of 
Fiction; questions of art are questions (in the widest sense) 
of execution; questions of moral ity are quite another affair, and 
will you not let us see how it is that you find it so easy to mix 
them up?4 
The Oscar Wi"lde-ish air of this is somewhat mitigated when James, now in 
absolute earnest, traces the connection between moral sense and intelligence: 
There is one point at which the moral sense and the artistic 
sense lie very near together; that is in the. very obvious truth 
4 "The Art of Fiction" in Partial Portraits, introd. Leon [del (1888; 
rpt. Ann Arbor: University of MTChigan Press, rQ70), pp. 404-05. 
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that the deepest quality of a work of art will always be the 
quality of the mind of the producer. In proportion as that 
intelligence is fine will the novel, the picture, the statue 
partake of the substance of beauty and truth. (p. 406) 
88 
The companion piece to this statement is of course its equally well-known 
elaboration in the Preface to the New York edition of The Portrait of a Lady: 
There is, I think, no more nutritive or suggestive truth in this 
connexion than that of the perfect dependence of the "moral" sense 
of a work of art on the amount of fe lt 1 ife concerned in produc i ng 
it. The question comes back thus, obviously, to the kind and the 
degree of the artist's prime sensibility, which is the soil out of 
which his subject springs. The quality and capacity of that soil, 
its ability to "grow" with due freshness and straightness any vision 
of life, represents, strongly or weakly, the projected morality. 
That element is but another name for the more or less close 
connex ion of the subject ~,; th some mark made on the inte 11 i gence, 
with some sincere experience. 5 
Statements like these do seem to allow for John Goode's assertion that 
James did not pass "moral judgments on the world he 0as depicting". The 
kind of explicH valuatior. that We associate with morell judgement ~/ould seem 
to James to be far too external to the creat-i ve process to be part of the 
"projected moral ity". But the process is a1 so much more active than is 
suggested by Goode's phrase "aesthetic contemplation": the moral 
intelligence does not merely contemplate, it intE!rprets its material by 
ordering it. It is in this ordering thv_t a "vision of life" is embodied; 
and it is in the capacity to order that "the moral sense and the artistic 
sense lie very near together". 
Of course, such theoretical statements can at best tell us what weight 
James himself attached to the moral element of a work of art, and what he 
thought it consisted in. The "amount of felt life concerned in producing it" 
. can ultimately only be judged from the completed work, and many readers of 
the late novels have found them deficient in exactly this respect. 
Generations of students who have had to struggle with The Ambassadors have 
found authority for their recalcitrance in E.M. Forster's strictures: 
5 The Art of the Novel, introd. Richard P. Blackmur (1907; rpt. New 
York: CllaITes-"S"cribner's Sons, 1934), p. 45. 
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The beauty that suffuses The Ambassadors is the reward due to a 
fine artist for hard work. James knew exactly what he wanted, he 
pursued the narrow path of aesthetic duty, and success to the full 
extent of his possibilities has crowned him. The pattern has woven 
itself ,. with modulati on and reservations Anatole France will never 
attain. But at what sacrifice! 
So enormous is the sacrifice that many readers cannot get 
interested in James, although they can follow what he says (his 
difficulty has been much exaggerated), and can appreciate his 
effects. They cannot grant his premise, which is that most of 
human life has to disappear before he can do us a novel. 6 
To this F.R. Leavis has added the weight of his formidable 
discriminations: 
It is as if his interest in his material had been too specialized, 
too much concentrated on certain limited kinds of possible 
development, and as if in the technical elaboration expressing 
this specialized interest he had lost his full sense of life and 
let his moral taste slip in abeyance. 7 
Both Forster and Leavis would thus see the "artistic sense" here impoverished 
by the absence of "l1Ioral sense", in an emphasis on technique that sacrifices 
"life" to "pattern". 
Implicit in this, as in the criticisms of Goode and Holloway, is the 
charge of aestheticism. The term is of course often little more than a 
vaguely referential, vaguely emotive label for ar.ything artistic that 
occurred near the turn of the century; but in a recent study by i~ichael Bell 
it is employed with some precision in relation to James. His subject in this 
section of his essay is "the break up of fictional realism" ,8 and before he 
discusses James he compares a passage from Middlem~rc~ with a passage from 
!:!ly~::. to clarify his distinction betv/een realism and aestheticism. George 
E'Hot's realism, he maintains, is "based on an organicist conception of life 
in which the interconnections of the book's structure, for all that they are 
created by the author, are modelled on the supposed interrelations of life 
itself." (p. 6) He analyses Dorothea's vision of "the largeness of the 
world" (which I quoted in the previous chapter) and concludes: 
6 Aspects of the Novel, p. 161. 
7 The Great Tradition (1948; rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962), p. 178. 
8 !'Introduction: ~lodern t10vements in Literature", 1900- 1930, ed. 
Michael Bell (London: Methuen, 1980), p. 4. 
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The physical structure of the scene reflects inherent moral 
relations ••.. Hence the vision at this moment is continuous with 
the whole and individual objects come to us imbued with an 
inherent moral meaningfulness. Eliot's world is value-laden. 
(p. 7) 
Bell's fairly specialised (although, as we shall see, not unique) sense of 
"real ism", the~_~eJ_~r:s._Jo~_Q.gpj_~Jjon .Of that intel"relatedness ... oJ s9~iety 
which, in the previous chapter, I discussed as central to the shaping of the 
Victorian novel, in Little Oorrit as much as in Middlemarch. 
By contrast with this type of realism, Bell argues that in the scene 
from Ulysses (one of Bloom's slightly sickening series of culinary associations 
in "Lestrygonians") the order is not inherent in the scene, but imposed upon 
it by the patterns of the novel: 
The randomness of everyday life is seen in a perspective of serene 
order but the order is a lvJays a creati on of the book, of the 
perceiving mind. For all the minute depiction of Dublin the 
structure is not strictly derived from external rea,' ity but from a 
consciously artistic creation. (p. 7) 
To Ge-ll-te difference between the "real ist" mode of t~iddlemarch and the / -= - -
,"aesthetic" mode of Ulysses thus 1 ies in the ultimate source of the order 
created in the novel: in Eliot it mirrors an order perceived in, that is 
ascribed to, the external world, wherea~~;(ul~;~0it is ~-fu-~c~ion of the 
esoteric i nterna 1 references of the work .----.. 
It is in this self-reflectin nature of the inner consistencL._o:Lth.~ 
work tha{~ll finds Henry James' 1 ate n~l-;-;o~-in-g-t~~~~ds-~irth~t-j;;sm~) 
.~------ - ----,-~---- --'''-.------~.--.-----~ ,. ", " .. ,-.-~-~,. ---,.----------,--~-. 
The infinitely self-qualifying plasticity of the language is at 
once a minute truthfulness to the flux of experience yet the 
pursuit of an ideal so pure as to become an end in itself. From 
within the most intrinsic logic of realist form there emerges an 
aesthetic stance. (p. 65) 
By this argument, the late nov~J.S_ become as self-enclosed as Ulysses by 
"'-/ --.. _-'" -"'.------~,-.-.. --<.---~--------...----
pushing to an extreme the realist concern with "truthfuiness to the flux of 
"-, .-- " ._.-._-" ~-- '-._-,.,' 
ex~rignce": ultimately vie become trapped in the flux itself, and no 
" determinate llIeal1i~g_is ac;hjeved: 
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For James there seems never to be an achieved truth but a 
continuing engagement with the flux of perception. The language 
does not ~)(press thougbt so much as the process of thinkTng:--(p. 6Sr- -- .. 
Raymond Will iams makes much the same point, but he is perhaps best approached 
through Lukacs, to whose concept of rea 1 i sm both Hi 11 iams and Bell seem to 
owe something, and whose comments reveal more explicitly the ideological 
application of this concept. For Lukacs, the converse of.!'~aJi5m is not 
aestheticism, but modernism~and then more specifically what he calls the 
"n;turalistic character of modernist literature".9 His distinction beb/een 
rea 1 ism and natural ism "depends on the presence or absence ina work of art 
of a 'hierarchy of significance' in the situations and characters presented." 
(p. 34) Naturalism thus presents a reflection of reality that is not 
structured by a normative purpose: all details are equally important in that 
all are arbitrary. Lukacs also chooses Ulysses as his example: 
The perpetually oscillating patterns of sense- and memory-data, 
their powerfully charged - but aimless and directionless - fields 
of force, give rise to an epic structure with is static, reflecting 
a belief in the basically static character of events. -(po 18) 
The "perpetually oscillating patterns of sense- and memory-data" which are 
not directed towards a conclusion would seem to have something in common with 
the "continui~~._e~ement ~/itht~~ [1 ux of perception" that Bell ascri bes 
to James: ("~~~~~ and ~stheti_~~~eet i~~":!.!:...£~J~c.~_~f a 
"hie~!chy of significance". 
For Raymond Wi 11 i ams the concept of rea 1 ism also depends on an element 
of evaluation implicit in the presentation. For him "the realist tradition 
in fiction"is exemplified by "the kind of novel ~Ihich creates and judges the 
qual ity of ~hol~Vla)' of 1 ife i!l_ terms of the qual ities of persons. "10 
.. ----.,- ~--___:_~---=--c~~-,--
Like Bell, he selects Middlemarch as representative of the organicist 
principle of the realist novel; he sees the novel as "a complex of personal, 
9 Georg Lukacs, The Heaning of Contemporary Realism, trans. John and 
Necke ~lander (1955; London: I~erl i n Press, 196~p. 34. 
10 "Realism and the Contemporary Novel" 
rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), p. 304. 
does allow Ulysses into the realist canon. 
in The Long Revolution (1951; 
Unlike Bell and Lu~acs, Williams 
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family and working relationships, which draws its whole strength from their 
interaction in an indivisible process" (pp. 312-13). Elsewhere Williams sees 
this interrelatedness as yielding, in the works of James, to "a transfer of 
process from the signified to the signifier; from the material to the work 
on material; from the 1 ife to the art": 
What really matters in James is that act of signifying in which 
the novel becomes its own subject. .,. Consciousness in James, to 
put it another way, is the almost exclusive object and subject of 
consciousness. 11 
I am not for the time being concerned with the concept of realism; but 
in the roughly similar sense in which it is used by these three critics the 
term provides a useful short-hand reference to a principle of nineteenth-
century fiction that they find missing in later novels, more specifically, 
with Bell and Will i ams, in the 1 ate novels of Henry James. Whether these 
critics see the converse to realism as aestheticism or modernism, that 
converse would seem to bear some resemblance to the "technical elaboration" 
Leavis deplores, or to what Hollo~lay calls the "multitudinously self-
reflecting" quality of the late novels. Roughly speaking, one might say that 
all these criticisms impute to these novels an absence of reference outwards, 
an enclosure in the static reality of the novel's own patte!,!,~i_~ 
This is to see James, in his devotion to his art, as similar to Conrad's 
inhumanly efficient chief accountant in "Heart of Darkness": "he was devoted 
to his books, which were in apple-pie order."12 Like the accountant, "out 
of the chaos", concentrating on his ledgers and trying not to be distracted 
by the groans of a dying man (p. 69), James could be seen as scribbling away, 
absorbed in documents that have admirable internal_ocdl2r_and consis_!~_ncy, but 
reflect nothing of the chaos outs-ide~n--- -Dictating his novels in the serene 
, ~---.-
II The English Novel from Dickens to Lawrence (1970; rpt. St Albans: 
Paladin, 1974), pp. -109-10. 
12 "Heart of Darkness", p. 68. 
13 In a letter James referred to the Har as "this great d.istraction". 
One might be tempted to see this as clinching the analogy with the company 
accountant; but James goes on to say of the War that his "job won't at all 
consent to be done in the face of it. The picture of private adventures 
simply f~des away before the great public." (To Rhoda Broughton, 10 August 
1914, Selected Letters, ed. and introd. Leon Edel [London: Rupert Hal't-
Davis,---r95i)] , p. 2"5ZT. We know that James immersed himself quite 
uncharacteristically in public work after the outbreak of war (Leon Edel, 
The Master [London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1965], pp. 517 ff.) 
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seclusion of the Garden Room of Lamb House, Rye, James may seem not even to 
have needed such elaborate precautions as the accountant against the 
intrusion of the "horror" outside: he was so remote from it in any case. 
Interestingly, however, the word or a close relation of it finds its way into 
climactic scenes of all three late novels. 14 In itself this proves little, 
of course (we have seen that even Fanny Price was much given to using the 
word), but it may serve to alert us to deeper currents under the placid 
surface of the late style. 
If we were to look for an alternative to the accountant as Conradi an 
image for the Jamesian attitude, we might consider Marlow - Marlow, the 
participant-observer, involved yet critical, attracted yet repelled. If at 
first sight the comparison seems far-fetched, a consideration of Marlow's 
technical function may clarify the point of the parallel. In Marlow's 
narrative Conrad dramatises the struggle to extract the significance of an 
experience, perhaps to pronounce upon it; the narrative embodies the 
exploratory process by which the author discovers the meaning of his work. 
In this respect, Conrad's use of ~larlow resembles Lawrence's creation of 
Birkin in Women in Love, in whom, as Leavis has pointed out, "Lawrence 
enacts a tentative or kind of experimental process - a testing and 
exploring .... "15 
What I am suggesting is that the "technical elaboration" that Leavis 
objects to in later James may be an exploratory process, analogous to 
Marlow's groping narrative. James, of course never seems to grope .. he leaves 
his reader to do that - but what Bell calls "the flux of perception" may not 
be as much an end in itself as he suggests. To put it diff~rently, 
"consciousness" can be seen to be "the exclusive object and subject of 
consciousness", as Willia~s maintains, only in the sense that it serves to 
14 The Ambassadors (New York, 1909; rpt. New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 
1971), II, 257-58: "It was a sharp fantastic crisis that had popped up as if 
in a dream, and it had only to last the few seconds to make him feel it as 
quite horrible." 
The Viings of the Dove (New York, 1909; rpt. New York: Augustus M. 
Kelly, 1976), II, 350: "She made it all out, bent upon her - ... his horror, 
almost, of her lucidity." 
The Golden Bowl (New York, 1909; rpt. New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 
1971), Il,ill: "... the horror of fi nd ing evil sea ted a-ll at its ea se ~Ihere 
she had only dreamed of good; the horror of the thing hideously behind, 
behind so much trusted, so much pretended, nobleness, cleverness,tenoerness." 
15 D.H. La~lrence: Novelist (1955; rpt. Harmondsl'iorth: Penguin, 1964), 
p. 184. 
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create or modify its own subject in the process of expression. It is in this 
sense that, in James' words, "the deepest quality of a work of art will 
always be the qual ity of the mind of the producer": there are not certain 
subjects that are "deeper" than others. 
This view of the exploratory function of technique has been persuasively 
argued by Mark Scharer in his well-known essay, "Technique as Discovery". 
According to Schorer, 
technique is the means by vlhich the writer's experience, which is 
his subject matter, compels him to attend to it; technique is the 
only means he has of discovering, exploring, developing his subject, 
of conveying its meaning, and, finally, of eva.1uating it. 16 
This description enables us to see precisely in what sense Marlow serves as 
a technical device: the functions ascribed by Schorer to technique ay'e so 
clearly also the functions Marlow performs both in "Heart of Darkness" and 
Lord Jim. 17 It is less clear that this is in fact what James' technique 
achieves; much of the rest of this chapter will hinge on this question, if 
not always explicitly. 
To proceed from Scharer's discussion of technique to the question of 
uny'eso1ved irony in The Ambassador~, one has to cross the disputed territory 
of Intention. Schorer clearly provides, in his emphasis on "discovery", for 
an unforeseen, that is "unintended", meaning to emerge in the process of 
writing. I have so far taken this as critical common ground - in an 
interpretation of Fanny Price, for instance, that Jane Austen is unlikely to 
have intended, or in following Schweik in ascribing meanings to The Mayor of 
Castforbridge that Hardy may well not have been fully conscious of. In this 
assumption, I am of course implicitly subscribing to Wimsatt and Beardsley's 
classic statement in their essay "The Intentional Fallacy": "the design or 
intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standat'd for 
judging the success of a work of 1 iterary art". 18 It is true that here the 
16 "Technique as Discovery", The Hudson Review, I (1948). Rpt. in 2Qth 
~entury Literary Criticisn~, ed. Davld Lodge (l.ondon: Longman, 1972), p.JB1. 
17 It seems to me not to apply to r~arlOl'i as he is used in "Youth" and 
Chance. 
----
18 W.K. Wimsatt and M.C. Beardsley, "The Intentional Fallacy", Sewanee 
Review, 54 (Summer 1946). Rpt. in On Literary Intention, ed. David Newton -
aeMoTina (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1mT: p. 1. 
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authors do not mention the relation of intention to the meaning of a work, 
but the rest of the essay makes clear that their statement is meant also to 
apply to that.19 Wimsatt has in fact since reformulated the statement: 
The statement in our essay of 1946 should certainly have read: 
'The design or intention of the author is neither available nor 
desirable as a standard for judging either the meaning or the value 
of a work of literary art. '20 
Resistance to this position has generated more ingenuity than can be 
adequately dealt with here, but it does seem necessary to take brief account 
of some of these arguments. 
Much of the opposition preserves a spurious air of bell igerence by 
assaulting Wimsatt and Beardsley interpretation of the word intention, while 
in effect granting the essence of their argument. 21 Such a desire to 
maintain a belief in the sanctity of the author's intention can strain the 
semantic elasticity of language to breaking-point: 
If we establ ish the existence of a discrepancy betl~een the 
interpretation we give to a work of art, and that of the author, we 
haven't shown that the work has a meaning independent of what the 
author intends because what the a~thor intends will now be the 
interpretation given to the vlOrk by us and his own statement as to 
its meaning an aberration.22 
It is difficult to see why such critics cling to the word intention 
after they have emptied it of all useful meaning, except perhaps as a talisman 
to ward off the ghost of New Criticism. In the midst of such verbal 
19 Pace E.D. Hirsch, Jr., who, in correcting the "popular version" of 
this essay,-insists that "the intentional fallacy has no proper application 
whatever to verbal meaning." (Validity in Interpretation [New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1967J, pp. 11-12.) 
20 "Genesis: a fallacy Revisited" in The Disciplines of Criticism, 
eds. Peter Demetz, Thomas Greene and Lowry NeTSon, Jr. (1958). Rpt.ln 
Newton-de Molina, p. 136. 
21 See, for instance, George Watson, "The Literary Past" from The· Study 
of Literature (1969), pp 66-83, rpt. in Newton-de Molina, pp. 158-73; also 
Alastalr FO\~ler, "Intention Floreat", Ne\~ton-de ~101 ina, pp. 242-55. 
22 Frank Cioffi, "Intention and Interpretation in Ct'iticism", 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 64 (1963-4). Rpt. in Newton-de 
~101ina, p. 65. 
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gymnastics, it is a relief to come across what would have been anywhere else 
a slightly pedestrian statement of the obvious: 
In the most common sense of the terms 'intention' and 'intended', 
the sense in which it would be reasonable to take the term 
'intended' in the question we are considering, a meaning in a poem 
being written could not be 'intended' without the poet 'being 
aware of' it. 2::l 
Or, as Wimsatt and Beardsley said in 1946, "Intention is design or plan in 
the author's mind." (p. 1) Theorists who find this definition of intention 
too narrow are faced with the need to invent a new term for this "narrow" 
sense. The most popular has proved to be the tautology "conscious 
intention",24 which in turn yields what Graham Hough calls "the solecism 
'unconscious intention'" .25 It becomes clear that such an argument can be 
prolonged indefinitely, since the language game is proceeding unhampered by 
anything as restrictive as the original issue. 
A more substantial argument against the anti-intentional ist position 
has been voiced by E.O. Hirsch, Jr., who has, from his own field of 
hermeneutics, become something of a spokesman for the author's rights: 
For, once the author had been ruthlessly banished as the 
determiner of his text's meaning, it very gradually appeared that 
no adequate principle existed for judging the validity of an 
interpretation. 26 
Hirsch distrusts the emphasis on "What the text says" as against what the 
author means, "since the text can say different things to different readers. 
One reading is as valid or invalid as another." (p. 11) This argument. 
appears more substantial in the sense of address ing the point at issue, 
which is whether a work can mean something which the author was not conscious 
of. It turns out, however, that Hirsch too can only maintain his belief in 
23 Theodore Redpath, "The Meaning of a Poem" from British Philosophy in 
the Mid-Century. ed. C.A. Mace (1957). Rpt. in Newton-de Molina, p. 1~---
24 See, for instance, Watson, p. 169. 
25 "An Eighth Type of Ambiguity" from VJilliam Empson: The Man and his 
VJol'k, ed. Roma Gill. Rpt. in Newton-de r,lolina:;-p-:-zZ3. 
26 Validity in Interpr'etation, p. 3. 
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the determinant value of the author's intention by conflating "meaning" and 
"unconscious meaning": "many of my sharable meanings are meanings which I 
am not directly thinking at all. They are so-called unconscious meanings." 
(p. 18) From here it is a short step to the famil i ar "i ntended but 
unconscious meanings" (p. 21) - at which point one feels that the author 
has been brought back from banishment only as a linguistic fiction. It is 
difficult to see how the author's "unconscious intention" is in any way more 
readily available "for judging the validity of an interpretation" than "the 
text's meaning": they seem in fact to be indistinguishable, which enables 
Hirsch to state, with all the confidence of somebody playing a game invented 
by himself: 
No exampl e of the author's ignorance with respect to hi s meani ng 
could legitimately show that his intended meamng and the meaning 
of his text are two different things. (p. 22) 
Since "legitimately" here means "according to my definitions", the statement 
is indeed impeccable: what Hirsch is saying, with a kind of baroque 
circularity, is that the work means what the critic says the author meant, 
which is what the work means. 
A more straightforward version of the "intentionalist position is stated 
by Wayne C. Booth in his work on stable irony. He clearly, if grudgingly, 
recognises that meanings unintended by the author may be created in a work, 
but he distrusts them as he distrusts all invitations to mere critical 
ingenuity: 
.•. many authors seem finally to create works that go deeper or 
further than their conscious art could ever plan for, and a complete 
Rhetori c of Irony wou 1 d, I suppose, account for the deeper 
communings that such works invite us to. Insofar as such 
instabil Hies are "intended by the work" (regardless of the author) 
they would in theory enter our subject, but I'm afraid that what I 
see done by others when they attempt to describe their 
reconstructions of such works too often confirms my caution about 
making the attempt. ... Since in fact most artists knOlv more 
about their work than most of us eve~7discover, our subject is 
still vast enough to keep us humble. 
To fly in the face of such a statement requires a certain amount of 
27 A Rhetoric of Irony, p. 241 n. 
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determination; but it does seem to me that Booth. in his understandable 
impat ience ~Ji th over-ingenuity. impoveri shes the arti sti c process by denyi ng 
its exploratory aspect. To go beyond the "conscious art" of the author is 
not to proceed "regardless of the author": it is merely to stress that 
element of the author's "prime sensibility" which is involved in the 
, 
execution of his intentions, and which may "discover" unforeseen meanings. 
This is not necessarily to cast off all restraint on critical ingenuity: 
the meaning must still be shown to be derived from and consistently supported 
by the text. In The Rhetoric of Fiction Booth cites some admittedly 
inhibiting examples of the kind of liberty taken by critics who regard the 
author's probable intention as irrelevant; but critical irresponsibility can 
be fostered by intentionalist and anti-intentionalist assumptions alike. It 
would be difficult, for instance. to say whether Leon Edel's psychologising 
distortions of James' fiction owe more to the intentionalist insistence on 
restoring the author to his work, or to the anti-intentionalist search for 
unconscious meanings: all we can say is that Edel ignores the 1 imits set 
by the work itself·to its meaning. 
The Ambassadors is a particularly challenging work from this point of 
view, because ~Ie have such copious information about James' intentions in 
the ~lOrk: a long outline in the Notebooks, as ~Iell as an unusually informative 
Preface, in which James tells us not only what he intended, but also how well 
he succeeded. By Booth's criteria, the meaning is determined for us by these 
statements, and the critic's task is to appreciate and eludicate the skill 
with which James fleshed out these conceptions - technique thus being the 
process by which a conception is realised as fully as possible without 
changing its essentials. 
I believe, however, that a close reading of The Ambassadors reveals 
implications that James seems unaware of both in the Notebooks and in the 
Preface. The process by which these implications are generated is an 
absorbing vindication of Schorer's dynamic view of technique; it also 
demonstrates how "unintended" meanings can give rise to unresolved ironies 
that to an extent liberate the novel from an aestheticist straitjacket. 
James' Preface to The Ambassadors is very much concerned, in fact, with 
the question of technique. He devotes the last part of the Preface to a 
fond retrospective appreciation of his treatment of Maria Gostrey, that is, 
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his deliberate use of her as an "aid to lucidity" for the reader. 28 To put 
it simply (which is notoriously not James' aim in the Prefaces), James needed 
a means of informing the reader of Strether's past, "the whole situation at 
Woollett and the complex forces that propelled [him to Europe]" (I, xxi), 
and found this means in Strether's conversations with Maria. 
This is an acceptable enough point of technique; but it soon emerges 
from James' discussion that technique was of such importance in the writing 
of the novel that it over-shadowed the mere human themes, thus lending support 
to Leavis' charge that in his "technical elaboration ... [James] had lost his 
full sense of life". James takes leisurely delight in the fact that he has 
succeeded in concealing Maria's purely technical function so effectively that 
she seems to become part of the subject matter of the novel - which, he 
emphatically states, she is not: 
The "ficelle" character of the subordinate party is as artfully 
dissimuTafed, throughout, as may be, and to that extent that, with 
the seams or joints of Maria Gostrey's ostensible connectedness 
taken particular care of, duly smoothed over, that is, and 
anxiously kept from showing as "pieced on", this figure doubtless 
achieves, after a fashion, something of the dignity of a prime 
idea; which circumstance but sholvs us afresh how many quite 
incalculable but none the less cl~ar sources of enjoyment for the 
infatuated artist, how many copious springs of our never-to-be-
slighted "fun" for the reader and critic susceptible of contagion, 
may sound their incidental plash as soon as an artistic process 
begins to enjoy free development .... To project imaginatively, 
for my hero, a relation that has nothing to do with the matter 
(the matter of my subject) but has everything to do with the manner 
(the manner of my presentation of the same) and yet to treat it, at 
close quarters and for fully economic expression's possible sake, 
as if it were important and essential - to do that sort of thing 
and yet muddle nothing may easily become, as one goes, a signally 
attaching proposition ...• (I, xxi-xxii) 
For most readers this sort of "ftln" is perhaps too much 1 ike an elephant 
balancing on a ball to be really contagious, but one's more serious 
misgivings are reserved for the distinction James draws between the "matter" 
of his subject and the "manner of his presentation of the same". In terms 
of this distinction, Strether's "relation" to Maria Gostrey belongs purely 
to "manner" and never forms part of the subject of the novel. James' "fun" 
28 The Ambassadors, I, xix. 
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seems to derive from the illusion he has created that Maria Gostrey, "the 
most unmitigated and abandoned of ficelles· (I, xix), matters at all beyond 
this purely technical capacity. In this vein of confidential reminiscence, 
James reveals that the function of the last scene, Strether's rejection of 
Maria's offer of marriage, "is to give or add nothing whatever, but only to 
express as vividly as possible certain things quite other than itself . ... " 
(I, xxi) 
We could hardly wish for a more explicit statement of artistic intention 
than this. To accept it as it stands, however, is to accept that technique 
was to James at this stage not so much a matter of transforming into 
aesthetic terms a felt concern with human issues as of the fabrication of 
spurious issues for a particular effect. This, of course, is how Leavis sees 
James' emphasis on technique in The Ambassadors - "a technique the subtleties 
and elaborations of which are not sufficiently-controlled by a feeling for 
value and significance in living.,,29 
There are, however, suggestions in the Preface that James did not see 
the whole novel as an exercise in technical elaboration. If Maria is only a 
ficelle, Strether at least is the stuff of life: 
I rejoiced in the promise of a he"ro so mature, who would give me 
thereby the more to bite into - since it's only into thickened 
motive and accumulated character, I think, that the painter of 
life bites more than a little. (I, viii) 
But how confront "a hero so mature" with a I ady who has every appearance of 
appreciating his maturity, and simply rule out the resultant interest as 
irrelevant? James can see that "as soon as an artistic process begins to 
enjoy free development" the author's intenti on ceases to determine the 
relations generated by his subject matter; but he seems not to accept that 
what he credits, rather grudgingly, with achieving "after a fashion, something 
of the dignity of a prime idea", become~, by dint of that achieved dignity, 
a prime idea. It is difficult to imagine, in terms of practical effect, the 
difference between an unimportant subject consistently treated "as if it 
were important and essential" and an important subject thus treated: in both 
instances, what James ca1ls the "artist's prime sensibility" is responsible 
for the realisation of the subject. The only difference can be in the 
29 The Great Tradition, p. 178. 
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author's private attribution of value, not in the achieved effect. To insist 
in such a case on the author's intention as determinant of meaning. is t'o do 
so at the expenses of his creation. 
My analysis of the novel will concentrate mainly on the "unintended" 
meanings created by Maria Gostrey's "ostensible connectedness" to the main 
subject. This will perhaps give disproportionate weight to her part in the 
novel, but if, as I believe, the pressures of technique establish the 
"ostensible connectedness" as a true connectedness, the discussion will 
inevitably take in much of the rest of the novel. 
The "connectedness" can best be demonstrated from what James regarded 
as the "essence" of the novel (I, v), Strether's impassioned address to 
little Bilham in G10riani's garden, his "quiet stream of demonstration that 
as soon as he had let himself go he felt as the real relief": 
It had consciously gathered to a head, but the reservoir had 
filled sooner than he knew, and his companion's touch was to make 
the waters spread. There were some things that had to come in time 
if they were to come at all. If they did n't come in time they Ivere 
lost for ever. It was the general sense of them that had 
overwhelmed. him with its long slow rush. 
"It's not too late for you, on any side, and you don't strike 
me as in danger of missingtlJe train; bes.ides which people can be 
in general pretty well trusted, of COUl'se - vlith the clock of their 
freedom ticking as loud as it seems to do here - to keep an eye on 
the fl eet i ng hour. A 11 the same don't forget that you're young -
blessedly young; be glad of it on the contrary and live up to it. 
Live all you can; it's a mistake not to. It does n't so much 
matter what you do in particular, so long as you have your life. 
If you have n't had that what have you had? This place and these 
impressions - mild as you may tTnO them to wind a man up so; all 
my impressions of Chad and of people I've seen at his place - well, 
have had their abundant message for me, have just crrDpped that into 
my mind. I see it now. I have n't done so enough before -=-and 
now I'm old; too old at any rate for what I see. Oh I do see, at 
least; and more than you'd believe or I can express. ItTs too 
late. And it's as if the train had fairly waited at the station 
for me Ivithout my having had the gumption to know it I'/as there. 
Now I hear its faint receding whistle miles and miles down the 
line. What one loses one loses; make no mistake about that. The 
affair - I mean the affair of life - could n't, no doubt, have been 
different for me; for it's at the best a tin mould, either fluted 
and embossed, with ornamental excrescences, or else smooth and 
dreadfully plain. into which, a helpless jelly, one's consciousness 
is poured - so that one 'takes' the form. as the great cook says. 
and is more or less compactly held by it: one lives in fine as one 
can. Still, one has the illusion of freedom; therefore don't be, 
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like me, without the memory of that i11usion. I was either, at 
the right time, too stupid or too intelligent to have it; I don't 
quite know which. Of course at present I'm a case of reaction 
against the mistake; and the voice of reaction should, no doubt, 
always be taken with an allowance. But that does n't affect the 
point that the right time is now yours. The right time is any 
time that one is still so lucky as to have. You've plenty;-that's 
the great thing; you're, as I say, damn you, so happily and 
hatefully young. Don't at any rate miss things out of stupidity. 
Of course I don't take you for a fool, or I should n't be 
addressing you thus awfully. Do what you like so long as you don't 
make my mistake. For it was a mistake. Live!" (1,217-18) 
James declares the main significance of Strether's speech to lie in the 
fact that "he now at all events sees; so that the business of my tale and 
the march of my action, not to say the precious moral of everything, is just 
my demonstration of this process of vision." (I, vi) The "process of vision" 
is, however, not a simple one: even while Strether claims "Oh, I do see, at 
least!" he remains blind to certain aspects of his situation. There are, it 
seems to me, at least three different though related "processes" enacted in 
the course of the novel, all three of which meet in this scene. 
The first "process", most obviously, is the one which James refers to 
in his Preface, and which culminates in this scene: Strether's growing 
realisation that Chad's life in Paris has been much richer than anything he 
ever had. With Strether's recognition of all that Chad has gained and all 
that he himself has missed, the gentle irony at the expense of his prim 
Woollett notions is resolved. 
The second "process" can be seen to be initiated by this scene; it 
demonstrates the incompleteness of Strether's vision at this point, and 
reaches its ovm resolution when Strether meets Chad and ~1adame de Vionnet 
by the river and realises that for all his "seeing" he has been blind, not 
only to the true nature of the relationship, but to the self-seeking that 
still remains under Chad's miraculously changed exterior. Thus the first, 
apparently resolved, irony is reversed, and Strether is left enlightened 
but disillusioned about what it means to "live". 
The tllird and most problematic "process" is not really a "process" 
in the strictest sense, since it is static: it consists of a perSistent 
blindness on Strether's part to his own opportunities and the use to which 
he has put thel11. The blindness creates an il'ony which is pl'esent in his 
address to little Hilham and continues to the last scene, where it is 
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confirmed, but not resolved. We must assume, on the authority of the Preface 
and the Notebooks, that this consistent irony at Strether's expense was 
unintentional on James' part. This irony can nevertheless be shown to be 
constantly reinforced by the details of the text; but such a demonstration 
is perhaps best approached through a further consideration of the two 
prominent patterns of resolved irony. 
Strether's progress from the blinkered state of Wool lett can be said to 
start at little Bilham's breakfast in Chad's rooms (I, 116-18), where poor 
Strether has to reconcil e his preconcepti ons about "the fundamental 
impropriety of Chad's situation" with his impression of Chad's friends and 
"the way the irregular 1 ife sat upon Bilham and Miss Barrace". Not only are 
they not noticeably depraved, but he simply finds that he likes them, which 
is disturbing to the Wool lett assumption that one naturally and instinctively 
dislikes the irregular. Strether tries to dispose of this dilemma by 
generously assuming that they don't actually share in the irregularity - "he 
was eager to concede that their relation to it was all indirect" - but he 
is after all clear-sighted enough to see that their presence in Chad's rooms 
and their "grateful enjoyment of everything that was Chad's" establish a sort 
of compl i c ity - and, wha tis more, tha t th~ comp 1 i ci ty even extends to him: 
"he himself was sitting down, for the time, with them". The parenthetical 
"for the time" represents Strether's last grasp at his old moral position: 
he cannot yet accept that he is sitting down with them for long enough, as it 
were, to forfeit his seat at the heavy mahogany table of Wool lett. Strether's 
attempts to regain his moral footing are amusingly rendered, as he tries to 
make a certainty of his very uncertainty: "One thing was certain - he saw 
he must make up his mind." Upon this he girds his loins with brave but vague 
resolution: 
He must approach Chad, must wait for him, deal with him, master 
him, but he must n't dispossess himself of the faculty of seeing 
things as they were. 
By "the faculty of seeing things as they were" is presumably meant the 
ability to fix the identity of things by attaching labels to them; but since 
the 'labels are proving so unreliable, Strether seems well on his way to being 
dispossessed of this faculty, This considerably complicates the procedure 
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he tries to represent as so straightforward: " ... approach Chad ... wait for 
him, deal with him, master him .•.. ": The closest he gets to preparing a 
basis for this determined assault is the rather fumbling injunction to 
himself: "He must at any rate be clearer as to what - should he continue to 
do that for convenience - he was still condoning." The parenthetical 
rationalisation. forestalling the implications of the dread word "condoning". 
graphically conveys both Strether'squick sense of what he is about, and his 
hasty shying away from the realisation. His excuse is ready, as it were, 
before the accusation is made. 
By the time Strether delivers his address to Bi1ham he has at least 
renounced the simp1 ifying vision of Woollett. He may not be much clearer "as 
to what ... he was still condoning", but he seems to be less concerned with 
finding out. In fact, it seems to have ceased to matter: "It does n't so 
much matter what you do in particular," he advises little Bi1ham, "so long 
as you have had your life." This is a curiously amoral statement for 
Strether to make, and it suggests that he has moved to the opposite extreme 
of his Woo11ett notions - notions that earlier prompted him to tell Maria 
that Chad "wants, as I see him, to be protected. Protected I mean from 
1 i fe." (I, 71) As he now sees Chad, the 1 i fe that he represents is the 
thing most worth having - it seems at any price. 
It is at this point that the first "process of vision" culminates in 
the resolution of the first pattern of irony; it is by the same token the 
point of departure for the second process, posited on Strether's blind 
idealisation of Chad and his circle. This idealisation is demonstrated 
slightly later in the same scene when Strether, on the point of expressing 
a whimsical desire to be like G10riani, catches sight of Chad and Jeanne de 
Vionnet: 
It was the click of a spring - he saw the truth .... "Oh, Chad!"-
it was that rare youth he should have enjoyed being "like." (I, 220) 
The "truth" that Strether sees here is of course only a half-truth, based as 
it is on his ignorance of what Chad is really "like". 
In James' placing of Strether's idealisation of Chad and all he 
represents 1 ies, I think, the answer to F.R. Leavis' question: 
What, we ask, is this, symbolized by Paris, that Strether feels 
himself to have missed in his own life? If we are to take the 
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elaboration of the theme in the spirit in which we are meant to 
take it, have n't we to take the symbol too much at the glamorous 
face-value it has for Strether?30 
What is "symbolized by Paris" and embodied in Chad is simply the "life" that 
Strether feels he has missed; and if it seems insufficiently realised, that 
is because "the glamorous face-value it has for Strether" is at this stage 
our only access to it. Buf this "face-value", I should say, is presented as 
such: "the elaboration of the theme" involves the revelation of precisely 
this truth to Strether and to the reader. 31 In reacting against the 
"mistake" of his own youth, as he can even at this stage partially see, 
Strether is making the very mistake Maria Gostrey warned him against: 
"Don't make up your mind. There are all sorts of things. You 
have n't seen him all .... Take time - that's the only way not to 
make some mistake that you'll regret. Then you'll see. He does 
rea lly want to shake her off." 
Our friend had by this time so got into the vision that he almost 
gasped. "After all she has done for him?" 
Miss GostY"ey gave him a look which broke the next moment into a 
wonderful smile. "He's not so good as you think!" (I,171) 
Maria is right, of course, and in his "process of vision" Strether is 
eventually brought to see this, and even to share her view of "good" - which, 
in this instance, consisting as it does of remaining faithful to Madame de 
Vionnet, is the exact opposite of Woollett's. But in Gloriani's garden his 
charmed vision of Chad and his associates. can still, with the simplification 
30 The Great Tradition, p. 178. 
31 David Lodge has made much the same point, on different evidence, in 
his essay "Strether by the River": 
I suggest that what is being realized in the greater part of The 
Ambassadors is the experience of a man who has himself not fuTTY 
"reallZeepr--the total impl ications of the experience; and that 
what might seem inadequate realization in terms of our customary 
demands on literature, in fact displays a perfect adjustment of 
means to an end in terms of the overall design of this particular 
book. (The Language of Fi ct i on [London: Routl edge and Kegan 
Paul, 19bt;-J, p. 194.) 
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attributable to his "reaction against the mistake", issue in the impossibly 
comprehensive moral imperative: "Live!" 
For Strether, "life" is what Chad has; he has no clearer conception 
of it than that. His disillusionment, or clarification, entails a growing 
understanding of what exactly it means to live as he enjoins little Bilham 
to do, and as he admiringly sees Chad doing. I am not thinking so much of 
his not-very-surprising discovery that Marie de Vionnet is Chad's mistress 
as of his realisation that to live as Chad does is simply to make use of 
other people: 
He habitually left things to others, as Strether was so well aware, 
and it in fact came over our friend in these meditations that 
there had been as yet no such vivid illustration of his famous 
knowing how to live. (II, 264) 
What enables him to leave things to others is his easy charm, his polished 
manner: Vlhat ~tadame de Vionnet has done for him is to enhance his capacity 
for having his own way by pleasing others. 
In Chad's last conversation with Strether it is quite clear that he is 
aware, in appropriately commercial terms, of what t~adame de Vionnet has done 
for him: 
" Your value has quintupled." 
"Well then, would n't that be enough -?" 
Chad had risked it jocosely, but Strether remained blank. 
"Enough?" 
"If one should wish to live on one's accumUlations?" (II, 312) 
Even as a joke this is chilling: it may not express a firm intention on 
Chad's part to cash in on his accumulated value, but it does reveal that he 
is capable of taking this mercenat'y view of his own "value". It is 
appropriate that the branch of the family business that appeals to him as 
"the great new force" should be advertising (II, 315). Advertising, after 
all, is the "art" ("It's an art like another", says Chad blandly) of 
presenting a product in a way that makes it seem desirable (we remember that 
Wool lett produces an item that apparently requires a certain amount of 
presentation to seem other than prosaic), which is what Chad excels at. The 
progeny of the nineteenth-century robber baron, he is the precursor of the 
twentieth-centur'y pub 1 ie relations executive. As Woo"ett can rise in 
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stolid serenity above the tainted sources of its wealth, so Chad wlll 
presumably conceal from Hoollett the source of his invaluable polish. It is 
one of the sharper ironies of the work that Chad should turn out to be, after 
all, a true son of Woollett: his notions of business are just more up-to-
date. The irony is resolved, with a classical simplicity, in Strether's 
recognition of Chad's personal and moral identity: Chad, Strether comes to 
see, is "none the less only Chad." (II, 284) With his sharpened "faculty of 
seeing things as they were", Strether recognises that Chad's moral deficiency 
lies not in anything Paris has done to him, but in having remained faithful 
to Woollett. Christopher Newman's defeat at the hand of French subtlety in 
The American has been revenged. 
Chad imperturbably having his life without paying any price for it: 
this is the view we have of him by the end of the novel, even while he is 
administering a kick to the prospect of a lucrative career in advertising -
a kick which we distrust as we distrust at this stage all manifestations of 
Chad's boyish exuberance. It is clearly a view which severely qualifies 
Strether's statement to Bilham that "it does n't so much matter what you do 
in particular, so long as you have your life." Strether comes to see that 
"having your 1 ife" may be a matter of having it at the expense of others. 
The alternative offered by the novel is, apparently, not to have one's 
life, for fear of exploiting others. This is presumably the principle 
motivating Strether's return to an uninviting America at the end of the novel. 
Structurally this completes the contrast with Chad, who will return to 
success and riches in America, having gained all he could from Europe and 
Madame de Vionnet. That, at any rate, seems to be the scheme according to 
whi ch the nove 1 was vlritten; and in terms of thi s scheme Strether' s 
renunciation of Maria Gostrey is to be seen as the clear-sighted act of a 
man who refuses to gain anything for himself from a mission in which he feels 
he has accomplished nothing for others. 
It does not seem to me, however, that Strether's vision of himself is 
clear enough to give this renunciation the moral weight James seems to have 
intended. He has had from the start a deterministic view of himself, a 
belief in his own failure which relieves him of the responsibility of living 
up to his ovm advice. He can, in Gloriani 's garden, confidently advise 
Bilham to "live", on the safe assumption that it is too late for anybody to 
expect him to do so. He thus ignores his own statement that "The right time 
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is any time that one is still so lucky as to have." By that definition, 
the right time for him is now, but he rhetorically covers this implication 
under the blanket assertion that "I'm old; too old; too old at any rate for 
what I see." What he sees is the glamorous array of guests at G10riani's 
gathering, above all Chad, his idealisation of whom makes him fail to 
appreciate any more prosaic and attainable reality. It is this failure to 
"see" that forms the basis of the third pattern of irony in the novel. Set 
against Strether's increasing insight into both Paris and Wool lett is his 
blindness, not only to what he is "still so lucky as to have", but to the 
implications of his renunciation of Maria Gostrey. It is, in other words, 
through the ficelle's assumption of "something of the dignity of a prime idea" 
that this irony is generated and left unresolved. 
What Strether can still have, in spite of his claim that it is "too 
1 ate", is demonstrated when, after hi s conversati on with Bil ham, most of the 
guests retreat into the house, leaving Strether alone with Maria - and "it 
was as if our friends had waited for the full charm to come out": 
It was noth i ng new to him, however, as we know, that a man mi ght 
have - il.t all events such a man as he - an amount of experience 
out of any proportion to his adventures; so that, though it \'las 
doubtless no great adventure to sit on there with Miss Gostrey and 
hear about r~adame de Vionnet, the hour, the picture, the immediate, 
the recent, the possible - as well as the communication itself, not 
a note of which fai led to reverberate - only gave the moments more 
of the taste of history. (r, 227-28) 
These moments, during which all the impressions of the afternoon combine with 
the charm of the setting and the hour to enhance the pleasure of communication 
with somebody who can, as it were, appreciate his appreciation: is this not 
a kind of life for ~Ihich he is not too old? His vision of "the immediate, 
the recent, the possible" surely refers back to, and in referring cancels, 
his lament that "It's too late"? But the occasion passes as only an 
opportunity to hear about Madame de Vionnet. lam suggesting, of course, that 
for much of the nove 1, Strether, for a 11 he "sees", averts his gaze from the 
fact that he is being offered, through Maria Gostrey, a second chance - not 
to regain his lost youth, as he futilely tries to do through Chad and ~1adame 
de Vionnet, but to make the most of his lIIaturity, to stop envying other people 
the fact that they are "so happily and hatefully young." 
In Strether's words to little Bilham we see something of the habit of 
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mind that prevents him from profiting by such opportunities - what is called 
elsewhere "his constant habit of shaking the bottle in which life handed him 
the wine of experience" (I, 180). His argument spl its rather akwardly into 
two contentions: that it is a "mistake" not to avail oneself of such 
opportunities for living as are offered, and, secondly, that one does not 
have much say in the matter after all: "the affair of life" is "at the best 
a tin mould, ••• into which, a helpless jelly, one's consciousness is poured". 
Since a helpless jelly can not be held responsible for flaws in the mould, it 
is difficult to see what avoidable mistake Strether made. Strether somewhat 
lamely tries to refer the contradiction to "the illusion of freedom"; but 
if it is only an illusion, there seems little point in cultivating it. 
Strether is, of course, only voicing the age-old perplexity in the face 
of free will and determinism, and it cannot be held against him that he does 
not have the sol ut ion. But we do note that he does not seem aware of the 
contradiction, and that the total effect of the speech is to make Strether's 
position seem thoroughly safe. "What one loses one loses" - and not, it 
would seem, through any fault of one's own. The helpless jelly runs no risks 
and incurs no responsibility. 
The conflict between choice and deternrinism underlies, I believe, James' 
whole conception of Strether. Strether, in terms of James' project for the 
novel, must be somebody who feels life has passed him by, and to keep the 
poignancy complete, he must not be in the process of proving himself wrong. 
On the other hand, to qualify as Jamesian centre of consciousness he must be, 
in James' words, "still able to live with suffic"ient intensity to be a source 
of what may be called excitement to himself, not less than to the reader".32 
In order, then, to account for the fact that he does not change - change, at 
any rate, sufficiently to grasp the opportunity offered him - he has to be 
provided with a temperament that resists such opportunities. This James does 
- but the effect is to make his hero seem considerably less clear-sighted 
about himself than about others. Thus Strether's statement to Bilham does 
not, as Edel maintains, "give the novel its 'deterministic' post-Darwinian 
philosophy,,33: it conveys in the first place Strether's habit of seeing 
32 The Notebooks of Henry James, ed. F.O. ~latthiessen and Kenneth B. 
Nurdock "(1947; rpt. New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1955), p. 374. 
33 The Master, p. 74. 
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himself as helplessly determined by his circumstances. 
If this habit had been only a tendency to passivity, we might have felt 
no more than a slightly pitying impatience; But combined with his passivity 
is an inclination to dwell on the ignominy of his failure, on the "fact that 
he had failed, as he considered, in everything, in each relation and in half 
a dozen trades, as he liked luxuriously to put it" (I, 83). His sense of 
failure has, in short, become an indulgence. One detects the note of 
luxuriating, of liking the extravagant formulation, in so many of his 
disarmingly modest statements. Even his name on the cover of the Review 
testifies obscurely to his insignificance: 
" It's exactly the thing that I'm reduced to doing for myself. 
It seems to rescue a little, you see, from the wreck of hopes and 
ambitions, the refuse-heap of disappointments and failures, my one 
presentable little scrap of an identity." (I, 65) 
The rueful self-depreciation does, of course, contain a saving touch of 
humour - Strether is at least never morose 1 ike Waymarsh - but this does not 
prevent it from coming across as rather facile. What ambitions, on the 
evidence offered us, what very precise hopes, did he ever have? We don't 
even know whether he had one good square failure, that is, an unsuccessful 
but concel"ted attempt at a definitely formulated goal. Claiming failure at 
everything is less humiliating than admitting failure in a particular instance, 
and also less challenging. In making himself as small as possible he gives 
himself very little to live up to. 
I have avoided the word self-pity, because it is such a faded label for 
so vividly presented and complex a state of mind. At times, however, the 
word becomes unavoidable: 
Had ever a man, he had finally fallen into the way of asking 
himself, lost so much and even done so much for so little? (I, 84) 
It is possible that we are expected to take the much that he claims to have 
done on trust; but the particular loss he is lamenting here is the death of 
his son, who "had been banished and neglected, mainly because the fa tiler had 
been unwittingly selfish" - characteristically by devoting himself "to merely 
missing the mother." In this case, at least, he has nothing because he did 
nothing. This could have been simply sad, but there is also something 
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disturbing in his having "finally fallen into the way of asking himself" 
this self-pitying question: it has become yet another habit. It is 
intimately connected with his habit of regarding himself as a failure, with 
the difference that it slips into a more comfortable implication that his 
failure is not his fault, that he has someho~1 remained unappreciated by 
destiny. 
To take this even further, Strether's sense of being wronged seems at 
times to turn into resentment of others who are successful. Even Waymarsh's 
. incongruous flirtation with Sarah Pocock, involving early-morning visits to 
the flower market, becomes for Strether a case of others enjoying themselves 
at his expense. The train of thought is characteristic: 
..• the practice of getting up early for adventures could indeed 
in no ma·nner be fastened on him. It came to him in fact that just 
here was his usual case: he was for ever missing things through 
his general genius for missing them, while others were for ever 
picking them up through a contrary bent. And it was others who 
looked abstemious and he who looked greedy;· it was he somehow who 
finally paid, and it was others who mainly partook. Yes, he should 
go to the scaffold yet for he would n't quite know whom. (II, 
185-86 ) 
This presumably means that Waymarsh and Sally are using the opportunity 
provided by Strether's delinquency to indulge with impunity in the kind of 
conduct he is held accountable for. This may well be true, but there is 
something rather egocentric in such an interpretation of suchan occasion. 
And the ramifications of the interpretation are startingly ingenious. 
Starting from the recognition that he lacks the initiative for "getting up 
early for adventures", Strether easily moves to the famil iar territory of 
his confirmed habit of failure, his "usual case", "his general genius", with 
others "for ever" inexplicably, undeservedly "picking up" things. This leads 
to the implication that there is something rather gross in this "contrary 
bent", a grossness that is unfairly ascribed to the "abstemious" Strether, 
while the truly "greedy" escape, leaving Strether to pay for the meal - pay, 
if need be, with his life. So from his realisation that it would not have 
occurred to him to take ~laria to the ~larche aux Fleurs, he arrives at the 
conclusion that.he is incurably but undiscriminatingly unselfish. This 
unselfishness, however, is not a free choice: he does not grab the bill for 
the meal as much as he gets stuck with .it. 
This habit of thought is evident also in his "sense of the .service he 
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rendered" (I, 256) to Chad and f.1adame de Vionnet by taking their side against 
Woollett. He does not so much blame others for exploiting him as blame 
himself for being exploitable; but he is certainly sensitively aware of 
being exploited: 
He 1 i ked a hlays, where Lambert Strether was concerned, to know the 
worst, and \~hat he now seemed to know was not only that he was 
bribeable, but that he had been effectually bribed. The only 
difficulty was that he could n't quite have said with what. It was 
as if he had sold himself, but had n't somehow got the cash. That, 
however, was ~Ihat, characteristically, would happen to him. It 
would naturally be his kind of traffic. (II, 69) 
We have by now 1 earnt to take the apparently innocuous "he 1 i ked" at its 
literal value. As "he liked luxuriously" to attribute total failure to 
himself, he here enjoys taking the worst possible view of himself. He is 
bribeable, he has been bribed, "the only difficulty" being that his condition 
misses an essential element of bribery: he has not been paid. 
Characteristically this prompts the suspicion that he has been cheated in the 
transaction. Thus he can believe that he is both a knave and a fool, without 
getting anything either way out of the service he is rendering so agreeably 
"to those who profited by it". (1, 256) 
Strether's luxurious sense of his own deficiencies and deficits does at 
times yield to a clearer recognition that he ~ gaining something from the 
experience: 
" I began to be young, or at 1 east to get the benefi t of it, 
the moment I met you at Chester, and that's what has been taking 
place ever since. I never had the benefit at the proper time -
which comes to saying that I never had the thing itself. I'm 
having the benefit at this moment .... It's a benefit that would 
make a poor show for many people .... But nevertheless I'm making 
up late for what I did n't have early. I cultivate my little , 
benefit in my own 1 iUle way. It amuses me more than anything that 
has happened to me in all my life .... it's my surrender, it's my 
tribute, to youth. One puts that in where one can - it has to come 
in somewhere, if only out of the lives, the conditions, the feelings 
of other persons." (II, 50-51) 
The tone characteristically minimises the "poor show" of his "little benefit" 
and his "little way", but there is at least an admission here that he has 
gained something, that he is in fact not selling himself for nothing. The 
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whole speech sensibly contradicts his contention to little Bilham that "what 
one loses one loses": he now seems to accept that it is possible to make up 
for one's losses, and even that Maria has been instrumental in this. 
The pity is that Strether does not, in the rest of the novel, accept the 
second chance that is being offered him. Furthermore, even here it is not 
quite clear whether he realises the full implications of his making his youth 
"out of the lives, the conditions, the feelings of other persons." He seems 
to be referring only to the youth he experiences. vicariously through Chad and 
Marie de Vionnet, but it is surely true that in a more parasitic way he is 
"only" cultivating his little benefit out of the life, the conditions, the 
feelings of Maria Gostrey. That, at any rate, is the way it would have been 
open for Maria to interpret it if she had had Strether's habit of calculating 
what she is owed by life. 
In this scene t·laria comes as close as she ever does to making a demand 
upon Strether - whether encouraged by his appreciation or exasperated by his 
obtuseness is not clear. Upon her implying that she, unlike Chad and Madame 
de Vionnet, will never "fail" him in the sense of leaving him nothing to do 
for her, he rep J i es: 
" Oh I beg your pardon; you n~cessarily, you inevitably will. 
Your conditions - that's what I mean - won't allow me anything to 
do for you." 
"Let alone - I see what you mean - that I'm drearily dreadfully 
old. I am, but there's a service - possible fOr you to render -
that I know, all the same, I shall think of." 
"And what will it be'?" 
This, in fine, however, she would never tell him. "You shall 
hear only if your smash takes place. As that is really out of the 
question, I won't expose.myself" - a point at which, for reasons 
of his own, Strether ceased to press. (II, 52) 
Strether's "reasons of his own" clearly relate to the fact that he does not 
want to be told what service he could render Maria: "constantly accompanied 
by a sense of the service he rendered" (I, 256), his self-image would make 
it difficult for him to turn down a request for service. A-Iso, as long as he 
can believe her to be self-sufficient ("Your conditions ... won't allow me 
anything to do for you"), she does not rest on his conscience, thus leaving 
that faculty free to invent adm-j rable reasons for avoiding the responsi bi 1 ity 
of a relationship based on anything more demanding than his sense of failure. 
In his project for the novel, James explains that if ~laria 's questions 
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to Strether about his mission have not "fully illustrated for him the kind 
of turn her interest in himself may be apprehended as capable of taking, that 
is because he does n't in general jump rapidly to such conclusions."34 In 
the actual novel, however, his slowness to jump seems to owe less to modesty 
than to an unwillingness to understand her. The same characteristic appears 
when he tel1s Maria that Mrs Newsome provides all the money for the Revievl: 
"I hope then you make a good thing - " 
"I never made a good thing!" he at once returned. 
She just waited. "Don't you call it a good thing to be loved?" 
"Oh we're not loved. We're not even hated. We're only just 
sweetly ignored." 
She had another pause. "You don't trust me!" she once more 
repea ted. (1. 66) 
Strether's shying away from Maria's implication shows a complete immersion in 
his snug habit of self-abasement - we note again how automatically the habit 
asserts itself in the reply that comes "at once". His ignoring of present 
opportunity in dwelling on the past is not unlike his loss of his son through 
grief over his wife. 35 
This uncharitable view of Strether is of course one-sided, but I believe 
that it represents a side of Strether that has to be taken into account in 
assessing his final action of turning down Maria's offer of marriage. Simply 
to accept Strether's own version of the latter, as a refusal to profit by his 
failure to carry out his mission, is to ignore a great deal of information 
that we have been given about him. Granting that he could see acceptance of 
Maria's offer as tainted by the self-seeking he has discovered under the 
glamorous surface of Chad's Paris, we nevertheless know by now that Strether's 
mental processes are seldom as simple as this. 
Strether's deterministic vievl of himself has by this stage been so 
firmly establ ished by the novel that it is difficult not to find it confirmed 
34 Notebooks, p. 385 
35 Nicola Bradbury comments on Strether's evasion that "Maria, comically 
and tellingly, assumes that this is a.brilliant sidestepping of the personal 
issue." (Henry James: The Later Novels [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1975], p. 4TJ It lsaTITiCuTf, hOI'/ever, to see it as anything but a 
sidestepping, though not notably brilliant: it certainly does neit take in 
Maria. 
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by the final scene: 
"Shall you make anything so good -?" But, as if remembering what 
Mrs. Newsome had done, it was as far as she went. 
He had sufficiently understood. "So good as this place at this 
moment? So good as what you make of everything you touch?" He 
took a moment to say, for really and truly, what stood about him 
there in her offer - which was as the offer of exquisite service, 
of lightened care, for the rest of his days - might well have 
tempted. It built him softly round, it roofed him warmly over, it 
rested, all so firm, on selection. And what ruled selection was 
beauty and knowledge. It was awkward, it was almost stupid, not to 
seem to prize such things; yet none the less, so far as they made 
his opportunity they made it only for a moment. She'd moreover 
understand - she always understood. 
That indeed might be, but meanwhile she was going on. "There's 
nothing, you know, I would n't do for you." 
"Oh yes - I know." 
"There's nothing," she repeated, "in all the world." 
"I know. I know. But all the same I must go." He had got it at 
last. "To be right." 
"To be right?" 
She had echoed it in vague deprecation, but he felt it already 
clear for her. "That, you see, is my only logic. Not, out of the 
whole affair, to have got anything for myself." (II,325-26) 
Having seen Strether "shaking the bottle in which life handed him the wine 
of experience", we cannot but read this scene in the light of that knowledge. 
We have also seen him "for reasons of his own" refrain from pressing l~aria to 
reveal the nature of the service he can render her; since the service she 
here offers to render him amounts to the Same thing - marriage - we suspect 
that he simply does not want to marry Maria. This is not a sin, of course, 
but nor is it to be passed off as noble self-denial. Besides, Strether's 
scruples seem rather selective: to use Maria as a confidante, without being 
able to reciprocate the feeling he is creating by doing so, sorts oddly with 
his determination "not, out of the whole affair, to have got anything for 
[him]self." Strether can tell Chad "more has been done for you ... than I've 
ever seen done ... by one human being for another" (II, 224), and yet fail to 
see that he may be under a like obligation to Maria. "There's nothing, you 
know, I would n't do for you", she tells him - to which he rather blandly 
and complacently replies "Oh yes - I know." We have in fact seen him availing 
himself of this knovlledge ~Iith an insensitivity worthy of Chad. For instance, 
feel ing "lonely and cold" after his meeting \~ith Chad and Madame de Vionnet, 
he reflects that 
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Chad and Madame de Vionnet had at least the comfort that they could 
talk it over together. With whom could he talk of such things? -
unless indeed always, at almost any stage; with Maria? He foresaw 
that r~iss Gostrey would come again into requisition on the 
morrow. (II, 265) 
The ease with which he takes Maria's services for granted, not really noticing 
how his afterthought qualifies the loneliness he self-pityingly imputes to 
himself, gives a certain literal force to the "requisition" that Miss Gostrey 
will come into on the morrow. 
The point of this is that Strether's reliance on Maria's cheerful services 
has become so automatic that he has no sense of her own possible claims. As 
he takes for granted her availability as confidante, so he blithely assumes 
that she will accept his "only logic": "She'd moreover understand - she 
always understood." Good old Maria. 
It is not absolutely clear exactly how much Maria does understand; the 
reader, at any rate, may find Strether's logic slightly puzzling: 
Honest and fine, she could n't greatly pretend she did n't see it. 
Still she could pretend just a little. "But why should you be so 
dreadfully right?" 
"That's the way that - if I must go - you yourself would be the 
first to want me. And I can't do anything else." (11,_ 326) 
The paradox poor Lucasta was confronted with was simple compared with this 
one. If Strether must go, Maria might indeed derive some consolation from 
his rightness; but since she is in effect questioning the necessity of his 
going, his reply only sidesteps the essence of her question, and settles on 
the rather flat "I can't do anything else." 
Maria's acceptance of this does not really confirm Strether's confident 
assumption that "she'd moreover understand". Perhaps she does, but nothing 
we are given expresses that understanding: 
So then she had to take it, though still with her defeated protest. 
"It is n't so much your being 'right' - it's your horrible sharp 
eye for what makes you so." 
"Oh but you're just as bad yourself. You can't resist me when I 
pOint that out." 
She sighed it at last all comically, all tragically, away. "I 
can't indeed resist you." 
"Then there we are!" said Strether. (II,327) 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
117 
Maria simply has no choice but to accept with good grace ("she had to take 
it"). Her distinction between "being 'right'" and Strether's "horrible sharp 
eye for what makes [him] so" may either credit him with moral clear-
sightedness or ascribe to him an excessive scrupulousness, depending on the 
reader's own view of Strether's "rightness". Her inability to "resist" him 
means only that she finds him irresistable, not, as he seems to mean, that 
she cannot oppose his logic. Thus Strether's "Then there we are" merely 
confirms their relative and mutually exclusive positions - his rightness, 
her hopeless affection. To find here, as Nicola 
existential acceptance of the order of things"36 
Bradbury does, "an almost 
is to muffle in vague 
reverence the fact that the "order of things" is entirely of Strether's 
making, hardly requiring "almost existential acceptance" on his part. 
It seems to me, in short, that neither Strether nor his creator has 
established a consistent case for what Matthiessen calls "Strether's tenuous 
renunciation."37 James' own comments on the renunciation do not seem to me 
to provide any firmer a base: 
He can't accept or assent. He won't. He does n't. It's too late. 
It mlght n't have been, sooner - but it is, yes, distinctly, now. 
He has come so far through his total little experience that he has 
come out on the other side - on the other side, even, of a union 
with Miss Gostrey.38 
Since Strether himself claimed "It's too late" considerably earlier in the 
novel, the repetition of the excuse, even by James himself, seems unconvincing. 
Furthermore, it's difficult to see how "he has come out on the other side" of 
his experience - except in the sense of not committing himself to it, which 
is merely his "usual case". 
Accepting this explanation by James, Frederick Crews has put forward an 
unironical interpretation of the novel's conclusion which seems to me only 
to reveal the spuriousness of Strether's "only logic": 
To marry r~iss Gostrey would not in itself destroy his independence, 
but it would be a symbolic avowal that her world, the European one, 
36 The Later Novels, p. 70. 
37 F.O. r·latthiessen, Henry James: The ~lajor Phase (1944; rpt. London: 
Oxford University Press, ,.946), p. 41. 
38 Notebooks, p. 415. 
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corresponds to what he wants. Europe comes closer than Ameri ca, 
perhaps, but both fall so far short of the ideal that Strether 
prefers to forego them both . •.. His return to a life that can 
hold few pleasures ..• is his supreme tribute to Life as a whole. 39 
Never can a woman have been turned down on such theoretical grounds. I don't 
know why we should look for symbolic avowals here: to marry Miss Gostrey 
would be a straightforward enough recognition that what she offers is what he 
wants. Since he turns this down, we expect some more substantial alternative 
than "the ideal" or a "tribute to Life as a \vhole". What is this ideal that 
neither America nor Europe can satisfy? A man who at fifty-four declines two 
continents because they fall short of "what he wants", presumably wants 
something more specific than "Life as a whole"; but neither Crews nor the 
novel defines it. 
Crews' vindication of Strether makes him sound rather like Isabel Archer, 
turning down Caspar Goodwood and Lord Warburton in pursuit of her 
"enlightened prejudice in favour of the free exploration of life".40 To 
make the comparison is to see that we are being asked to condone, in a mature 
man, the kind of idealism that James showed to be theoretical and deluded in 
the case of a presumptuous young person like Isabel Archer. Also, Isabel's 
return to Osmond at the end of the novel provides a useful parallel with 
Strether's "return to a life that can hold few pleasures" - useful in 
establishing a standard by which to measure Strether's renunciation. Whatever 
we think of Isabel's return to Osmond - even if we see it as the betrayal of 
the substance of marriage for the sake of the form - we can see that it is 
truly her "only logic": the decision is totally consistent with Isabel as we 
have come to know her. The alternatives available to Isabel - life with 
Goodwood, or even just. open separation from the husband she has publicly 
committed herself to - would be intolerable to her. The alternative offered· 
Strether, on the other hand, has everything to recommend it, unless we are 
persuaded that it would be violating a principle as sacred to him as 
consistency is to Isabel. All that the novel offers us, as an ad hoc 
discovery ("He had got it at last"), is Strether's determination not to have 
profited by his experience, which, as I have argued, is neither clear-sighted 
39 Th.~. Tragedy of Hanners (1957; rpt. Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1971), p. 56. 
40 The Portrait of a Lady (New York, 1908; rpt. New York: Augustus 
M. Kelly, 1976), I, 155. 
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nor, under the circumstances, particularly unselfish. 
Since taking the conclusion on Strether's own terms yields such an 
unsatisfactory reading, the less flattering interpretation of Strether's 
decision readily asserts itself: instead of a moral triumph we have yet 
another of Strether's failures to board the train, presented as a fastidious 
refusal to travel at somebody else's expense. 41 
When read like this, the novel moves out of line with the "heroic" 
tradition of self-sacrifice to an ethical claim - the renunciations of an 
Antigone, a Coriolanus, a Daniel Deronda - and approaches the perplexed 
ironies of a novel like Lord Jim. Strether, offered "exquisite service, 
1 ightened care, for the rest of his days", finds that "so far as they made 
his opportunity they made it only for a moment" (II,325-26): the greater 
opportunity "to be ri ght" demands that he turn hi s back on these thi ngs. 
Similarly, Jim turns his back on the devotion of Jewel and the people of 
Patusan for the sake of his "opportunity,,42: a chance to redeem himself in 
terms of a code of conduct that has no reality for anybody else in the alien 
environment where he has been offered his second chance. Where Conrad makes 
the validity of Jim's "exalted egoism", his "shadowy ideal of conduct" (p. 
313) an issue in the novel, James does not overtly question Strether's ideal. 
But, to return to the analogy I drew at the· beginning of this chapter, in 
place of Conrad's Marlow we have James' technique - in Schorer's sense of 
"the means of exploring and defining the values in an area of experience 
which, for the first time then, are being given. "43 This is to say that the 
demands of technique - in this instance the need to create an "ostensible 
connectedness" for Maria Gostrey - do create a total context within which 
the values overtly affirmed in the novel are subjected to something similar 
41 For an even more unflattering view of Strether's renunciation, in 
which Maria's technical function as ficelle is oddly conflated with her 
identity in the novel, see Bernard RlChards, "The Ambassadors and The Sacred 
Fount: The Artist Manqu~", The Air of Reality, pp. 241-42. The relevant 
comment is worth quollng, if only because 1t oemonstrates the perils of 
reading the Preface as if it were part of the novel: 
Strether thi nks he sees an offer of 'exqu is ite servi ce' and 
'ligtened care' from Maria Gostrey, but she is probably an old 
ficelle to the last .... He is very likely 'renouncing' a niche 
that E not even offered for his occupation. 
42 Joseph Conrad, Lord Jim (1900; rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1957), 
p. 312. This is the last of-rne many occurrences of the word. 
43 "Technique as Discovery", p. 388. 
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to Marlow's "uneasy doubt" (p. 44). Of course the similarities cannot be 
pushed too far - the two protagonists are just too different - but in both 
cases we have the disjunction typical of unresolved irony: the disjunction 
between the presented reality and the "certainties" seeking to stabilise 
that reality. 
Interestingly, in the year after the completion of The Ambassadors, 
James wrote a tale in which the irony (fully resolved in this case) hinges 
on the unwitting selfishness of a man involved in a relationship much like 
that of Strether and Maria. "The Beast in the Jungle" can of course not 
"prove" any interpretation of The Ambassadors, since it is quite common for 
a writer to preserit essentially the same situation from a variety of 
perspectives and with very different implications; but the tale does show 
that a more disturbing interpretation of such a relationship was at least 
apparent to James. 
"The Beast in the Jungle", unlike The Ambassadors, is an exercise in 
traditional tragedy. The tragic pattern, in fact, seems to be a deliberate 
adaptation of that of Oedipus the King: in trying to avoid the fate 
ordained for him, the protagonist unwittingly ensures its fulfilment. 
The life unl ived, which Strether laments in The Ambassadors, is here 
seen as the consequence of a self-absorbed "watching" for the supremely 
significant event that is to place its stamp on the life of the protagonist, 
John Marcher. In Marcher's friendship with May Bartram, and in his acceptance 
of her undertaking to "watch" for the spring of the beast with him, James, 
with thinly-concealed irony, reveals the complacent selfishness that 
masquerades as selflessness: 
He had kept up, he felt, and very decently on the whole, his 
consci ousness of the importance of not being selfi sh, and it was 
true that he had never sinned in that direction without promptly 
enough trying to press the scales the other way. He often repaired 
his fault, the season permitting, by inviting his friend to 
accompany him to the opera .... It even happened that, seeing her 
home at such times, he occasionally went in with her to finish, as 
he called it, the evening, and, the better to make his point, sat 
dO\'1n to the frugal but always careful 1 ittle supper that awaited 
his pleasure. His point was made, he thought, by his not eternally 
insisting 11ith her on himself. ... 44 
44 "The Beast in the Jung1e", The Novels and Tales of Henl'y James, New 
York edition (New York: Charles Sc~{bner's Sons, 1909), XVII, 90. 
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With such self-conscious little gestures Marcher placates his conscience and 
keeps the friendship alive until May Bartram becomes ill. In this illness 
which is to prove fatal, May Bartram tries to tell him that she has guessed 
his fate and that he can yet avoid it: "It's never too late" (p. 105) -
never, that is, while he still has the opportunity to love her and accept 
the love she extends to him. In his self-absorption he fails to see what 
she means, and it is only after her death that knowledge comes to him. 
Visiting her grave, he sees the passion of grief shown by a stranger for a 
dead beloved, and wonders: 
What had the man had to make him, by the loss of it so bleed and 
yet live? (p. 12~ 
This leads him to an understanding of what May Bartram had tried to tell him: 
The fate he had been marked for he had met with a vengeance - he 
had emptied the cup to the lees; he had been the man of his time, 
the man, to whom nothing on earth was to have happened .... 
---The escape would have been to love her; then, then he would 
have lived. She had lived - who could say now witniWnat passion? 
- since she hac-loved him for himself; whereas he had never 
thought of her (ah how it hugely glared at him!) but in the chill 
of his egotism and the light of her use. (pp. 125-26) 
My point is that, allowing for the greater starkness of treatment in 
"The Beast", essentially the same judgement could have been passed on 
Strether. The difference is that Marcher attains the insight into himself 
that Strether does not: in keeping with the classical pattern of the tale, 
the irony constructed upon Marcher's blind "watching" is resolved with his 
moment of vision (indicated, as in the Oedipus, by the loss of vision: "His 
eyes darkened"). 
Strether of course does learn much from his experience: each of the 
two climactic moments of vision in the novel, in Gloriani's garden and by 
the river, serves as the resolution of a "process of vision". But, as in 
confirmation of his own theory of human nature as a "helpless jelly" 
determined by its mould, he remains bl ind to, and therefore trapped in, the 
timid egoism of exaggerated scruple. Where in Dickens the static and 
dynamic principles were separated out and embodied in different characters 
according to their capacity for change, in The Ambassadors the two principles 
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are united in a complex, contradictory protagonist, his insight offset by 
his blindness, his honesty and integrity qualified by his lack of self-
knowledge, the resolved ironies of his situation undercut by the unresolved. 
This is not to deny such insight and honesty as he undeniably possesses;4S 
it is merely to show how James' technique, as an instrument of moral 
discovery, creates a hero more complex than could have been foreseen at his 
conception. 
I believe that the discovery arrived at in the course of writing The 
Ambassadors made it possible for James to compose "The Beast in the Jungle" 
50 single-mindedly. The unambiguously tragic cast of the tale, the explicit 
conclusion, the classicially resolved irony, all suggest that James was 
dramatising a complete subject - a subject which The Ambassadors enabled him 
to find. As Thomas Moser says in a different context: 
A novel's true subject is the one that, regardless of the novelist's 
conscious intention, actually informs the work, the one that elicits 
the most highly energized writing. To put it another way, a 
novelist has found the true subject of his book when he dramatizes 
the truth he cannot escape rather than the illusion he longs to 
make true. 46 
To theorists like Wayne C. Booth it would seem highly presumptuous for a 
critic to claim to have found a novel '5 "true subject ... regardless of the 
novelist's conscious intention". The critic who wishes to justify the 
practice can, however, claim support from D.H. Lawrence's famous statement: 
If you try to nail anything down, in the novel, either it kills 
the novel, or the novel gets up and walks away with the nail. 47 
45 I would not be taken, for instance, as sharing Bernard Richards' 
unqualified judgement of Strether as "timid, self-centred, ungenerous, over-
diplomatic, untrustworthy and on many occasions untrusting." ("The Artist 
Manqu~", p. 224) 
46 "What ;s the Matter with Emily Jane? Conflicting Impulses in 
Wuthering Heights", Nineteenth-Century Fiction, XVII, ,. Rpt. in The 
ViCfDrfan NoveT;-ed. Ian WatTTNew York: OxTOrd University Press,-n-71), 
p. 183. 
47 "Morality and the Novel", Phoenix, ed. and introd. Edward P. 
McDonald (London: William Heinemanil;"-l916), p. 528. 
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This does not necessarily grant the critic licence to presume to remove the 
nail, but it does at least recognise the novel's potential to assume 
independence of its creator's conscious purpose. Much the same point is in 
fact made by Henry James in his Preface to The Portrait of a Lady: 
Here we get exactly the high price of the novel as a literary form 
- its power not only, while preserving that form with closeness, 
to range through all the differences of the individual relation to 
its general subject-matter, all the varieties of outlook on life, 
of disposition to reflect and project, created by conditions that 
are never the same from man to man (or, so far as that goes, from 
man to woman), but positively to appear more true to its character 
in proportion as it strains, or tends to burst,· with a latent 
extravagance, its mould. 48 
In the case of The Ambassadors, then,James may have failed to appreciate 
the "latent extravagance" of his novel. To see James positively delighting 
in this extravagance, we have to go to his next novel, The Wings of the Dove. 
48 The Art of the Novel, pp. 45-46. 
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Chapter IV 
"The Working and the Worked": 
Realism in The Wings of the Dove 
If James in his Preface to The Ambassadors savours the satisfaction of 
an intention achieved, he seems, in his Preface to The Wings of the Dove, at 
most to pretend dismay at an intention transcended. Through the thickets of 
this particularly impenetrable Preface emerges, ruefully but not exactly 
contritely, James' "scarce more than half-dissimulated despair at the 
inveterate displacement of-his general centre."1 He laments the missed 
opportunities and the "makeshift middle", the fact that "one's plan, alas, 
is one thing and one's result another" (I, xiii), but like a father pretending 
to complain of his son's naughtiness, he can't really hide his pride at the 
exuberance of his offspring: 
Such cases are of course far from abnormal - so far from it that 
some acute mind ought surely to have worked out by this time the 
"law" of the degree in which the artist's energy fairly depends on 
his fallibility. How much and how often, and in what connexions 
and with what almost infinite variety, must he be a dupe, that of his 
prime object, to be at all measurably a master, that of his actual 
substitute for it - or in other viords at all appreciably to exist? 
(I, xiii) 
In this case, James' "prime object", "the situation on which this long-drawn 
fiction mainly rests", is of course the plight of Milly Theale, "a young 
person conscious of a great capacity for life ... condemned to die under 
short respite" (I, v). The first step in the expansion of the subject was 
the realisation "that though [his] regenerate young New Yorker, and what 
might depend on her, should form [his] centre, [hiS] circumference was every 
whit as treatable." (I, xi) The treating of this "circumference", the 
relation of Kate Croy and ~lerton Densher, accordingly became the "actual 
substitute" for the original "centre"; in other words, Kate and Merton 
assumed a disproportionate part of the interest of the novel. This would 
seem to be a repetition of ~1aria Gostrey's arrogation to herself of more 
than her destined share of the novel, vlith the difference that in this case 
James seems to have been fully aVlare of what his novel was doing under his 
1 The Wings of the Dove, I, xviii. 
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hand. 
The full extent to ~/h;ch this shift of emphasis affected the novel can 
of course only be demonstrated from the novel itself, but as a preliminary 
it is interesting to watch, in a long notebook entry, the potential of a 
subject growing, even at the primary level of plot, as the need arises for 
further elements to support the basic conception. The entry starts with a 
tentative statement of a possible subject: 
Isn't perhaps something to be made of the idea that came to me some 
time ago and that I have not hitherto made any note of - the little 
idea of the situation of some young creature (it seems to me 
preferably a woman, but of this I'm not sure) who, at 20, on the 
threshold of a life that has seemed boundless, is suddenly condemned 
to death (by consumption, heart-disease, or whatever) by the voice 
of the physician? She learns that she has but a short time to live, 
and she rebels, she is terrified, she cries out in her anguish, her 
tragic young despair. 2 
By the end of the entry, James has practically established the whole plot, 
including the estrangement of Merton Densher and Kate Croy. This;s of course 
still a matter of the barest outline, with little indication of the 
complexities to emerge, but it provides an interestingly simplified example 
of James' exploration of the possibilities uf his subject, for instance in 
his feeling his way towards Merton Densher's moral crisis: 
The little action hovers before me as abiding, somehow, in the 
particular complication that his attitude (to the girl) engenders 
for the man, a complication culminating in some sacrifice for him, 
or some great loss, or disaster. (p. 170) 
Illuminating as the notebook entry is, the main concern of this chapter will 
be the more complex exploration done by the novel itself, through which the 
relatively slender subject develops not only into the history of Merton 
Densher and Kate Croy, but into a comprehensive analysis of a commercial 
society. I am particularly interested in the way in which the intricate 
ironies of the work establish that "hierarchy of significance" characteristic, 
according to Lukdcs, of the realist novel. The "mixed" ironies - that is, 
the coexistence of resolved and unresolved ironies - seem to me to be a 
result of the ft'ee development of the subject in James' execution of it; and 
what they reflect, mainly through the unresolved ironies, is a considerably 
2 Notebooks, p. 169. 
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more critical view of society than James projects in his notebook entry. 
This is to say that the scope of the unresolved irony is here much wider than 
in The Ambassadors, where it was a function only of James' analytical interest 
in his hero. In this respect, the irony of The Wings of the Dove prefigures 
the totally unresolved irony of The Golden Bowl. 
The development of the novel beyond its seminal idea may be one of the 
factors that make it so intractable to interpretation. Critical opinions on 
The Wings of the Dove may not be much more divided than on most of James' 
novels, but the divergence does stem from more basic assumptions. John 
Goode's reading of it as a kind of black comedy is admittedly too extreme to 
be representative,3 but even more conventional accounts of the novel differ 
on matters as fundamental as who the tragic protagonist is, or even whether 
we can see the novel as tragic in the full sense of the word. ~latth i essen, 
for instance, speculating "whether such a theme [as Milly's plight] can 
yield more than exquisite pathos", concludes: 
There is much more of pity than of terrOI' in Milly's confronting 
of fate. Her passive suffering is fitting for the deuteragonist 
rather than for the protagonist of a major tragedy, for a 
Desdemona, not for an Othello. 4 
Frederick Crews, concurring with Matthiessen, says: 
She is sacrifi ced as a martyr, but the choi ceof martyrdom is not 
her own. . .. 
•.. Matthiessen might have added that The Wings of the Dove 
does have an Othello of sorts. Merton Densher has allowed himself 
to be morally swi ndl ed no less than Othe 11 0 was. ... Like Othello, 
Densher pays dearly for his blindness. S 
3 "The Pervasive r~ystery of Style", pp. 296 - 97: 
A right evaluation of the novel depends on seeing it, to the end, 
as cOllledy, instead of sentimental izing it, as most critics do, as 
tragedy. The effects of Milly's death are very funny. 
Goode does not, alas, explain his amusement contagiously. 
4 The Major Phase, pp. 78, 79. 
5 The Tragedy of Manners, p. 75. 
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From this it is a short step to seeing Milly as secondary to Densher in the 
novel's structure: 
If one sees that Densher rather than Milly is the character who 
acquires a tragic vision, he will agree that Milly's chief 
importance in the last three books lies in the impression she makes 
upon Densher. (p. 78) 
From this, in turn, it is a short step to deciding, as John Goode does, that 
the novel is not about Mi lly. Two-th i rds of it a re concerned with 
the development of Densher's consciousness, and she is absent from 
both the beginning and the end .•.. In this respect, Milly is 
James's most important ficelle. 6 
Dorothea Krook, on the other hand, for much of her analysis of the 
novel, places the tragic emphasis strongly on Milly: 
The principal tragic theme of The Wings of the Dove, like that of 
The A~lkward Age, is the impact of the worldly world upon the 
unworldly - its power to undermine, reduce, and (in this instance) 
finally to destroy those who cannot accommodate themselves to its 
values'? 
Krook reconciles this view of Milly as "the principal vessel of 
consciousness in The Wings of the Dove" (p. 201) with Densher's prominence 
in the last book by speculating that 
it is as if James, having cast him for the part of the male lead 
to the second leading lady of the drama and kept him strictly 
subordinate to her up to this pOint, at last gives him the centre 
of the stage. (p. 221) 
This shift of emphasis produces a different kind of tragedy to complement 
Milly's: the "gradual, painful disclosure of the differences between Kate 
Croy and Merton Densher who had seemed such a mutual pa i r" (p. 228). Krook 
finds, however, that the painfulness of this estrangement is qualified by 
"a powerful sense of the bond of passion that still holds them together 
6 The Pervas i ve Mystery of Styl e", p. 246. 
7 The Ordeal of Consciousness in Henry James (1962; rpt. London: 
Cambridge Onlver'slty Press, ~-67), p. "21lTI":---
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right to the end"; 
The effect, if one follows the process closely enough, is as 
overwhelming as it is in Antony and Cleopatra, and leaves one·with 
the same sense of an affirmatlon of life so powerful as to 
transcend the proper 1 imi ts of tragedy. (pp. 229-30) 
Against this one could place Walter Allen's summing-up of the novel: 
The Wings of the Dove is modern tragedy, one could say drawing-room 
tragedy; yet the characters in literature Kate Croy and Merton 
Densher most irresistibly call to mind are Lad~ Macbeth and ~1acbeth, 
as Milly Theale suggests Ophelia or Desdemona. 
This parallel clearly implies a more sombre interpretation· of the ending than 
the "affirmation of life" Krook finds in it. Examples of such divergences, 
both major and minor, could be multiplied almost indefinitely, but the above 
will probably suffice to demonstrate the bewildering aspect The Hings of the 
Dove presents to the reader. 
I do not think there is any point in trying to decide which of these 
approaches to the novel is the "correct" one, that is, to settle who the 
tragic hero is or which Shakespearean character he or she most resembles. 
The need to identify a central consciousness seems to proceed from critical 
expectations schooled in, say, The Portrait of a Lady, with its firm 
subord i nati on of its material to the centra 1. character. For all the 
similarities between Isabel Archer and Millie Theale, the "conception of a 
certain young \~oman affronting her destiny", which James describes as the 
"single small corner-stone" of The Portrait,9 is inadequate as a key to The 
Wing~_. In attempting to locate the centre of the novel in one character, 
whether r~ill ie Theale or ~lerton Densher, we may miss that major part of the 
novel's meaning which consists in the fact of interrelatedness, that is, as 
in Middlemarch, that the individual, though standing at the centre of his own 
little universe, is necessarily seen by others as subordinate to their 
purposes. Isabel Archer also discovers that other people have found her 
useful, but this is in the first place an irony revealing the illusory nature 
of her independence; only in the second place does it form the basis of a 
8 The English Novel (1954; rpt. liarmondsworth: Penguin, 1958), p. 277. 
9 Preface to The Portrait of a Lady, The Art of the Novel, p. 48. 
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generalisation about the society in which she finds herself. Although, that 
is, Isabel is subject to manipulation, even in the form of Ralph's generous 
intervention in her destiny, she does not to the same extent as Milly become 
part of a whole system of manipulation wherein "the working and the worked 
[are] ... the parties to every relation."10 
Seen as a description of the principle of social interaction in the 
novel, these words of Kate's seem, to a sardonic view, to anticipate Raymond 
Williams' characterisation of Middlemarch as "a complex of persorial, family 
and working relationships, [which] draws its whole strength from their 
interaction in an indivisible process".11 That description of what Williams 
regards as the representative realist novel in fact applies very precisely 
to The Wings of the~ove, as does his shorter definition, namely "the kind of 
novel which creates and judges the quality of a whole way of life in terms 
of the qualities of persons." (p. 304) 
This is not to say that The Wings of the Dove turns out to be a belated 
Victorian novel: it merely suggests that far from moving towards the 
"aesthetic stance" Michael Bell ascribes to late James, the novel achieves a 
form of realism adapted to the nature of the society depicted. If James' 
analysis of London society has something in common with George Eliot's 
concept of interrelatedness, it nevertheless differs significantly from the 
"organicist" principle underlying Mj~dlemarch: James' image is much more 
mechanical than organic, as Kate's elaboration makes clear: 
The worker in one connexion was the worked in another; '" with 
the wheels of the system, as might be seen, wonderfully oiled. 
(I, 179) 
The choice of metaphor implies that the system, however well-oiled its 
wheels are with charm, even kindliness, reduces human beings to objects. 
If the implication on the one hand takes us back to Dickens (notably the 
Dickens of Our t~utual Friend with its Lammles, its Fledgeby, its Wegg), on 
the other hand it anticipates Lawrence's extreme rendering of the 
mechanisation of human relations in Women in Love, the "participation in a 
great and perfect system that subjected life to pure mathematical 
10 The ~'ings of the Dove, I, 178. 
II "Realism and the Contemporary Novel", pp. 312-13. For a fuller 
d"iscussion of real ism as understood by Will iams, Lukacs and Bell, see pp. 
89-92 above. 
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principles": 
It was the first great step in undoing, the first great phase of 
chaos, the substitution of the mechanical principle for the organic, 
the destruction of the organic purpose, the organic unity, and the 
subordination of every organic unit to the great mechanical 
purpose. It was pure organic disintegration and pure mechanical 
organisation. This is the first and finest state of chaos. (p. 
305) 
Although Lawrence is here concerned with industrial relations, the rest of 
his novel shows the mechanical principle in operation also in sexual 
relations, notably of course in the Gudrun - Gerald relationship. It seems 
to me that James approaches the Lawrentian vision of the "chaos" that 
paradoxically is a result of organisation, the "disintegration" that very 
precisely means the "loss of integrity" both in individual and society. Of 
course, the overtly destructive nature of the Gudrun - Gerald relationship 
is almost as far from the history of Kate Croy and Merton Densher as that 
hi story is from the romance of L i zz i e Hexham and Eugene Wrayburn or of 
Dorothea and Will Ladislaw; but the point is that if The Wings contains 
something of the resolved irony of Our f.lutual Friend. and ~1iddlemarch, it 
also contains something of the unresolved irony of Gudrun's bleak vision. 
This is to set the problematic redemption of t~erton Densher bebleen the overt 
redemption of Eugene Hrayburn (and, less forcefully, of Fred Vincy and Will 
Ladislaw) and the overt damnation of Gudrun. It is clear that Eugene 
Wrayburn finds in Lizzie Hexham's love a value that overcomes his bored 
disenchantment Ivith life; it is as clear that Gudrun's society offers her 
no single value that she can be unironical about: between these two 
extremes we have the more questionable redemption of Densher, based as it is 
on values so elusive as to produce a "hierarchy of significance" almost as 
unstable as Thackeray's in Vanity Fair, though more lucidly so. 
But generalisations about the novel are inclined to hover between the 
crypti c and the over-s imp 1 ifi ed. The c 1 eares t approach t.o the 1 abYl'i nth of 
"the worker and the worked" probably lies, as in the case of The Ambassadors, 
through the novel's seminal scene, "the situation of some young creature ... , 
who at 20, on the threshold of a life that has seemed boundless, is suddenly 
condemned to death •.. by the voice of the physician".12 
12 Notebooks, p. 169. 
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In the event, Sir Luke Strett's verdict is far more ambiguous than this, 
but the scene retains its seminal quality, both in terms of the action it 
precipitates and the issues it gives rise to. Its central statement is in 
fact very similar to that of The Ambassadors, that is, Strether's advice to 
little Bilham: "Live all you can. It's a mistake not to." In The Wings, 
the oracular Sir Luke tells Milly: "Well, see all you can. That's what it 
comes to. ... It's a great rare chance": 
OSha 11 I at any rate suffer?" 
"Not a bit." 
"And yet then live?" 
"My dear young lady," said her distinguished friend, "is n't to 
'live' exactly what I'm trying to persuade you to take the trouble 
to do?" (I, 245-46) 
For Milly, of course, "living" contains a crucial ambiguity that it did not 
have for Strether: for her, to live means in the first place not to die. 
Nevertheless, this literal meaning of the formula is extended to include also 
the sense of "experiencing to the full". Sir Luke's reply to Milly seems to 
shift the meaning to the second of these senses, although we never know if 
his implication is simply that she should make the most of life while she 
can, or that she could remain alive if she could supply herself with a motive 
for doing so - if, that is, she would "take the trouble" to live in the 
second sense. In Milly's subsequent reflections in the Regent's Park, her 
wry wor.d-play seems to hinge on this ambiguity: 
It was perhaps superficially more striking that one could live if 
one would; but it was more appealing, insinuating, irresistible 
in short, that one would live if one COUld. (I, 254) 
It is· in her relationship with Merton Densher, of course, that the two senses 
fuse for Milly: she could have stayed alive if she had been given the 
motive, by his love, "to take the trouble" to do so. Densher becomes life to 
her, as Kate with her usual lucidity explains to him: 
"She at any rate does love 1 ife. To have met a person 1 ike you 
•.. is to have felt you become, with all the other fine things, 
a part of life .... " (IJ,52) 
"All the other fine things" cannot sustain Milly when she is told the truth 
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about Merton and Kate, as Merton recognises: 
UThe way it affected her was that it made her give up. She has 
given up beyond all power to care again, and that's why she's 
dying." (II, 320-21) 
The equation of Densher with life is ironically prefigured in Milly's arch 
statement to Sir Luke, in the course of their second interview: " ... when 
you talk of 'life' I suppose you mean mainly gentlemen." Sir Luke's tactful 
rephrasing of this remark extends the scope of the irony: 
"When I talk of 'life,'" he made anS\'ier after a moment during 
which he might have been appreciating her raciness - "when I talk 
of life I think I mean more than anything else the beautiful show 
of it, in its freshness, made by young persons of your age. " 
Milly herself unconsciously points the irony of Sir Luke's safely 
genera 1 is i ng phrase "young persons of your age": 
"One of our companions will be Miss Croy, who came with me here 
first. It's in her that life is splendid; and a part of that is 
even that she's devoted to me. But she's above all magnificent 
in herself ...• " (II, 128) 
"L ife" as def'ined by Sir Luke is for Milly, then, represented by Merton 
Densher and, in a different way, by Kate Croy; and "the beautiful show of 
it, in its freshness" is to claim Milly as victim. For Milly's attempt to 
1 ive is foiled by the fact that she rel ies on people who, "devoted" as they 
may be to her, have their own determination to 1 ive: 
if they could", and they see her in the light of that 
they also "would live 
determination. Apal"t, 
then, from the simple ambiguity that "life" initially has for Milly, it 
acquires a mOl"e profound ambiguity as she comes to realise that it is not a 
passive property or entity to be pursued on one's own terms: to the extent 
that it is derived from other people, it makes its own conditions. The 
"beautiful show of it, in its freshness" is also entirely ruthless. 
The extent to which Milly's quest for life is interwoven with the 
similar quest of other people, is graphically demonstrated in the superb 
sequence of Milly's visit to the National Gallery, which she has so far 
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neglected in the pursuit of "1 ife as opposed to learning" .13 At first she 
feels that "the benignant halls" offer "the air she wanted and the world she 
would now exclusively choose", that is, the impersonal world of art; soon, 
however, feeling "after all too weak for the Turners and Titians", she 
engrosses herself in the more appealingly human efforts of the lady-copyists: 
"She would have liked to talk to them, to get, as it figured to her, into 
, 
their lives ...• " From them her attention strays to the American tourists: 
"That perhaps was the moral of a menaced state of health - that one would sit 
in public places and count the Americans." Into thei r 1 i ves she can enter 
imaginatively - "She would have been able to say where they lived, and also 
how, had the place and the way been but amenable to the positive" - but the 
interest they offer is too meagre to sustain her. It is a comment of one of 
these on "the English school" that draws her attention '~n her weak wonder 
as to what they had been looking at" not to a painting, as she first supposed, 
but to Merton Densher "tapping his forehead with his pocket-handkerchief" in 
prosaic demonstration of his humanity. He, like Milly, is not intel'ested in 
the "schools" ("he glanced absently, as she could see, at the top tier of 
the collection"): he is looking for Kate Croy, and as Milly notes that he 
is "too preoccupied to see anything", she becomes aware that she is in turn 
being "other~lise looked at" - by Kate Croy •. The works of art, from the first 
only a pretext for the lovers to meet (presumably where they are least likely 
to meet Aunt Maud!), become completely irrelevant to the various human 
purposes vlhich intersect here in gazes which cross without meeting. In 
Merton's looking for Kate, Milly's looking at Merton, and Kate's looking at 
~Iilly looking at Merton, we have a tableau representing the main ironic 
intrigue of the novel - with Kate characteristically seeing more, and 
probably thinking further, than either of the other participants. It is here 
that Kate conceives the first stage of her plan to use Milly - initially only 
to serve as a cover to their meetings, but soon for the much bolder purpose 
which forms the substance of the second part of the novel. Ultimately, the 
Titians and Turners for which Milly felt "too weak" might have been less 
demanding than the 1 ives of which she suddenly finds herself a part. Her 
involvement with r~erton and Kate becomes that "question of taking full in 
the face the whole assault of life" that Susan Stringham foresaw as entailed 
in Hilly's future (I, 125); and a necessary condition of that assault is 
13 All references to this sequence are to I, 288-93. 
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taking one's place in the system of "the working and the worked". 
It is one of the main ironies of the novel that amidst the confusing 
london world with its ambiguous values, Milly's own value in the eyes of 
others should be so pathetically simple: she is fabulously rich. This 
constitutes the ground of her appeal, even to Susan Stringham. Though Susan 
is more disinterestedly romantic than any other character, the "harrowing 
pathos" which "primarily, was what appealed to her" derives from the 
incongruity of Milly's having "thousands and thousands a year ..• and yet to 
have been reduced by fortune to little humble-minded mistakes" (I, 110). 
Li ttl e humble-minded mi stakes do not in themselves make for harrowi ng pathos; 
like the rest of Milly's qualities and actions, they derive their complexion 
from her money. As Susan recognises, 
it prevailed even as the truth of truths that the girl could n't 
get away from her wealth ..•. that was what it was to be really 
rich. It had to be the thing you were. (I, 121) 
Milly, then, ~ money; and through this identification the novel develops 
as mordant a view of "material interests" as Nostromo itself. But, as in 
Nostromo, money presents itself in different guises to different 
temperaments: accordingly, Milly is cast in whatever role best serves the 
ideal iSing imagination of the observer who, 1 ike Charles Gould, "could not 
believe his own motives if he did not make them first a part of some fairy 
tale."14 Thus, for Susan Stringham Milly's wealth transforms her simply 
into a princess. This may demonstrate the defeat of New England democratic 
principles by New England romanticism; but Milly's reception in London no 
less trenchantly demonstrates the defeat of old Engl ish class pl'inciples by 
new English materialism. For even the Matcham world treats Milly like a 
princess - though the title, of course, is less lightly used in England, 
where it has a precise denotation, than in America, where it remains a 
wistful metaphor. Whereas poor Aunt Maud, laying her all on the line for an 
invitation to ~latcham, seems destined never quite to buy her way out of the 
trading classes (unless Kate, suitably dowered, can marry both of them into 
the upper classes), Milly meets ~Iith no resistance. Money on such a scale, 
and embodied in a figure so helplessly unvulgar, so exempt from the taint 
14 !iostromo, p. 215. 
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of having scrambled (that is, worked) for it, could overcome stronger 
prejudices than those of an impoverished aristocracy - the more so that the 
money is safely American, and thus exempt also from the strictures raised 
against presumptuous natives. 
There is thus a pathetic irony in Milly's surprised sense, upon being 
accepted by London society, of "being, as Lord Mark had declared, a success" 
(I, 160). The pathos derives from Milly's assumption that she is valued for 
herself: she has not yet fixed her own value in the currency of Lancaster 
Gate and Matcham. Discussing with Lord Mark Mrs Lowder's "fidel ity" to her 
old school friend, she makes the innocent point that Mrs Stringham has 
nothing to offer i'1rs Lowder: 
" it is n't as if she had anything to give." 
"Has n' t she got you?" Lord Ma rk aSkeOWTthout excess i ve delay. 
"Me - to give Mrs. Lowder?" Mi lly had cl early not yet seen 
herself in the light of such an offering. "Oh I'm rather a poor 
present; and J don't feel as if, even a t that, I had as yet quite 
been given." (I, 154) 
In the most literal of senses, which is Mrs Lowder's sense, Milly is most 
certainly not "poor": and whether or not Milly feels that she has "as yet 
quite been given", Mrs Lowder has taken possession. Lord Mark, for instance, 
gives Milly "the highest place among their friend's actual properties." 
(I, 157). But at this point Milly cannot give due weight to this; the only 
explanation that she can find for Mrs Lowder's kindness to her and Mrs 
Stringham is that "She idealises~, my friend and me, absolutely. She sees 
us in a light . ... " (I, 161). 
Milly may just be right in believing that Mrs Lowder idealises her -
to the ultimate materialist, ideals take the shape of fabulous material 
wealth - but it takes her a while to discover the true light in which Mrs 
Lowder sees her. It is at Matcham that she starts noticing the subtle social 
discriminations governing the society she has entered. It is also here that 
she receives an intimation of her own value, for Aunt Maud, in such a 
society. ~lusing upon Aunt Maud's plea to her to "stay among us .•. in any 
position", Milly realises that Aunt r~aud, like herself, but for very 
different reasons, is haunted by the possible impermanence of her tenure 
on this world - which is, for Aunt Maud, the world of truly high society. 
Milly's three weeks as a "success" in society seem to her like a 
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hardly more settled in the habit of social success: 
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The parenthesis would close with this admirable picture, but the 
admirable picture still would show Aunt Maud as not absolutely sure 
either if she herself were destined to remain in it. What she was 
doing, Milly might even not have escaped seeming to see, was to 
talk herself into a sublimer serenity while she ostensibly talked 
Milly. (I, 210) 
More simply put, Aunt Maud fears that her first invitation to Matcham may 
turn out, upon Milly's departure, to have been her last. James employs his 
most "late" idiom - "Milly might even not have escaped seeming to see" - to 
convey both the lightness of the impression and the delicate necessity of not 
betraying her insight to Aunt Maud. In three weeks Milly has not only formed 
a clearer idea of the "light" in which Aunt Maud sees her, but also acquired 
some consciousness of the precariousness of living in such a society. 
The most important survival tactic that Milly develops as part of the 
learning process is to accept and enter into the roles other people choose 
for her. As she accepts Susan's casting of her as a princess, so she consents, 
with lord Mark, to "being popped into the compartment in which she was to 
travel for him" (I, 157). With Densher she takes refuge in "her own native 
wood-note" : 
She became as spontaneous as possible and as American as it might 
conveniently appeal to Mr. Densher, after his travels, to find her. 
(I, 295-96) 
Most notably, of course, she accepts the role of dove offered her by Kate. 
It is a rather problematic role, and one can understand leavis' brusque 
rejection: "the fuss the other characters make about her as the 'Dove' has 
the effect of an irritating sentimentality" .15 It must be added, though, 
that the context in which the "fuss" occurs sheds a wryly ironic light on 
it, which counteracts the inherent sentimentality of the image: it is Kate 
who first bestows the title on Milly, and Kate is fully intent on taking 
advantage of the dove-1 ike nature she ascribes to ~lilly. As ~lerton comes to 
realise later, "Kate was ... exceptionally under the impression of that 
15 The Great Tradition (1948; rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962). p. 175. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
137 
element of wealth in her which was a power, which was a great power, and 
which was dove-like only so far as one remembered that doves have wings and 
wondrous flights, have them as well as tender tints and soft sounds." (II, 
218) Kate, at least, is not guilty of "irritating sentimentality". 
If we see Milly's acceptance of the role of dove as a deliberate 
strategy, in line with her policy of conforming to other people's impressions 
of her, it acquires a much keener pragmatic edge: Milly is slowly feeling 
her way through the intricacies of the system intent on exploiting her; or, 
as Kenneth Graham puts it in his firmly unethereal reading: 
Milly takes up the image as one of the best of her defensive 
weapons .... And the first act of the dove is to tell a lie. 
This will be part of her 'form' and her 'manner' - her contribution 
to the great honeycomb of social relationships .... It will be 
Milly's own little conspiracy: she will manipulate the system, 
giving and taking, and challenging it radically only where 
necessary.16 
To see vihat other people are seeing (as Kate also did in the National Gallery) 
is to exchange the role of ~1..9zon for that of eiron, which is what ~lilly vey'y 
gradually does. At r~atcham, for instance, apart from recognising her own 
usefulness to Mrs Lowder, she realises that-Lord Mark, for all his social 
expertise, does not understand her response to the Bronzino pOI'trait; and 
, 
in her slightly condescending appreciation of his uncomprehending kindliness 
she seems the more socially adept of the two: 
Though he still did n't understand her he was as nice as if he had; 
he did n't ask for insistence, and that was just a part of his 
looking after her. (I, 221) 
But if the scene demonstrates how much Milly has learned, it also shows 
hO\~ much remains to be learned. Lord Mark's "looking after her" is subject 
to the general rule of social living he himself enunciated to Milly: "Nobody 
16 Henry James: The Drama of Fulfilment {Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1975T;-p-:-Z-rro, Graham's level-heaaea discussion of James, and in 
particular of The Wings, succeeds admirably in his declared aim "to be fair 
to the James of 'the natural, the fundamental, the passionate things', and 
to suggest that high style and spiritual vision can be made to take their 
place alilong these things." (p. xiv) Graham's statement of critical 
priorities in his Introduction provides much-needed clarity in the deepening 
murk of ,lames criticism - indeed of literary criticism in gener'al. 
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here, you know, does anything for nothing" (I, 160). In time Milly comes to 
realise that "looking after her" can present itself to others, to Lord Mark 
no less temptingly than to Eugenio, as a tremendously lucrative occupation. 
Kneeling at the window of her Venetian palace, with Lord Mark next to her, 
she at last discovers her true "value" for him: 
If he had come to her moreover with the intention she believed [i.e. 
of proposing to her] , or even if this intention had but been 
determined in him by the spell of their situation, he must n't be 
mistaken about her value - for what value did she now have? It 
throbbed ~Iithin her as she knelt there that she had none at all; 
though, holding herself, not yet speaking, she tried, even in the 
act, to recover what might be possible of it. With that there came 
to her a light: would n't her value, for the man who should marry 
her, be precisely in the ravage of her disease? She might n't last, 
but her money would (II, 149) -
She thus finds out the full truth of Kate's statement that "everyone who had 
anything to give ... made the sharpest possible bargain for it"; but she 
also discovers for herself that, as Kate put it, "this might be, in cases, a 
happy understanding .... People could quite like each other in the midst of 
it." (1,179) In the midst of her suspicion that Lord Mark may be mainly 
interested in inheriting her money, she finds it impossible to recoil· iri 
indignant horror from the "ugly motive" she imputes to him: 
... there was a beautiful reason - indeed there \1ere two - why her 
companion's motive should n't matter. One was that even should he 
desire her without a penny she would n't marry him for the world; 
the other was that she felt him, after all, perceptively, kindly, 
very pleasantly and humanly, concerned for her .... he liked her. 
(II, 150) 
Thus Milly, protected from Lord Mark's designs by her relative indifference 
to him, can even value the genuine, if shallow, amiability that serves to 
make palatable this exploitative social system. In coming to terms with this 
bewildering system, Milly ceases to be simply its dupe; nor is she motivated 
by an all-embracing charity. She has merely learned to survive to "live" 
in the only ~Iay open to her, by extracting the sting of the ugly motive and 
cherishing the kindness that it is oddly compatible with. 
In keeping with the clarity of Milly's own perception of her situation, 
the reader has, in the whole of her conversation with Lord Mark, an 
impression of a more forceful, less role-determined Milly, more directly and 
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vividly presented than elsewhere in the novel. As Milly ceases, for the 
moment, to be mainly the object of other· people's designs, she also ceases to 
be the Princess, the Dove, or the American Girl, and states simply: "I'm 
very badly ill." (I I, 155) A major irony of the nove 1 is resolved as she 
confronts the ugly truth that her "value" may lie in what she has seen as the 
denial of all value, the hitherto unmentionable "ravage of her disease". In 
mentioning it, she liberates herself, in this one relation at least, from the 
elaborate pretense that has attended her glittering progress across Europe. 
But it is characteristic of this novel that an irony is resolved only to 
reveal a further irony. If Kate's description of the system as "in cases a 
happy understanding" \'Jould seem to be vindicated by Milly's coming to terms 
with it here, it nevertheless remains a system that allows for no stronger 
feeling than "quite liking" the other members. Its good-natured reciprocal 
exploitation provides no basis for anything less superficial than amiable 
social living. Milly may feel that mutual liking is a satisfactory basis for 
her relationship with Lord Mark, but he does not; and in his jealous 
disappointment he avails himself of the weapon that Milly has unwittingly 
provided in betraying to him her ignorance of Kate's engagement to Densher. 
The blow is aimed at Densher, but, as Lord Mark could have foreseen, Milly is 
its first victim. The fact that "he liked her" does not oblige him to spare 
her. 
The system, then,breaks down when one party feels that he is not getting 
his due. This precipitates the supreme test of Milly's accommodation to the 
principle of reciprocity: the revelation that the man she loves has been 
acting towards her in accordance with that principle. The fact that, upon 
this revelation, Milly ceases "to take the trouble" to live, might seem to 
support Crews' contention that her end is not "to be taken as a conscious 
moral decision,,17, that is, that it lacks the element of active choice 
associated with the tragic protagonist. 
This, however, is to assume that the last we hear of Milly is that "she 
has turned her face to the wall." (II,270) In fact, of course, she 
summons Densher to he)' palace, to see him "face-to-face" (II, 327), as if ~ 
to take to the last "full in the face the whole assault of life" (I, 125). 
Densher says of this conversation that Milly "showed nothing but her beauty 
and her strength", as if Milly has briefly acquired something of Kate Croy's 
17 The Tragedy of r~anners, p. 75 
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qualities in the supreme effort of sending Densher away: 
"If it was somehow for her I was still staying, she wished that to 
end, she wished me to know how little there was need of it. And 
as a manner of farewell she wished herself to tell me so." (II,327) 
In itself, Milly's act of sending away the man she loves "forgiven, dedicated, 
blessed" (II, 343) shows a courage and magnanimity that make her more than a 
passive victim or martyr; but this suggestion is further reinforced by one 
of those intricate verbal patterns, made up of apparently trivial phrases, 
that serve, especially in James' late novels, to define and develop major 
meanings. In this instance, Milly's deprecation of Densher's "staying" is the 
cUlmination of a series based on variants of "coming", "going" and "staying", 
usually "for" somebody. 
This particular verbal complex is introduced relatively early in the 
novel, in Aunt Maud's plea to Milly in London: "You must stay on with us. 
Above all you must help me with Kate, and you must stay a little for her ..•. " 
(I, 215) Here "staying" is establ ished, frankly enough, as a service - in 
this instance a service intended to advance Kate's (and Aunt Maud's) social 
career. This becomes unnecessary as they leave with Milly for Venice - where 
Merton's staying behind after Kate's departure becomes crucial to their plan. 
As Kate says to him, "All you'll have to do will be to stay" (II, 227) -
his staying thus constituting both his pleasing of Kate and his tacit 
deception of Milly. In return for this Merton demands that Kate come to him: 
"I'll stay, on my honour, if you'll come to me. On ,your honour." (11,230) 
- and "she had come, that once, to stay, as people called it" (II, 235). 
In return for Kate's "coming to stay", that is, Densher undertakes to "stay". 
The quid pro quo basis which the relationship assumes is starkly revealed 
in the simple verbal echo; Milly is a mere commodity in this bartering 
process. 
After this, the pattern shifts slightly to reveal the conflict of 
loyalties that is to contribute to Densher's separation from Kate. Thus he 
overcomes his initial reluctance to allow Milly to "come to him" in the 
rooms he associates with Kate's visit: "You can come ... when you like." 
Upon her telling him "We \~ant you not to go", he replies "I won't go." 
"Then I won't go!" she brightly declared. 
"You mean you won't come to me?" (II,247) 
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Thus Milly's not coming to Densher becomes the counterpart of Kate's coming, 
in both cases as response to his "not going". Metaphorically, although of 
course unwittingly, Milly is renouncing the opportunity to take Kate's place. 
Densher, on the other hand, quite conscious of the implications of his offer, 
needs to prove to himself his continuing loyalty to Kate; ironically, the 
form this proof takes brings him as close as he ever comes to expressing 
attachment to r~illy: "Is n't it enough .•. to stay after all for ~?" 
(II, 250) To stay, then, is, contrary to Kate's promise, not all he has to 
do: he has, t.o show his loyalty to Kate, to spell out the lie that up to 
this pOint has been tacit: 
So was it, by being loyal, another kind of lie, the lie of the 
uncandid profession of a motive. He was staying so little "for" 
Milly that he was staying positively against her. (II, 250) 
Thus, in the light of the thematic significance of Merton's "staying", Milly's 
request to him not to stay "for" her signals t.he fact that she has assumed 
some measure of control over the comings al)d goings which have comprised the 
plot against her. The "Princess" is at last exerciSing her royal prerogative 
- or, more simply, Milly at last extricates herself from the system of the 
"working and the worked". 
Milly's bequest to Densher is in the spirit of this liberation from a 
society in which "nobody ..• does anything for nothing". It is also in the 
spirit of hel' 
other people: 
and Kate, she 
earlier strategy to enter into the role best.owed upon her by 
having finally been illuminated as to her value for Merton 
simply accepts that value. In doing this, she acts in 
accordance with her tribute to Kate, expressed in her innocence to Sir Luke: 
"It's in her that life is splendid"; she loves Densher enough to wish him 
to have the life that she was not to have. 
This point is obscured, though not necessarily contradicted, by Dorothea 
Krook's view of Milly's act as exemplifying "the power of the good ..• to 
abase the proud by answering it with forgiveness, loving-kindness and 
sacrificial death."18 Described like this, such "power" sounds too much 
1 ike moral one-upmanshi p to atcord wi th our (and, no doubt, Dorothea Krook' $) 
impreSSion of Milly. Furthermore, "the proud" seems a rather inaccurate 
abstraction in this context: it may just apply to Kate, but she is not 
18 The Ordeal of Consciousness, p. 221. 
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abased by Milly's forgiveness as much as by Densher's ultimatum; whereas 
Densher, who ~ abased, is not conspicuously proud. And there is surely a 
decisive difference between the generous bequest of a dying person and 
"sacrificial death", unless we were to accept that Milly died in order to 
leave Densher her money. The descent of the Dove, in short, is not a form of 
deus ex machina, but the forgiveness extended by Milly Theale to a young man 
whom she still loves even after discovering his duplicity. 
The ironic pattern of the deluded heroine, enlightened at last, making a 
free choice which confirms her previous deluded choice, is familiar from The 
Portra it of a Lady. It is a measure of the complex ity of The Hi ngs of the 
Dove that this pattern forms only one element of a larger design, one aspect 
of the process by which the novel, in Williams' words, "creates and judges 
the quality of a whole way of life in terms of the qualities of persons." 
The creation and judging are, of course, to be seen as taking place 
simultaneously, and there is perhaps no clearer demonstration of James' 
ability to fuse the two functions than in his ironic use of "setting" in The 
Wings of the Dove. This is to say that each setting derives its significance 
not only from local detail, but from its relation to other settings in the 
novel - and of course from the characters inhabiting or observing those 
settings. One way of describing this techn1que is to say that it combines 
Luk~cs' "hierarchy of significance" with the mimetic function of realism. 
On the one hand this differs from Dickens' description of, say, Coketown, 
in being more firmly based on observation of detail; 19 on the other hand it 
differs from, say, Thackeray's use of setting in Vanity Fair in extending 
beyond the elementary "social" gradations. Thackeray obviously knows that 
Russell Square is an appropriate setting for a stockbroker'S family, and 
makes a point of distinguishing it from the more aristocratic Grosvenor 
Square; he knows that Vauxhilll Gardens is where his characters would go for 
an outing, and can give us a lightly satirical description of it; but the 
settings have little more real significance than the town of Pumpernickel in 
defining the values of the novel. By contrast, each scene in The Wings of 
the Dove, from Chi rk Street to the Palazzo Lepore 11 i, has its place ina 
moral frame of reference. 
19 The example is of course not entirely representative of Dickens at 
his best. His settings are frequently much more "real istic" than Coketown, 
without sacrificing anything of their metaphorical significance. 
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The setting that dominates the novel is, of course, Lancaster Gate, and 
this in spite of the fact that much of the action takes place in Venice. 
Lancaster Gate becomes so firmly established as the seat of certain values, 
that its influence travels, as it were, with the characters, to be felt even 
in the Piazza San Marco. Our introduction to it, through Merton Densher, is 
perhaps the most straightforward example in the novel of the definition of 
value through setting: 
Lancaster Gate looked rich - that was all the effect; which it was 
unthinkable that any state of his own should ever remotely resemble. 
He read more vividly, more critically, ... the appearances about 
him; and they did nothing so much as make him wonder at his 
aesthetic reaction. He had n't known - and in spite of Kate's 
repeated reference to her own rebellions of taste - that he should 
"mind" so much how an independent lady might decorate her house. 
It was the language of the house itself that spoke to him, writing 
out for him with surpassing breadth and freedom the associations 
and conceptions, the ideals and possibilities of the mistress. 
Never, he felt sure, had he seen so many things so unanimously 
ugly - operatively, ominously so cruel. .•. He could n't describe 
and dismiss them collectively, call them either Mid-Victorian or 
Early - not being certain they were rangeable under one rubric. It 
was only manifest they .~Iere splendid and ~Iere furthermore 
conclusively British. They constituted an order and abounded in 
rare material - precious woods, metals, stuffs, stones. He had 
never dreamed of anyth i ng so fri Jlged and sca 11 oped, so buttoned and 
corded, drawn everywhere so tight and curled everywhere so thick. 
(I, 77-79) 
To describe Lancaster Gate as "ugly" waul d seem to be merely an understatement 
of the obv i ous, but ina novel where "beauty" is such an ambi guous qua 1 i ty, an 
unequivocal judgement of anything as "unanimously ugly" establ ishes at least 
one firm pOint of reference. 
Nor is it merely a point of aesthetic reference. Densher's "aesthetic 
reaction" is more than an effete shudder at the vulgarity of Aunt Maud's 
taste: the judgement being passed clearly has a moral element. His 
apprehension of the "cruel" assertiveness of this massive display of 
indifference to non-commercial values explains why he should 
uncharacteristically "'mind' so much how an independent lady might decorate 
her house": it represents a morality different from his own, ultimately 
hostile to his own: 
But it was above all the solid foms,the wasted finish, the 
misguided cost, the general attestation of morality and money, a 
good conscience and a big balance. These things finally 
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represented for him a portentous negation of his own world of 
thought. (I, 79) 
Lancaster Gate is, then, the concrete (or "rosewood and marble and malachite" 
- I, 79) embodiment of the philistine, "conclusively British" spirit of trade, 
the well-appointed counting-house of "Britannia of the Market Place" (I, 30). 
As such, it is as central to the novel as the Marshalsea is to Little Dorrit. 
It is worth noting in passing, in anticipation of the rift that is later 
to develop between the lovers, that Kate's misgivings about Lancaster Gate 
are described merely as "rebell ions of taste", as against Densher's morally 
based revulsion. She can live in Lancaster Gate, as Densher could not, 
because it does not offend,against her essential values; just as he feels 
that he, unlike Kate, "could have lived in such a place" as Mrs Condrip's 
poverty-stricken home (II, 365). But at this early stage of the novel the 
lovers are st-il 1 jointly di sti ngui shed from the overbearing ugl iness of 
Lancaster Gate, a point overlooked in Dorothea Krook's reference, in the 
same breath as it were, to the "beautiful, gracious circle of Lancaster Gate" 
and "the bright beauty of Kate Croy and Merton Densher".20 This is more 
than a quibble: it is essential to the tragedy of Densher and Kate that 
their very real beauty is at first set against the ugliness of Lancaster 
Gate, to be ultimately vanquished by it. Initially, Lancaster Gate, like 
the system of va 1 ues it represents, provi des no refuge for "the bri ght beauty 
of Kate Croy and Merton Densher". It is in fact significant that their 
meetings do not take place there: their love finds its proper metaphorical 
setting in Kensington Gardens: 
Suddenly she said to him with extraordinary beauty: "I engage 
myse 1 f to you for ever." 
The beallty was in everything, and he could have separated 
nothing - could n't have thought of her face as distinct from the 
whole joy. Yet her face had a new light. "And I pledge you - I 
call God to witness! - every spark of my faith; I give you every 
drop of my life." That was all, for the moment, but it was enough, 
and it 11as almost as quiet as if it were nothing. They were in 
the open air, in an alley of the Gardens; the great space, which 
seemed to arch just then higher and spread wider for them, threw 
them back into deep concentration. (I, 95) 
20 The Ordeal of Consciousness, p. 216. 
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This moment recalls Sir Luke's characterisation of life as "the beautiful show 
of it, in its freshness", and confirms Milly's tribute to Kate: "It's in her 
that life is splendid". The two principal values of the novel, "life" and 
"beauty", are for once manifested unambiguously. With its beauty that is "in 
everything", the scene forms the positive counterpart to the "unanimous" 
ugliness of Lancaster Gate. Kate's unconditional pledge of her "faith" and 
"life" figures as an affirmation that, for the moment, renders the "ideals 
and possibilities" of Mrs Lowder irrelevant. True, this is hot the unfettered 
passion of the Yorkshire moors - we are reminded by the slight concussion of 
"in the open air" against "in an alley of the gardens" that the lovers' 
freedom remains circumscribed by the artifice of a sophisticated society -
but of the various locations in this very urban novel, this one is the most 
"natural" . 
At the risk of oversimplification, one might say that the "hierarchy of 
significance" of the novel is based on the two opposed absolutes of Lancaster 
Gate and Kensington Gardens. But if the open spaciousness of Kensington 
Gardens is contrasted with the cluttered pomposity of Lancaster Gate, it is 
contrasted with different effect to the "grim breathing-space" Milly finds 
in the Regent's Park after her visit to Sir Luke (I, 250). The Park is, like 
Kensington Gardens, a respite from the artificiality of social living: "the 
real thing was to be quite away from the pompous roads". But the real ity 
that Milly finds in the Park with its "shabby grass". its "smutty sheep", 
the "scattered, melancholy comrades ..• down on their stomachs in the grass", 
is clearly a far more sombre reality than that of Kate and Densher: "one 
would live if one could" is the moral Milly extracts from it (I, 250-54). 
Milly's pathetic little foray into "real" life thus reinforces by contrast 
the strength and vital ity of the lovers' moment in Kensington Gardens. 
Against this must be set the more complex relation between Kensington 
Gardens and r~atcham - on one level again a contrast between natural and 
artificial, with the refined artifice of Matcham embodying an older, more 
tasteful ideal of social living than the vulgar opulence of Lancaster Gate. 
It is not simply a contrast, though: Milly's experience of Matcham also has 
certain elements in common with the ecstatic betrothal of Kate and Densher: 
Once more things melted together - the beauty and the history and 
the facil ity and the splendid midsummer glO\~: it was a sort of 
magnificent maximum, the pink dawn of an apotheosis coming so 
curiously soon. (I, 220) 
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In both cases the experience 
into one overwhelming whole: 
is of a merging of all the elements of the scene 
for t·1illy "things melted together", as for 
Merton "the beauty was in everything, and he could have separated nothing". 
Both scenes represent "a sort of magnificent maximum"; but Densher has been 
led to it by the beauty of Kate's living face, whereas Milly's "apotheosis" 
is prompted by the Bronzino portrait resembling herself. Hhere Densher "could 
n't have thought of [Kate's] face as distinct from the whole joy", Milly 
rea 1 i ses that the subject of the portra it was "unaccompanied by a joy." And 
against Kate's pledge of faith ("I give you every drop of my life") is placed, 
in its terrible conciseness, the starkest meaning of the portrait: "And she 
was dead, dead, dead." Kate can "give" her 1 ife and be the stronger for it; 
the portrait can give Milly only the dead beauty of a work of art. (I, 221) 
The Matcham scene stresses in the first place the contrast between 
Milly's career and that of the lovers; 
living beauty and that of art it points 
in its implied contrast between the 
forward to the scene in the National 
Gallery, and beyond that, to Milly's retreat into the serene artificiality of 
the Palazzo Lepore1li, in apparent acceptance of her kinship with the Bronzino 
portrait. 21 But the pairing of Matcham with Kensington Gardens also produces 
a more ironic relevance to Kate and Densher. Milly's simple summary of her 
experience at Matcham, "I shall never be better than this" (I, 221), becomes, 
in retrospect, also a comment on their "magnificent maximum": for them, too, 
the "apotheosis coming so curiously soon" is a maximum which can only 
diminish. As t~illy's moment in front of the Bronzino cOl\tains everything 
that she faces the prospective loss of in her "I shall never be better than 
this", so the moment in Kensington Gardens contains everything that Kate 
faces the actual loss of in the declaration that concludes the novel: "We 
shall never be again as we were!" 
The moment in the Gardens turns out to have been only a respite from 
Lancaster Gate, not all escape from it. In the novel's precise topography, 
Lancaster Gate overlooks Kensington Gardens; and, in retrospect, Kate's 
insistence that they should meet virtually under Aunt Maud's windows shows 
a deference to that Lady's opinion which is incompatible with her 
unconditional pledge of faith to a man of whom her aunt disapproves. There 
21 The point is stressed by Mrs Stringham's comparison of Milly's life 
at the Palace to "a Veronese picture" (II,206). 
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are, in short, other impulses in Kate that, though yielding temporarily to 
her love for Densher, nevertheless assert themselves readily - almost 
immediately after her brave declaration. There is a slight fumble as the 
lovers become aware of Lancaster Gate looming through the trees: 
They had exchanged vows and tokens, sealed their rich compact, 
solemnised, so far as breathed words and murmured sounds and lighted 
eyes and clasped hands could do it, their agreement to belong only, 
and to belong tremendously, to each other. They were to leave the 
place accordingly an affianced couple, but before they left it 
other things still had passed. (I, 95) 
The "other things" so casually introduced as an afterthought concern Densher's 
"horror of bringing to a p:--emature end [Kate's] happy relation with her aunt". 
This is partly the generosity of somebody who would not like to see his 
happiness cause unhappiness to others, and who feels strong enough to make 
concessions to the less fortunate. Such generosity, in a society where 
generosity is taken advantage of as a weakness, is akin to naivety: in the 
event, to put it bluntly, his loss of Kate can be traced back to her "happy 
relation with her aunt". The irony at his expense derives in the first 
place from his assumption that Aunt Maud is. so weak as to need his 
concessions, but in the second place from his apparent unawareness of the 
fact that Kate is considerably more reluctant than he to sacrifice her "happy 
relation with her aunt". Having early in the novel seen "as she had never 
seen before how material things spoke to her" (I, 28), and nevertheless 
determined to make Densher's "long looks ..•. most completely hel" 
possession", 
she reasoned, or a tall events began to act, as if she mi ght work 
them in with other and alien things, privately cherish them and 
yet, as regards the rigour of it, pay no price. (I, 61) 
Thus even the clear-sighted Kate misjudges her own strength: to assume that 
in such a society where "nobody ••• does anything for nothing" it is possible 
to "pay no price", is almost as na'i·ve as for Densher to make concessions to 
Aunt Maud: it fails to reckon with Aunt Maud's determination to "get back 
... her money", as Lord Mark put it to Milly (I, 160). 
At any rate, the lovers' combined motives issue in a decision to keep 
their engagement a secret - which, by the odd logic of rationalisation, 
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presents itself to them as a proof of strength: 
They were practically united and splendidly strong; but there were 
other things - things they were precisely strong enough to be able 
successfully to count with and safely to allow for; in consequence 
of which they \'/ou1d for the present, subject to some better reason, 
keep their understanding to themselves. (I, 97) 
Again the "other things" seem like trivialities in the face of their united 
strength; but these conven i ent 1y vague "other th ings" i nc1 ude, of course, 
Kate's unacknowledged reluctance to sacrifice the material benefits 
attendant upon Aunt Maud's blessing. And from the moment that Aunt Maud's 
blessing becomes necessary to their purpose, their relationship, for all that 
they are "practically united and splendidly strong", becomes a commodity in 
that market place of which Aunt Maud is the pastmistress. Their tragedy is 
Simply summed up in one sentence: "!twas impossible to keep Mrs Lowder out 
of their scheme." (1,62) 
If we were to imagine (without much effort) Aunt Maud avail ing herself 
of the opportunity for surveillance of the lovers in Kensington Gardens, it 
would graphically represent her position through much of the novel: looking 
down upon the lovers with the confident detachment of the eiron. This is to 
say that all the attempts of the lovers to "square" her become subject to the 
irony that ultimately they will do so only by accepting her terms. It is in 
attempting to "work" her that they are most "worked". 
It is Mrs Lowder's presence that betrays itself, so soon after their 
total commitment to each other, in their feeling of the need to lie to her. 
And their whole scheme of using Milly, of course,originated in a.n elaborate 
lie for Aunt Maud's benefit. She is, in fact, ever-present; Densher's 
confrontation of Kate in the middle of the Piazza San Marco, with Aunt Maud 
probably watching from the shop ~/here she is buying lace, sums up this aspect 
of their relationship. Until Aunt Maud is fully "squared" all their meetings, 
with the notable and significant exception of Kate's visit to Densher's rooms 
in Venice, take place, if not under her watchful but tactfully averted eye, 
then behind doors shut, as it \1ere, with her consent. Nor does Aunt Maud 
havE' to assert her powel' overtly: she knows people in general, and her 
niece in particular, well enough to realise that her wealth spe~ks for itself, 
albeit 'i n the bl'a.zen accents of Lancaster Gate. Aunt Maud has power over 
the lovers only because Kate acknowledges her money as a value. 
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This is not to say that Kate is, after all, a true child of Lancaster 
Gate. She is set apart from it by that quality which Densher sees as also 
distinguishing her from him: "She had more 1 ife than he to react from" 
(I,66). This "pure talent for life" as he later calls it (II, 176) may have 
something in common with Aunt Maud's crude vitality, but it also includes 
the ability to recognise Merton Densher's value in non-financial terms. 
Nevertheless, it is Kate's tragic paradox that this "pure talent for life" 
which distinguishes her from Lancaster Gate as a panther. is distinguished 
from a herd of domestic animals, also impels her towards it. Her talent for 
life demands favourable conditions for its expansion, material to feed on -
and for Kate these conditions include the "material things" offered by Aunt 
r1aud. 
Thus the attempted unification, as it were, of Kensington Gardens and 
Lancaster Gate necessarily involves the reconciliation of 'life' and 
commercial values; and in so far as "life" is a matter of survival on one's 
own terms ("they would live if they could"), and Kate's tet'ms include the 
material, the lavi of the jungle combines ~Iith the law of the market place in 
the great consort of "the working and the worked". 
It is part of the ambiguity of "life" that the brutality necessary for 
the exploitation of Milly is also part of the beauty of the lovers at their 
most vital. ~1illy discerns something of this quality in noting that Kate 
is "the least bit brutal" and "that there might be a wild beauty in that, 
and even a strange 91'ace" (I, 181-82). In this instance the brutal ity 
reveals itself as an indifference to the mild Susan Stringham; later, of 
course, Milly herself becomes its object. "I'm a brute about illness", says 
Kate (II, 54), and once again the brutality is registered as the adjunct 
of strength, the unscrupulousness of the strong in the face of the weak: 
She looked at him now a moment a~ for the selfish gladness of their 
young immunities. It was all they had together, but they had it 
at least without a flaw - each had the beauty, the physical felicity, 
the personal virtue, love and desire of the other. (II, 54-55) 
In this context the selfishness almost seems natural: it is of the essence 
of their kind of love that it is ultimately indifferent to all but the 
loved object. Their "virtue" is presumably il'ore a matter of elemental 
strength than of conventional rightness of conduct, but the ambiguity 
supports one's feeling that the very vigour of the lovers constitutes a 
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immunity from the judgement that could be passed on the conversation they 
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have been having about Merton's "consolation" of Milly. Their strength allows 
them a moment of pity for "the poor girl who had everything else in the world, 
the great genial good they, alas, did n't have, but failed on the other hand 
of this." (II, 55) It can even present itself to them as only kind that 
something of their abundance should be shared with the poor girl - in return, 
as Kate if not Densher must already be calculating, for something of the 
"great genial good they, alas, did n't have". 
So this apparently most self-sufficient of relationships becomes subject 
to the principle of the market place, whereby, as Kate explains to Milly, 
"everyone who had anything to give ..• made the sharpest possible bargain 
for it, got at least its value in return." (I, 179) In London society the 
bargain is usually comparatively uncomplicated: the "values" traded tend to 
be quite easily indentifiable. Thus Aunt Maud and Lord Mark are warily 
negotiating the time-honoured transaction between money and rank. But Kate 
and Densher are trading in a more intangible value - life. It may be this 
that prevents them from seeing the essentially commercial nature of their 
undertaking, and from applying to it the basic law of such transactions: 
each party has to sacrifice something in return for ~Ihat he or she gets. 
Ku te and Densher fail to see that each of them may have to surrender "the 
beauty, the physical felicity, the personal virtue, love and desire of the 
other" in return for "the great genial good they, alas, did n't have". 
At Lancaster Gate a certain genteel discretion still makes it possible, 
for much of the time, to ignore the mercenary nature of such transactions. 
It is, ironically, the appalling Lionel Croy, apparently representing 
everything that Kate is trying to escape, who most vigorously propounds, in 
their unadorned squalor, the principles of the society in which Kate seeks 
refuge: 
" There was a day when a man like me - by which I mean u parent 
like me - would have been for a daughter like you quite a distinct 
value; what's called in the business world, I believe, an 'asset'." 
He continued sociably to make it out. "I'm not talking of what you 
might, with the right feeling, do for me, but of what you might -
it's what I call your opportunity -;:-00 with me. Un"less indeed," 
he the next moment imperturbably threlv off. "they come a good deal 
to the same thing. Your duty as well as your chance, if you're 
capable of seeing it, is to use me. Show family feeling by seeing 
what I'm good for .... " (I, 17-18) 
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The "use" to which Croy cynically suggests he should be put, his view of 
himself as "quite a distinct value; ••• 'an asset"', his imperturbable 
equation of what Kate might do for him with what she might do with him -
these are only the Chirk Street equivalents of Lancaster Gate procedures. 
Croy's values are Lancaster Gate values "chalk-marked by fate like a 'lot' 
at a common auction" (I, 4), mercantile values gone bankrupt. 
Important as this opening chapter is in establishing sympathy for Kate 
Croy, its ironic function goes deeper than that. Lionel Croy's sleazy 
rapacity, his unscrupulous exploitativeness is not only what Leavis calls 
"one of the pressures driving her",22 it is also a threadbare version of 
what she is driven to. And in Lionel Croywe recognise a debased version of 
Kate's "talent for life", which in him manifests ,itself as an insolent 
persistence in surviving - beautifully against the odds: 
He had kind safe eyes, and a voice which, for all, its clean 
fulness, told the quiet tale of its having never had once to raise 
itself. Life had met him so, half-way, and had turned round so 
to walk with him, placing a hand in his arm and fondly leaving him 
to choose the pace. (I, 8) 
This is the domestic animal rather than the panther, the vapid benevolence 
of ~latcham with its "kind, lingering eyes" rather than the vivid brutality 
of Kate Croy; but it is Lionel Croy's style of employing a talent of which 
his daughter has her share. Even his lodgings, with all their redolence 
of "the failure of fortune and of honour" (I, 4), strike Kate as "a medium, 
a setting, and to that extent, after all, a dreadful sign of life" (I, 13)-
not, indeed, as ostentatious a sign as the more copiously padded upholstery 
of Lancaster Gate, but distinguished from it only by its failure of fortune: 
the failure of honour is not a function of setting. Ultimately, Lionel 
Croy's petty deceptions differ only in their pettiness from his daughter's 
grand deception of Milly. To Kate, however, the contrast betvleen Chirk 
Street and Lancaster Gate is absolute: in the language of material things, 
the failure of fortune is the failure of honour. The connection Kate is 
incapable of making is made for the reader by the linking of "the ugliness -
so positive and palpable that it was somehow sustaining" (I, 12-13) of 
22 The Great Tradition, p. 174. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chirk Street with the "unanimous" ugllness Densher discerns in the 
furnishings of Lancaster Gate. 
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Of course, ugliness being in the eye of the beholder, Densher and Kate 
are also placed by their reactions to these settings. As Lancaster Gate 
proclaims to Densher a spirit inimical to his values, so "the faint flat 
emanation of things" in Chirk Street represents an intolerable denial of 
Kate's sense of life. As Kate, despite her "rebellions of taste" can live in 
Lancaster Gate, so Densher could presumably live in ·Chirk Street, there being 
in neither case a violation of essential values. Similarly, in Densher's 
Venetian lodgings, the "ancient rickety objects, ..• refined in thei r 
shabbiness, amiable in their decay" (II, 178) perhaps owe their refinement 
and amiability mainly to Densher's appreciation; it is unlikely that Kate 
would find them so.23 
What I have called the technique of "ironic setting", then, entails the 
use of the resources of realism to place the concrete details of an 
environment in moral relation to its inhabitants, to produce that "total 
view" which John Holloway denies to late James. 24 The quality of attention 
paid to Lancaster Gate and Mrs Lowder is exactly the same as that paid to 
Chirk Street and Lionel Croy - that is to say it is something quite other 
than the "aesthetic contemplation" John Goode ascribes to the novel. The 
"hierarchy of significance" emerges unobtrusively, through the ironic network 
of impl icit contrast and correspondence, but it is as much present as the 
"pattern ... of moral significances" that Leavis traces in Nostromo. 25 
Though setting is, of course, by definition static, the pattern is 
nevertheless potentially dynamic in that it consists of interaction between 
character and setting. Ultimately, whether such irony is resolved or not 
will depend of course on the characters' awareness of the values embodied in 
setting. 
The rest of this chapter will be devoted to a consideration of the 
"mora lsi gn ifi cances" enacted in Kate and Densher' s progress through the 
23 This adds a further point to Densher's insistence on Kate's coming 
to him from the Palazzo Leporelli - she must quite literally meet him on his 
own ground in return for his frequenting the Palace. 
24 "The Literary Scene", p. 56. 
25 The Great Traditio~, p. 211. 
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novel's rich variety of settings - a "progress", however, that leads both of 
them back to where they started: Kate to Lancaster Gate, Densher to his 
meagre lodgings, though now with free access to Lancaster Gate. The 
significance of their progress may perhaps best be summed up in Kate's own 
insight - though it is an insight applied to her sister, with an irony of 
which Kate turns out to be the alazon. She sees in Mrs Condrip, clinging to 
the values of their more prosperous times in the same spirit as she retains 
the chandeliers reaching almost to the floor of her reduced quarters, 
a state of the spirit that perhaps marked most sharply how poor you 
might become when you minded so much the absence of wealth. 
(I, 34) 
The phrase "how poor you might become" impl ies a process; and it is such a 
process of impoverishment that we witness in the lovers' successful plot to 
gain the wealth they lack. Initially, their love is founded on "some sense, 
on the part of each, of being poor vihere the other was rich" (I, 50): the 
metaphor is precisely chosen to convey the non-material value they find in 
each other, and their generous acceptance of a corresponding poverty in 
themselves. lJltimately, it is Kate's minding "so much the absence of wealth" 
that deprives each of the riches offered by the other. 
In the course of the novel the enriching reciprocity of the lovers' 
complementary qualities yields to the exploitative reciprocity of the 
working and the worked - a system into which Kate is drawn by every human 
tie, other than Densher, that she possesses. Her father, sister, and aunt 
are "working" her, in their different ways, for all she is worth; in return, 
she "works" Aunt Maud, Milly, and ultimately even Densher. In the case of 
her aunt, this is merely an acceptance of the rules of a game between 
equally adept participants. Her exploitation of Milly, of course, is much 
more devious; and yet, this is not only what we measure Kate's fall by. 
Her use of Milly is not inconsistent with that brutality which, as we have 
seen, is inseparable from her beauty; thus, ruthless as it is, it is yet 
not a violation of the essential value that she represents in the novel. 
It is in her "working" of Merton Densher that she miscalculates and destroys 
her most beautiful possession. In a sense like Milly, she does not realise 
that the London system, although it allows one to "quite like" the other 
parties to the bargain, does not allow for one's truly caring for them. 
Her mistake is summed up in her 91 ib explanation to Merton Densher: 
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" You're what I have of most precious, and you're therefore what 
I use most." (II, 52) 
The disarming candour of this does not compensate for the speciousness of 
the logic whereby the preciousness of a loved one is equated with the 
usefulness of an object. What is intended as a tribute to him is in fact a 
subordination of him to the scheme that is supposed to unite them. The same 
confusion of priorities is evident in her warning to Densher: 
"I verily bel ieve I shall hate you if you spoil for me the beauty 
of what I see!" (II, 30) 
Here the "beauty" of the scheme takes precedence over the raison d'etre of the 
scheme - her relationship with Densher. In the event, of course, Densher 
does not spoil the beauty of what Kate sees; but Kate spoils the beauty that 
once, in Kensington Gardens, emanated from her, and yet "was in everything". 
The loss of that beauty is most starkly dramatised in Densher's attempt 
to recreate "their simpler and better time", to recover "the clearness of 
their prime" (II, 345), by meeting Kate in thei.r old trysting place in the 
Gardens. The midwinter setting forms the objective correlative to a 
relationship that is beyond revival by 5ucti means as Densher's insistence 
that they should get married immediately, before Milly's death: 
" We owe it to ourselves, we owe it to our feeling for 
ourse 1 ves and for each other, not to wa i t another day.-.-•. " 
(II, 347) 
Ironically, the death of the relationship is most evident in Kate's failure 
to see hew the plot against Milly has defiled their relationship, in her 
claim that nothing has changed: 
"I don't see, you know, what has changed." She had a large 
strange smile. "We've been going on together so well, and you 
suddenly desert me?" 
It made him helplessly gaze. "You call it so 'well '? You've 
touches, upon my soul - !" 
"I calli t perfect - from my 
where I wa s; and you mus t gi ve 
my dear, for your not being. 
original roint 
me some bt:ter 
" (I I, 348) 
of view. I'm just 
reason than you do, 
Ka te is ri ght, of course: she is just where she vias; it is Densher 
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who has changed. Having conceived the plan to benefit from Milly's death, 
she can see no reason to flinch from the consequences. With a kind of 
terrible innocence she assumes that he wants to get married immediately 
because he knows that he wi 11 inherit the money: "We need n' t, I grant you, 
in that case wait; and I can see what you mean by thinking it nicer of us 
not to." (II, 349) 
If we come to share Densher's "horror, almost, of her lucidity" (II, 
350), that lucidity is nevertheless part of what Densher recognises as her 
"imperturbable consistency" (II, 348). Kate has always been Kate, and has 
known herself from the start; we, like Densher, have simply got to know her 
better and to take the full measure of her "talent for 1 ife" - and its 
limitations. Kate is clear-sighted enough eventually to see that she has 
lost Densher to Milly, but to the end she has no real perception of what she 
has done to ~li lly, nor of what she has done to Densher. She has 
instinctively valued Densher for "all the high dim things she lumped 
together as of the mind" (I, 50), but she has developed no clearer sense of 
what these things consist of. She does not realise that they enable Densher 
to pass judgement on her, that what he is "rich" in enables him to assess 
what she is poor in. What Strether says of Mrs Newsome at the end of The 
Ambassadors applies also to Densher's view of Kate: 
"She's the same. She's mOt'e than ever the same. But I do what I 
did n't before - I see her." (II, 323) 
Kate's characteristic "lucidity" never deserts her; it is present, for 
instance, in her incisive "Her memory's your love" and, of course, in "We 
shall never be again as we were!" (II, 404-0S) But these are perceptions, 
not moral insights: she can see, more clearly than Densher, what has 
happened to their relationship, but she cannot see why. To her the change 
is explicable only in terms of Merton's having fallen in love with Milly's 
memory; she is incapable of the further recognition that his view of her 
has changed. 
For all Kate's clear-sightedness, then, she remains morally blind to 
the implications of her actions. If, as Walter Allen maintains, the lovers 
remind us of Macbeth and Lady Macbeth, Kate retains the direct simplicity 
of vision of Lady Macbeth before and immediately after the murder of Duncan. 
"But we've not failed", she assures Densher (II, 333) with as much 
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confidence as Lady Macbeth reassuring her husband: "But screw your courage 
to the sticking-place,/And we'll not fail." (Macbeth, 1.7.60-61) The irony 
implicit in her single-minded pursuit of what is to destroy what she had 
before remains unresolved: Kate has no criterion other than success by which 
to judge her actions. Her history has its moral, but she cannot pronounce 
it. James does not give to her the insight that Conrad gives to Mrs Gould 
in Nostromo, an insight that can serve to sum up Kate's success no less than 
Charles Gould's: 
It was a colossal and lasting success; and love was only a short 
moment of forgetfulness, a short intoxication, whose delight one 
remembered with a sense of sadness, as if it had been a deep grief 
lived through. There was something inherent in the necessities of 
successful action which carried with it the degradation of the 
idea. (p. 521) 
To apply Conrad's insight to Kate's situation is, of course, to see her 
behaviour not as an aberration from normal social behaviour, but as an 
instance of the necessary corruption of ideals in the pursuit of success in 
a society ruled by "material interests". This is not to exculpate Kate -
the determination to succeed in Lancaster Gate terms is her own - but to note 
that through her James passes a larger judgement on her society as well. In 
this, James' use of Kate is similar to Thackeray's use of most of his 
characters (though most notably, of course, Becky Sharp) in Vanity Fair. 
James' technique also has in common with Thackeray's his essentially static 
presentation of his character, though his greater skill conceals this more 
effectively than Thackeray's overt manipulation of his puppets. Ilhat Edwin 
Muir says of the characters of Vanity Fair applies in essentials to Kate 
Croy: 
Their weaknesses, their vanities, their foibles, they possess from 
the beginning and never lose to the end; and what actually does 
change is not these, but our knowledge of them. 26 
This too is a process of discovery, but it is not discovery enacted through 
the characters; Kate Croy, like Becky Sharp, is never the growth point of 
the moral consciousness of her novel. An important distinction between 
26 The Structul"e of the Novel, pp. 24-25. 
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Thackeray's novel and The Wings of the Dove, however, is the fact that Kate 
is set against, and to a large extent observed and judged, by Nerton Densher. 
In his case we do have the dynamic pattern of change, that is, the redemptive 
pattern that we have seen, for instance, in the career of Eugene Wrayburn. 
Hhereas Kate is from the first chapter of the novel possessed of those 
qualities whose full potential is developed in the course of the novel, 
Densher is at the outset something of a blank page - or, in James' metaphor, 
an undetermined value, an unstamped coin. 
He suggested above all ..• that wondrous state of youth in which 
the elements, the metals more or less precious, are so in fusion 
and fermentation that the question of the final stamp, the pressure 
that fixes the value, must wait for comparative coolness. 
(I, 48-49) 
Aunt ~1aud Ivou1d have recognised the metaphor, but she would have misunderstood 
it. The value that is to be fixed in the course of the novel is a matter of 
moral worth, not calculable in her terms, though expressed in imagery that 
ironically recalls those terms. Indeed, Densher's value in her terms is 
initially simply non-existent: she has herself applied the "final stamp". 
If she is not quite as absolute in her rejection of him as Lionel Croy is, 
the latter's description of him as "some blackguard without a penny" (I, 23) 
nevertheless reproduces the essence of her judgement on him - as Densher 
expresses it to Kate, "Her idea, you mean, that I'm a sort of a scoundrel" 
(I, 60). 
Ironically, Aunt Maud comes to reassess his value in the light of Nilly's 
interest in him, in a process parallel to the weighing of his moral value 
that the novel simultaneously enacts. The more of a "scoundrel" he actually 
becomes, the less of one he seems to Aunt Maud. He ends up having squared 
everybody but himself: 
"What a brute then I must be!" 
"A brute - ?" 
"To have pleased so many people." 
"Ah," said Kate with a gleam of gaiety, "you've done it to 
please me." (II,331) 
Kate is right, as she so often is; but. her demands are such that Denshel' 
can fully please her only by pleasing everybody else. And Densher is also 
right, in that. to please people as Kate demands they should be pleased, is 
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in this instance to be a brute. He has, in short, been initiated into the 
beautiful brutality of which Kate is the prime exponent. 
The brutality manifests itself, of course, in his complicity in Kate's 
plot against Milly. But he is after all not enough of a brute to accept his 
complicity with equanimity; those differences between the lovers that 
promised to enrich the relationship in its early days become irreconcilable 
under the pressure of Densher's guilt. Thus there is a terrible moral 
loneliness even in his attempt to see himself and Kate as united by their 
consciousness of guilt: 
Only Kate at all events knew - what Kate did know, and she was also 
the last person interested to tell it; in spite of which it was 
as if his act, so deeply associated with her and never to be 
recalled nor-recovered, was abroad on the winds of the world. His 
honesty, as he viewed it with Kate, was the very element of that 
menace: to the degree that he saw at moments, as to their final 
impulse or their final remedy, the need to bury in the dark 
b 1 i ndness of each other's anns the knowl edge of each other that they 
could n't undo. (II, 391-92) 
But Densher is disregarding the chasm that now exists between him and Kate: 
it is only his knowledge that needs to hide_ itself; 
by such knowledge as she has gained. Once again we 
Kate seems unappalled 
are reminded of a Lady 
Macbeth capable of saying "A little water clears us of this deed", of a 
~lacbeth capable of imagining the horrid deed blown in every eye ("abroad on 
the winds of the world" in Densher's modification of the image). 
An important part of the novel's final meaning, as Frederick Crews and 
Dorothea Krook amongst others have shown, res ides in M-j lly' s un intent i ona 1 
defeat of the lovers through forgiveness, and in Densher's consequent 
redemption from the system of the "working and the worked". But such a 
reading runs the risk of over-simpl ifying the estrangement, and seeing it 
only in tel'ms of Milly's influence. Thus, in referring to "the abyss that 
has opened between Kate and Densher as a result of his last interview with 
Milly",27 Doreothea Krook leaves out of account, once again by making the 
descent of the Dove stand in for psychological process, the much subtler and 
more gradual estrangement that takes place in the course of the novel. This 
27 The Ordeal of C9_nsciollsness, p. 226. 
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estrangement is a function of the plot against Milly, but it does not derive 
from any action of Milly's: it consists of the gradual erosion of good faith 
on Merton Densher's part, not only in relation to Milly, but also in relation 
to Kate. As he becomes aware of being "worked", he starts "working" Kate, 
and thereby contributes to the destruction of their relationship. 
This is not to deny that Densher is initially drawn into Kate's plan 
purely by his love for her: at the outset he is portrayed as helplessly 
under her spell. So, as Kate turns her back on him, impatiently bidding him 
"do what you like!", he realises that 
he was prepared to conform, by almost any abject attitude or 
profitable compromise, to his companion's easy injunction. He 
would do as she liked - his own liking might come off as it would. 
(I, 74-75) 
In the event he goes a long way towards this "abject attitude"; but it is 
still not quite true that, as Crews maintains, "all his guilt has consisted 
in allowing Kate to overrule his conscience. "28 We would be as 1 ittle 
interested in a Densher only led into sin by Kate Croy as in a ~lacbeth 
corrupted, against his better nature, by Lady Macbeth. 
What in fact happens is that what Kate "likes" becomes more and more 
"abject" to Densher, leading him to rebel against the subordination of his 
"liking" to hers.· Thus, on her suggestion that they might use Milly to 
facilitate their meetings, he confronts her with his challenge: "t4hy won't 
you come to me?" (II, 29) The challenge is perfectly understandable, as is 
the urgency of his desire as he asks "of his spirit and of his flesh just 
what concession they could arrange"; but in his resignation to her 
"intelligence" there is an element of resentment: 
..• it was he I'lho vias stupid - the proof of which was that he 
would do what she liked. (II, 30) 
What had earl ier been a testimony to Kate's beauty, now becomes a proof of 
his own stupidity; and gradually there grows in him a sense that he is 
being disregarded. Where earl ier he was prepared to disregard himself, he 
now resents her doing so; and by the time he is in Venice, dutifully 
28 The Tragedy of Manners, p. 80. 
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visiting t1illy at Kate's bidding, his sexual desire and his resentment at 
being manipulated are curiously indistinguishable: 
160 
There glowed for him in fact a kind of rage at what he was n't 
having; an exasperation, a resentment, begotten truly by the very 
impatience of desire, in respect to his postponed and relegated, 
his so extremely manipulated state. (II, 175-76) 
We notice that Oensher rebels, not against what he is being led into 
doing to ~1illy, but against the fact, as he sees it, that he is getting 
nothing in return. His desire for Kate we can, of course, assume to have 
been part of the relationship from the start; but this "impatience of 
des ire" is subtly corrupted by hi s "smothered soreness" (I I, 177). He does 
not simply want Kate, he wants Kate because he thinks it is his due, because 
he feels himself humiliated by not showing more spirit. He feels, in short, 
that he is being "worked" without "working" in return: 
whereas he had done absolutely everything that Kate had wanted, 
she had done nothing whatever that he had. (II, 177) 
"Nobody here" as Lord Mark told Milly, "does anything for nothing"; and 
Oensher's assertiveness in enforcing his bargain is a sign that this spirit 
of trade has infected him too. He feels like somebody swindled by a 
shopkeeper: partly sore at not getting his side of the bargain, but mainly 
angry at having been made a fool of, at having shown himself lacking in 
acuteness. 
Oensher demonstrates his new-found sense of purpose in his tense 
confrontation of Kate in the Piazza San Marco. Ostensibly an outdoor 
setting recalling Kensington Gardens, the Piazza, with its air of "a great 
social saloon, a smooth-floored, blue-roofed chamber of amenity" (II, 189), 
in fact belongs firmly to the drawing-room mil ieu of Lancaster Gate - a 
connection that is reinforced by Aunt Maud's probably-watchful presence in 
the shadows of the surrounding arcade. What might strike her as a stolen 
interlude between lovers, in truth has the grim mood of an ultimatum:. 
"Hhy not have done with it all and face the music as we are?" It 
tll'oke from him in perfect sincerity. "Good God, if you'd only 
take me!" 
--•.. "\~e've gone too far," she none the less pulled herself 
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together to reply. "Do you want to kill her?" 
He had an hesitation that was n't all candid. "Kill, you mean, 
Aunt t~aud?" 
"You know whom I mean. We've told too many lies." 
Oh at this his head went up. "I, my dear, have told none!" 
(II, 199) 
It is possible to question the absolute candour of Kate's qualms (a cynic 
might note that her objection to killing Milly is more to its timing than to 
its morality), but what is more striking here is Densher's loss of good 
faith - his lapse from the sincerity of his plea to "have done with it all" 
to the shuffling equivocation of his hesitation, culminating in his prompt 
exculpation of himself, at Kate's expense, by grasping at the barren 
technicality of not actually having told a lie. The self-righteousness 
merges into blackmail, only to be defeated by Kate's refusal to take the bait: 
"Rather than lay myself open to the least appearance of [telling a 
a liel I'll go this very night." 
"T~n go," said Kate Croy. 
Kate is once again right: 
only way of salvaging it 
if it is his integrity he is concerned about, the 
is to withdraw immediately. By calling his bluff, 
she forces him to reveal his true motive and press his real claim: 
"I'll tell any lie you want, any your idea requires, if you'll only 
come to me." (II,200) 
Thus the one relationship that seemed to be exempt from the principle of 
trade issues in the starkest statement of that principle: integrity is 
being traded against chastity, in what Crews calls "a simple business 
transaction".29 The business is, of course, a form of prostitution. 
At this point, however, Densher is marginally in the weaker bargaining 
position, his threat to leave Venice having failed of its desired effect. 
His pleading tone ("I'll tell any lie you want ... if you'll only come to 
me") has something of the desperation of an avid buyer emptying his purse on 
the counter in an attempt to bring down the price of a coveted object. But 
the relative bargaining positions are to change. 
29 The Tragedy of J1anners, p. 71. 
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At Milly's glittering reception a variety of circumstances combine to 
strengthen Densher's position and his resolve. In the first place, Susan 
Stringham innocently confirms to him his potential power over Milly, and thus 
ironically his value to Kate: "You can do everything, you know" (II, 211) 
she encourages him, thus unwittingly delivering her protegee over to 
betrayal. In the second place Milly, determined to prove to Sir Luke that 
she is "taking the trouble" to live, fails to convince the person most 
interested in the question: Kate Croy. "She is n't better. She's worse" 
she says to Densher (II, 219); but what poor Milly's splendour does bring 
home to Densher is what she represents to Kate - something but tenuously 
connected with the image of the dove that Kate, a trifle mechanically 
perhaps, has reintroduced: 
~Iilly was indeed a dove; this was the figure, though it most 
applied to her spirit. Yet he knew in a moment that Kate was just 
now, for t'easons hidden from him, exceptionally under the impression 
of that element of wealth in her which was a power, which was a 
great povlel', and which was dove-like only so far as one remembel'ed 
that doves have wings and wondrous flights, have them as well as 
tender tints and soft sounds. (II, 218) 
From this follows Densher's sharpened realisation of how acutely his lack of 
wealth matters to Kate Ct'oy, "how", as Kate herself real ised long ago, 
"material things spoke to her". [qilly's pearls become "a symbol of 
differences .... pearls were exactly what Merton Densher would never be able 
to give her." (Ir, 219) 
The stage is thus set, against the background of Milly's expensive 
music and inconveniently sociable guests, for Densher's strangely delayed 
realisation of exactly what Kate's beautiful idea entails. "If you want 
things named you must name them" she tells him, and he names the thing in 
the starkest possible terms: 
"Since she's to die I'm to marry her?" (II, 225) 
Upon this, in one terrible moment, constituting a rearrangement of the 
grouping in the National Gallery, the lovers are united in the full knowledge 
of their intentions against an innocent Milly: 
[Kate] turned her head to where their friend was again in range, 
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and it made him turn his, so that they watched a minute in concert. 
Milly, from the other side, happened at the moment to notice them, 
and she sent across toward then in response all the candour of her 
smile, the lustre of her pearls, the value of her life, the essence 
of her wealth. It brought them together again with faces made 
fairly grave by the reality she put into their plan. (II, 229) 
But having "brought them together again", Milly's smile, with all it implies, 
irrevocably divides them. In forcing Densher to face so squarely the 
"reality" of their plan and of his involvement in it, Kate has created a 
moral climate in which scruples seem irrelevant: Densher, now fully aware 
of the strength of his own position, can confront her with all the lucid 
pragmatism instilled in him by her example: 
"If you decline to understand me I wholly decline to understand 
you. I'll do nothing." 
"Nothing?" It was as if she tried for the minute to plead. 
"I'll do nothing. I'll go off before you. I'll go tomorrow." 
He was to have afterwards the sense of her having then, as the 
phrase was - and for vulgar triumphs too - seen he meant it. She 
looked again at Lady Wells, who was nearer, but she quickly came 
back. "And if I do understand?" 
"I'll do everything." 
She found anew a pretext in her approaching friend: he was 
fairly playing with her pride. He had never, he then knew, tasted, 
in all his relation with her, of anything so sharp - too sharp for 
mere sweetness - as the vividness with which he saw himself master 
in the confl ict. "Well, I understand." 
"On your honour?" 
"On my honour." 
"You'll come?" 
"I'll come." (II, 230-31) 
The participants in this "conflict", ending in the "vulgar triumph" of one. 
over the other· and in the legalistic sealing, in a horrible parody of 
"honour", of the coerced agreement, seem 1 ike different people from the 
couple who so freely pledged their love to each other in Kensington Gardens. 
When we 1 oak back, we real i se how much more vie have wi tnessed than the 
betrayal of ~lilly: we have experienced the slow erosion of a relationship 
by the attempt to reconcile it with the claims of a material istic world. 
The repeated "nothing", recalling Lord ~lark's formula, signals Densher's 
successful debut as one of the workers. 
I~illy can extend her forgiveness to Densher and signify that forgiveness 
by giving him freely what he sought by deceit from her; but Densher can 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
164 
never be absolved from having taken from Kate Croy what she did not give him 
freely. His use of Milly is a conscious suppression of a conscience that 
duly reasserts itself; but his use of Kate derives from a corruption so 
complete as to make it impossible for him to evaluate his own conduct. What 
he triumphantly tastes as "too sharp for mere sweetness" is the forbidden 
fruit. The truly fallen, it is said, are not aware of their own fallen state; 
and in this Densher is truly fallen. 
The irony that in gaining ~li11y's money, Densher loses Kate, is fully 
resolved by his recognition of the superiority of Milly's generosity to Kate's 
"talent for life"; but the irony that in his resentment at being "worked", 
he calculatingly "works" ("and for vulgar triumphs too") what was most precious 
to him, cannot be resolved, in that he has no insight into it. If Kate is 
degraded by the end of the novel, he has contributed to that degradation by 
his use of her, not in honest passion but in spirit of venality. 
To stress Densher's corruption by the values of Lancaster Gate is not 
to deny the contrary tendency of much of the novel, Densher's growing awareness 
of the enormity of their intended exploitation of Milly, and his redemption, 
through ~lilly's forgiveness, ft"om that particular sin. In this respect, we 
can accept ~latthiessen's statement that "like the hero in any great tragedy 
he has arrived at the moral perception of what has befallen him. "30 But, 
even waiving for the moment his lack of insight into his use of Kate, it does 
not seem to me that the novel ends, as Dorothea Krook maintains it does, on 
"a redemption of the suffering and loss by the saving power of a human passion 
reinforced by courage, dignity, intelligence, and good faith."31 One would 
not want to deny Milly these admirable qualities; it is just that it is 
very difficult to see them as constituting "a redemption of the suffering 
and loss". 
The "saving power of a human passion" seems less appropriate to the 
possibilities of James' world than those of, say George Eliot's: it is what 
is expressed, for instance, in Gwendolen Harleth's last words to Daniel 
Deronda: 
You must not gri eve any rna re for me. It is better - it shall be 
30 Ihe~ajor p~~_, p. 77. 
31 The Ordeal of Consciousness, p. 231. 
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better with me because I have known you. 32 
We do believe that it will be better with Gwendolen because she has known 
Deronda (though we may not find him as inspiring as she does): his example 
provides her with the impetus to seek, on however humble a level, that 
"larger life" that for George Eliot lies beyond the exclusive concern with 
self. 
By contrast, the world which Densher inhabits offers almost none of this 
"larger life"; what there was of it, was l'epresented by Kate Croy, as he 
realised on first falling in love with her: 
Having so often concluded on the fact of his weakness, as he called 
it, for life - his strength merely for thought - life, he logically 
opined, I'las what he must somehol'l arrange to annex and possess 
(I, 51) 
The formulation stresses the incongruity of such a rationalistic determination 
("he logically opined") to "annex and possess" something as elusive as life. 
Densher would also live if he could; but if, unlike Milly, he succeeds 
briefly in annexing and possessing it, he does so only on such conditions as 
make the possession worthless. The particular emphasis given to his moral 
awakening is fairly rendered in James' outline of the novel: 
In the light of how exqul~ite the dead girl was he sees how little 
exquisite is the living. 
This emphasises the negative, even incapacitating effects of this discovery: 
it comes too late to affect Densher's relationship I'lith Milly, but it does 
alienate him from Kate. As Kenneth Graham comments, "to reject Kate and her 
values represents an irreparable loss and possibly a 'perpetual unfitness for 
ordinary living."34 
In short, Densher's "redemption" does not liberate him, like Eugene 
Wrayburn or Gwendolen Harleth, into purposive action; all it leaves him is 
the "memory" which creates, incongl'uDusly, a bond with Mrs Lowder. It is 
32 Daniel Deronda, ed. and introd. Barbary Hardy (1876; rpt. 
Harmondsiffirth:-Penguln, 1967), p. 882. 
33 Notebooks, p. 173. 
34 The Dr'ama of Fulfilment, p. 224. 
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perhaps the most mordant irony of the novel that Densher should be drawn to 
Lancaster Gate by the consequences of an act that was to have rendered him 
independent of its goodwill - and that he should go there for the comfort of 
Aunt Maud's materialistic sentimentality: 
It was almost as if she herself enjoyed the perfection of the 
pathos; she sat there before the scene, as he could n't help giving 
it out to her, very much as a stout citizen's wife might have sat, 
during a play that made people cry, in the pit or the familY-circle. 
What most deeply stirred her was the way the poor girl must have 
wanted to 1 i ve. 
"Ah yes indeed - she did, she did: why in pity should n't she, 
with everything to fill her world? The mere money of her, the 
darling, if it is n't too disgusting at such a time to mention 
that - !" 
Aunt Maud mentioned it - and Densher quite understood - but as 
fairly giving poetry to the 1 ife Milly clung to: a view of the 
"might have been" before which the good lady was hushed anew to 
tears. She had had her own vision of these possibilities, and her 
own social use for them, and since Milly's spirit had been after all 
so atone wi th her about them, \vhat was the crue Hy of the event 
but a crue Hy, of a sort, to herself? (I I, 341) 
This defines with sardonic precision the limits of the tragic in the world 
represented by Aunt Maud, in which Densher _must find such solace as he can. 
The closest Aunt Maud can come to strong feeling is the luxurious kind of 
sentimentality which enjoys a good cry, and can thus respond copiously to 
"the perfection of the pathos". To her, human suffering is something one 
watches comfortably from a privileged, if economically-priced, position in 
the family-circle. Aunt t·laud's definition of poetry doesn't admit of 
recondite di sti nct ions between tragedy and sentimental melodrama: vJhether 
it is King Lear or La Dame aux Camelias, it is categorised only in terms of 
its most general effect, as "a play that made people cry". She is, of course, 
quite sincerely "stirred" (as opposed, perhaps, to being "moved"?) by the 
easy inverted nostalgia for "what might have been". Her scanty imagination 
is aided by the fact that "she had had her own vision of these possibilities, 
and her own social use for them". There is after all nothing quite as 
stirring as a loss in which one participates; the stout citizen's wife is 
left with the slightly aggrieved sense that through some mismanagement she 
has been depr-ived of her money's worth by the premature death of the leading 
1 ady. 
Aunt ~laud's response to ~lilly's death is almost comically untragic: 
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an apprehension of the tragic depends on an understanding of the value of 
what has been lost. For Aunt Maud, we know, value has only a material 
connotation: "The mere money of her, the darling" adequately sums up the 
nature of the loss over which she sheds tears. It is not, of course, the 
last word on the significance of Milly's death, nor does it detract from the 
force of Densher's own response; but it is also more than a revelation of 
Aunt Maud's vulgarity. It has something of the effect of Judge Brack's 
outraged disappointment at Hedda Gabler's suicide - "But people don't do such 
thi ngs!" - I'lhereby poor Hedda's one attempt at a "beautiful" deed is 
trivialised into a breach of social decorum. The comparison is over-
simplified, of course - Hedda's motives are in themselves more ambiguous than 
Milly's - but James, no less than Ibsen, acknowledges that complacent 
bourgeois morality does not provide the proper conditions for tragedy. In 
Densher's finding solace in the lush sentimentality of Aunt Maud, amidst the 
rosewood and marble and malachite, is 'an irony that threatens to subvert 
whatever n~ral resolution the novel has achieved. It does not ultimately do 
so; but the tvlO patterns 'of irony create an equil ibrium as precarious as 
that of King Lear. 
If, then, the novel grew from an intention to render the pathos of Milly 
Theale's situation, we can see not only how much richer it became in the 
process, but also how much more sombre. James may have sacrificed something 
of that unity that he admired so much in novels - in, of his own novels, The 
Ambassador~, for instance. But The Wings of the Dove is, more satisfyingly 
than The Ambassadors, a vindication of James' statement which I quoted 
earlier all "the high price of the novel as a literary form - " 
its power not only, while preserving that form with closeness, to 
range through all the differences of the individual relation to 
its general subject matter, ... but positively to appear more true 
to its character in proportion as it strains, or tends to burst, 
with a latent extravagance, its mould. 35 
The strain shows, in this novel, in the importance assumed by Kate Croy and 
Herton Densher, an importance that thl'eatens to USUI'p Milly's centrality in 
the novel. But James allows the interest to develop with a freedom that he 
seemed to begrudge Strether and Maria Gostrey in !heir relation to each 
35 Preface to The Portrait of a Lady, The Art of the Novel. pp. 45-46. 
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other. Also, if the deve 1 opment of ~lerton Densher I s character requ ires 
darker strains than could have been foreseen at its inception, James does 
not flinch from them as he does from the less admirable aspects of Strether 
that emerge in the course of the novel. They take their place in the 
complete "hierarchy of significance" that James creates in this most 
"realist" of novels. 
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Chapter V 
"The Misfortune of Being Too, Too Charming" 
and the Advantages of a "Rare Power of Purchase": The Gal den Bowl 
The crucial question about The Golden Bowl, as Matthiessen recognised, 
is "What sort of world is being portrayed, and how are we to judge it?"1 
The question points to the "real ist" element the novel has in common with The 
Wings of the Dove, but it also serves to distinguish between the two novels: 
as applied to The Wings, the question would be near-rhetorical, whereas in 
relation to The Golden Bowl it expresses the very real puzzlement felt by 
most readers. Difficult as the novel's immediate predecessors are, they do 
provide us with certain relatively clear pointers to a judgement on the 
society portrayed - for instance in Strether's gradual recognition of the 
deceptions underlying the glamour of Paris, or in Kate's explanation to Milly 
of the principles activating London society. But in The Golden Bowl we have 
no such guidance: we are, for the most part, helplessly dependent on the 
perceptions of the characters themselves. This is, of course, one of~ames' 
best-known ancffiiosCc"nerisheddevices: the use of a "centre of consciousness" ~-"'.~-""~''-----""-""'---" 
as far as Roderick Hudson. But in The Golden Bowl this can be traced back 
device, what James calls with monumental understatement "a certain indirect 
and obl ique vievl_M my presented action",2 -is more deceptively used: the 
""- --------
apparent relia~ceonalternative perspectives, notably that of the Assinghams, 
tends to. conceal the extent to which "the whole thing remains subject to the 
"'--- -----_.- ._-,- -- _. 
registe~, ever so closely kept, of the consciousness of but two of the 
characters ."(1, ,Ji) 
This does not necessarily mean that we "see" through the eyes of these 
characters, as we do through those of Strether or any other central "conscious-
ness" in James' earl ier explorations of "point of view". In The Golden BO\~l 
there a.re certain passages, notably those describing the early history of Adam 
Verver, which are clearly not filtered through any consciousness but that of 
the character immediately presented. But in being "subject to the register" 
of either the Prince or Maggie, such passages conforlO; to u particular 
predisposition on his or her part towards the subject: we see the subject, 
as it were, only as he or she might have seen it. Where his or her 
1 .:rh~!'!.ajor rh~~,p. 87. 
2\PrEdace to The Golden_ Bowl, I, v. 
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understanding is incomplete - as it so often is - every "insight" offered 
will be subject to qualification by the rest of the novel. 
This is to say that The Golden Bowl is James' most sustained piece of 
irony, an irony that devastates the pretensions of every character in the 
novel. Like so many other examples of unresolved irony discussed in the 
fi rs t chapter of th i s thes is, The Gol den BO~ll deri ves its energy from a 
tension between the values professed by the characters and the actions 
performed under·cover of those values: once again, the self-conscious 
justifications of the characters are undercut, their belief in the stability 
of their values ironised. 
The novel dramatises, in Fanny Assingham's phrase, "the misfortune of 
2 '11 
being too, too charming" (I, 392); and, as in Antony and Cleopatra, the 
lack of resolution of the irony admits a comic element to the misfortune. 
In this apparently most undramatic of novels, James avails himself of the 
dramatist's privilege of standing back and allowing the characters to speak 
for themselves - leaving us to judge for ourselves. Our task is considerably 
complicated by the fact that we are, for most of the time, in much the same 
position as the victims of this pervasive irony, privileged above them only 
in having tw'2. partial viel1s of the novel's action. As James explains this 
privilege, it does not seem altogether to confer upon us the god-like 
omniscience of the eiron: 
It is the Prince who opens the door to half our light upon Maggie, 
just as it is she who opens it to half our light upon himself; 
the rest of our impression, in either case, coming straight from 
the very motion with which that act is performed. We see Charlotte 
also at first, and we see Adam Varver, let alone our seeing Mrs. 
Ass i ngham, and everyone and every th i ng else, but as tlley are 
visible in the Prince's interest, so to speak - by which I mean 
of course in the interest of his being himself handed over to us. 
With a like consistency we see the same persons and things again 
but as Maggie's interest, her exhibitional charm, determines the 
view. (I, viii) 
This method of presentation creates comparatively few problems in the first 
volume, since most readers are incl ined to distrust the Prince in any case; 
but the temptation to see Maggie's vision aSlilore ButbClritative than the 
-"-.- '---'--_." ". 
Prince's can tota1ly destroy the point of the novel. The potential 
confusion inheres mainly in one relation: that of Maggie to her father. 
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For our interpretation of the novel is a function of our assessment of Adam 
Verver: he determines the "sort of world" that the novel portrays, and as 
we judge him, we judge it. Even our judgement of Maggie is to a certain 
extent dependent on our view of Adam, since so much of her energy is expended 
--- - -- ---~--- .---- -- -----." -
in loyalty to his cause. As Brian Lee says, in reviewing the divergent 
critical interpretations of Adam Verver, "these contradictory views of him 
do entail, for the people who hold them, different versions of the novel as 
a whole".3 
The Golden Bowl is domina ted by Adam Verver as The vii ngs of the Dove is 
dominated by Mrs LO~/der - in fact more so, since in his exclusive little 
world, more than ever a world of "the working and the worked", he is the 
supreme worker. In a novel no less concerned than The Wings with power and 
success, Adam, with his "rare power of purchase" (II, 360), is powerful and 
successful beyond Mrs Lowder's most avid dreams. He is also considerably 
more subtle than Mrs Lowder in his manipulation of everything that he 
touches: whereas there is, for much of the time, a brash amorality about 
her exercise of power, ~1r Verver manages to envelop his power in an aura of 
sanctity. It is once again a matter of "moral ity and money, a good conscience 
and a big balance."4 But as Mr Verver's "balance" is stupendous compared 
with Mrs Lowder's, his "fine eminent 'pieces' in gold, in silver, in enamel, 
majolica, ivory, bronze" (I, 141) immensely superior to her "gilt and glass, 
... satin and plush, ... rosewood and marble and malachite" (I, 79), so his 
" conscience" is proportionately more sublime. She, in short, is "Britannia 
of the Market Place"; he the American robber baron turned philanthropist. 
Her wildest dream is to have constant access to Matcham; 
is to found a dynasty. 
his lucid ambition 
• 
I am sU~9_esting, to put it bluntly, that Adam Verver is the corrupt 
centre of the novel, even, as Frederick Crews has suggested, "1 ikened to God 
Hims';,0-S This is startling, but ultimately misleading only if we 
entertain the odd idea that James is trying to justify the ~Iays of God to 
3 The Novel s of Henry James: A Study of Culture and Consciousness 
(London:Echvard"""".Z'i.riiOTO, 1978), p. HiS. Lee hlmself rather non-coillmitta-lly 
decides that "It is indeed hard to reconcile any other view of Verver than 
the ironic with what Jaiiles has given us of this type before", unaccountably 
ignoring what James actually gives us of Verver himself. 
4 Th~~vin.9s of the Dove, 1, 79. 
5 The Tragedy of t,lanners, p. 107. 
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man in casting Him as a millionaire American art collector - if, that is, 
we bel ieve with Dorothea Krook that Adam is "so to speak, a figure of the 
Just God of Judaism and Christianity as r,laggie is a figure of the Loving 
God".6 In fairness to Crews, I should add that he does not share this 
view: he reminds us that everything in the novel is observed through "one 
or another imperfect character", and thus "we ought to maintain a willingness 
to see some of the religious overtones as hypocritical or ironical." (p. 106) 
In the case of Adam, I should say that the overtones are completely ironical. 
As Crews says: 
Adam "created" the world that Charlotte, Amerigo, and Maggie 
inhabit; his money is the primum mobile of everything that happens 
in the novel. (p. 107) 
The obvious enough conclusion to be drawn from this (though Crews does not do 
so) is that "everything that happens in the novel" is thereby irredeemably 
tainted, If Adam's name has any relevanCe to his function in the novel, it 
lies, not in his "innocence", but in the fallen state of an Adam aspiring to 
be as God. Not that money is necessarily and by its very nature evil, as has 
long been taught for the chastisement of the rich and the consolation of the 
poor; but money as used by Adam Verver, for the acquisition and manipulation 
of human beings, is an instrument of evil - in Fanny Assingham's words if not 
quite in her sense, "Evil - with a very big E" (I, 385). 
In its mordant depiction of the ideal i sation of "material interests", 
The Golden Bowl, like its predecessor, invites comparison with Nostromo: but 
a closer parallel amongst Conrad's works may perhaps be found in "Heart of 
Darkness". Gabriel Pearson has compared these two works, but chiefly in order 
to establ ish what he regards as an essential difference between the two 
novelists: 
It is instructive to cite Conrad at this juncture as a novelist 
chronologically adjacent to James and technically sympathetic to 
him, who is yet operating through and beyond the illusions of the 
civilization that James's practice upholds. For Conrad, bourgeois 
civilization is sustained by power and protected by lies. To the 
6 The Ordeal of Consciousness, p. 286. I discuss Krook's long and 
scrupu'-ous analysis more fully later. 
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initiate into its underlying realities, it is a hollow cheat, one 
which it is, however deviously, the main impulse of his fiction 
to confess. The lie in James is sanctified by what it salvages 
and the disaster it postpones.? 
By my reading of the novel, the lie is exposed, not sanctified, and James' 
practice upholds neither the society that he depicts nor its illusions. It 
is true that the novel contains no equivalent to Kurtz's final pronouncement: 
the most obviously "Conradian" statement in the novel, the Prince's 
"Everything's terrible, cara - in the heart of man" (II, 349), is too 
heavily compromised by his own situation to be simply accepted as a judgement 
endorsed by the author. 8 It isin fa(;t symptomatic of the society presented 
by James that it contai!l§~Q protagonist with the insight and authority to 
~~------ ,,- --
proflounce on it. Instead of MarloW'S mus i[\gs or Kurtz's "The horror!" we have 
only Maggie's little pronouncement: "It's success, father." (II,366) 
But given what that success has been shown to consist of, the irony behind 
the statement is almost as devastating as Kurtz's outcry. We are once again 
reminded of Mrs Gould's reflections on success: 
There 0as something inherent in the necessities of successful 
action which carried with it the moral degradation of the idea. 9 
The Golden Bowl is the account of Maggie's "successful action", and its 
irony consistently expos~es- "the moral degradation of the idea": success is 
a matter of acqu i sit ion and control attended by self-ri ghteousness. If the 
Golden Bowl be broken - why, then "if there had been anything to hold [the 
pieces] the bowl might still quite beautifully, a few steps away, have passed 
for uninjured." (II, 182-3) The novel is concerned with, and sardonically 
critical of, the mechanism by which the bowl is held so as to pass quite 
beautifully for uninjured. 
The golden bowl stands, of course, for the superficially beautiful but 
essentially fl,awedr~_lati_~nships in the novel - notably, but not exclusively, 
the marria~,=-_~LMaggie and the Prince. This does not mean that James' 
7 "The novel to end all novels: The Golden BOWl" in The Air of Reality, 
ed. John Goode, p. 302. 
8 The statement does, of course, have a particular function in its 
context. I discuss this later. 
9 Nostromo, p. 521. 
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interest in his subject is limited to the exhaustive unpicking of a 
particular knot of relationships, isolated from any larger context: in 
spite of the meagre cast of characters and the severely truncated social 
spectrum, the novel achieves a range of reference comparable to that of 
"Heart of Darkness". 
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This wider perspective on the extremely limited action of the novel is 
introduced at the outset. Like "Heart of Darkness", the novel starts in 
London - starts, like Conrad's tale, on a complacent assessment of "the 
biggest, and the greatest, town on earth,,10: 
The Prince had always liked his London, when it had come to him; 
he was one of the Modern Romans V/ho find by the Thames a more 
convincing image of the truth of the ancient state than any they 
have I eft by the Ti ber. Brought up on the I egend of the City to 
which the world paid tribute, he recognised in the present London 
much more than in contemporary Rome the real dimensions of such a 
case. If it was a question of an Imperium, he said to himself, 
and if one wished, as a Roman, to recover a little the sense of 
that, the place to do so was on London Bridge . ... (I, 3) 
Like Conrad, James invites the -long historical view: the Prince, linked with 
the power of Rome both in its Imperial days, when London was one of its 
more dismal outposts, and in its days of a- corrupt but powerful papacy, when 
London was anathema - the Prince pays tribute to London, the New Rome, 
supreme in mil ita ry and economic power. Around him in the shop wi ndovls of 
Bond Street cluster "objects massive and lumpish, in silver and gold ... as 
tumbled together as if, in the insolence of the Empire, they had been the 
loot of far-off victories." (I, 3) 
But the Prince's pleasant historical reflections (he is clearly the 
least chauvinistic of Romans) are out of date: around him sprawls the London 
of Edward, not of Victoria. This may seem a mere quibble, but in a novel so 
centrally concerned with power, it is important to locate the source of 
power - and here it is not, as in Ihe >lings of the Dove, Victorian 
commercialism or "the insolence of the Empire": 
The new king, Edward VII, was not very interested in his Empire, 
and the Edwardian age n~ver did recapture the flair, conviction 
or vulgarity of the great enterprise . ... The Edwardian gentleman 
10 "Heart of Darkness", p. 45. 
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of England, though truly an ornament of western civilization, 
lacked the effrontery of Empire. 11 
This, of course, is not James's own emphasis, but it is the reality from 
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which the opening of his novel derives its irony. It is also implicit in the 
fact that the British presence in the novel is li~ited to Colonel Bob, his 
rank like a decoration won in a forgotten battle, and his role reduced to 
impotent spectatorship. The power of Empire is in fact yielding to a new 
power: "the power of the rich peoples" (I, 18). The irony is that the Prince 
does not realise that he has just yielded to it himself, in signing the 
contract (or treaty) drawn up by his lawyers and those of the Ververs. That 
he has sold his title and his name for an immense consideration he realises, 
of course, but he has as yet the vaguest of notions of what that consists of. 
"If it was a question of an Imperium, .•• and if one wished, as a Roman, to 
recover a little the sense of that ..• " - then perhaps one coul d do so at 
first hand by becoming one of the subject races. Not, of course that the 
Prince envisages his own sUbjection: ever adaptable, he is only too ready 
to enter a new era of history: 
What was it but history ... to have the assurance of the enjoyment 
of more money than the palace-builder himself could have dreamed 
of? (I, 10) 
The city to which the world, like the Prince, is to pay tribute is American 
City, which Adam Verver is already supplying with the "loot" of his own 
victories, the "insolence" of his conviction that "a world was left him to 
conquer and that he might conquer it if he tried." (I, 141) The conquest 
is to be benevolent, of course, and the conquered, like the Prince, are 
mainly left in pleased bewilderment at the high price they fetched. But the 
conquest is also absolute, as the Prince, not to mention Charlotte, is 
eventually to discover. 
These paints will be developed in due course; for the moment it is 
enough to note that this apparently self-enclosed domestic drama in fact 
deliberately extends the significance of the characters beyond themselves. 
At tines this is done quite explicitly: 
11 James ~lorri s, Fa relvell the Trumpets (1978; rpt. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1979), pp 105-06. 
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[Mr Verver] looked, at the top of his table, so nearly like a 
little boy shyly entertaining in virtue of some imposed rank, that 
he could only be one of the pOvlers, the representative of a force 
- quite as an infant king is the representative of a dynasty. 
(I, 324) . 
The mild aspect is, of course, deceptive: Mr Verver, having made it "the 
business of his future" to "rifle the Golden Isles" (I, 141) is well on his 
way towards establishing his own dynasty - complete with a Prince and a 
Principino to 
infant king: 
succeed him. "Stout Cortez" (I, 1411 with the demeanour of an 
the .ADJbjgu-i-tY.QLLRO.w~L:thj~.:t .can present itself as so 
benevolent, so innoc~Dt, so child-like, and yet can be so absolute in its 
domination, is.~entral to the novel. From this ambiguity derives much of the 
elusiveness of .the novel; for,-beguiled by the apparent benevolence of this 
power, all the characters pursue their various courses on the blithe 
assumption of their own freedom of action. And since we absorb their 
assumptions while we share their points of view, it takes us almost as long 
as it takes them to discover the illusory nature of their freedom, the limits 
of their silken halters. 
Adam's motives and criteria are expressed in some passages that are 
surprisingly explicit for a novel that as a rule eschews direct statement. 
It may be their very obviousness that has caused them to be so often 
explained away. The following extract, for instance, makes perfectly clear 
on just what basis Adam Verver accepted the Prince as his son-in-law: 
Representative precious objects, great ancient pictures and other 
works of art, fine eminent "pieces" in gold, in silver, in enamel, 
majolica, ivory, bronze, had for a number of years so multiplied 
themselves round him and, as a general challenge to acquisition 
and appreciation, so engaged all the faculties of his mind, that 
the instinct, the particular sharpened appetite of the collector, 
had fairly served as a basis for his acceptance of the Prince's 
sui t. 
Over and above the signal fact of the impression made on Maggie 
herself, the aspirant to his daughter's hand showed somehow the 
gr'eat marks and signs, stood before him with the high 
authenticities, he had learnt to look for in pieces of the first 
order. Adam Verver knew by this time, knew thoroughly; no man 
in Europe or in America, he privately believed, was for such 
estimates less capable of vulgar mistakes. (I, 140), 
That Adam should here be making one of the "vulgar mistakes" he fancies 
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himself immune to, could have been only an ironic example of common human 
proneness to error; but, apart from its hubristic element, the misjudgement 
is distinguished, say, from Isabel Archer's "generous mistake"12 or Catherine 
Sloper's naive infatuation in not originating in misplaced trust, but in the 
application of a non-human criterion to a human being. The parallel with 
Gilbert Osmond seems inescapable; but we surely do not even need such 
recourse to other novels to recognise in Verver's inability to distinguish 
between human beings and objects the most sinister manifestation of the 
"sharpened appetite of the collector". There is really nothing disinterested 
about his love of beauty: "representative precious objects" present 
themselves to him not as objects of delight or humble admiration, but as "a 
general challenge to acquisition and appreciation", presumably in that order. 
That this passion for possession should have engaged "all the faculties of 
his mind" suggests a pitch of materialism, a seriously impoverished humanity, 
that would seem to "place" Adam Verver, at least, too definitely for critical 
disagreement. In fact., of course, there are as many interpretations of Adam 
Verver as of everything else in the novel, which means that further 
illustration may not be entirely a labouring of the obvious. Here, for 
instance, are his criteria in selecting a wife: 
Nothing perhaps might affect us as queerer, had we time to look 
into it, than this application of the same measure of value to 
SllCh different pieces of property as old Persian carpets, say, and 
new human acquisitions; all the more indeed that the amiable man 
was not without an inkling on his own side that he was, as a taster 
of life, economically constructed. He put into his one little 
glass everything he raised to his 1 ips. '" As it had served him 
to satisfy himself, so to speak, both about Amerigo and about the 
Bernardino Luini he had happened to come to knowledge of at the 
time he was consenting to the announcement of his daughter's 
betrothal, so it served him at present to satisfy himself about 
Charlotte Stant and an extraordinary set of oriental tiles of which 
he had lately got wind. '" It was all at bottom in him, the 
aesthetic principle, planted where it could burn with a cold still 
flame; where it fed almost wholly on the material directly 
involved, on the idea (followed by appropriation) of plastic beauty, 
of the thing visibly perfect in its kind .... (I, 196-97) 
To be constantly surprised at the perversity of other critics is one of the 
12 The Portrait of a Lady, II, 417. 
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conditions of James criticism, but "nothing perhaps might affect us as 
queerer" than the critical reluctance to give due weight to such passages -
almost the only instances in the novel of James' intruding observations 
beyond the scope of his characters. t~atthiessen says merely that James "notes 
once that this collector applies 'the same measure of value to such different 
pieces of property as old Persian carpets ... and new human acquisitions,' 
but he never probes the implications of that anoma1y."13 Since, in fact, 
the whole novel .is a constant probing of "the implications of that anomaly", 
it is not surprising that Matthiessen should devote so much of his chapter 
to wondering why the novel is so unsatisfactory. 
Leavis duly notes the most explicit judgements passed on the Ververs, 
but concludes that 
though James can on occasion come to this point of explicitness, our 
attitude to the Ververs isn't meant to be ironical. He are to feel 
for and with them. ... That in our feelings about the Ververs 
there would be any element of distaste Henry J~~es, in spite of the 
passages quoted, seems to have had no inkling. 
The "passages quoted" seem to me to constitute considerably more than an 
"inkling" of distaste; for once James' intention seems relatively clear. 
As Joseph Firebaugh says in his brisk demolition of the Ververs, if "the 
'general moral background of the book' is offensive to readers as sensitive 
as ~lr. Leavis, that is because James wanted them to be offended by it. "15 
It may be unsafe to assume that what is offensive to Leavis was 
necessarily so intended by the offending author, but in this case there 
really would seem to be only one way of taking Adam Verver's "application of 
the same measure of value to such different 
carpets, say, and new human acquisitions". 
- though critics may lose theirs in reading 
pieces of property as old Persian 
James never lost his comic sense 
him, thereby missing also the 
13 The tft.ajor Phase, p. 100. Interestingly, in his chapter on The 
Amer"ican Scene Matthiessen quotes James' suspicion" 'of all attemptS;-
however gTittering and golden, to confound destroyers with benefactors'" 
(p. 110), without seeming to note its possible bearing on Adam Verver. 
14 Jhe Great Tradition, p. 178. 
15 "The Ververs", Essays in Cri1;icism, 4, No.4 (1954), 401. 
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serious purpose which the humour serves. It can hardly be conceived that 
James is asking us to admire, or even to regard as a harmless peculiarity, 
the grouping of Adam's prospective wife with "an extraordinary set of 
oriental tiles". But amusing as this anomaly is, its ruthless aspect is 
clearly enough implied by the ominous parenthesis in which we are told that 
Adam's "idea ... of plastic beauty" is necessarily "followed by appropriation". 
To see Adam's grossly materialistic aestheticism as the mainspring of 
the novel is not to suggest that the other characters are mere victims of 
this amoral power, any more than Kate Croy is a helpless victim of 11rs 
Lowder. They are only too willing to form part of Adam Verver's collection, 
believing that to be acquired is to be admitted to the seat of power. The 
Prince, having, as we have seen, assisted at the signing away of his freedom, 
complacently reflects on the symbolic value of a crank lowering an iron 
shutter over a display of "objects massive and lumpish" in Bond Street: 
There was machinery again, just as the plate glass, all about him, 
was money, was power, the power of the rich peoples. Well, he was 
of them now, of the rich peoples; he was on their side - if it 
was n't rather the p1easanter way of putting it that they ~Iere on 
his. (I, 17- 18) 
He is "of them", of course, mainly in being "theirs", and they are on 
his side only in the sense that all people are on the side of their 
possessions: they fight for them in the face of illegitimate claims, and 
protect them with plate glass and iron shutters. In this the wishes of the 
possessions are not consulted: they are emblems, not sharers of power. But 
Prince has no reason to pursue the implications of his at this stage the 
pleasant conceit: 
of money and pOlver. 
outside. 
it is enough for him to have been admitted to this realm 
So far, he has only seen the "machinery" from the 
The Prince is not even deterred, though he ~ vaguely puzzled, by his 
dim apprehension of the nature of his value for the Ververs: 
He had stood still, at many a moment of the previous month, with 
the thought, freshly determined or renewed, of the general 
expectation - to define it roughly - of which he was the subject. 
What was singular was that it seemed not so much an expectation 
of anything in particular as a large bland blank assumption of 
merits almost beyond notation, of essential quality and value. 
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It was as if he had been some old embossed coin, of a purity of 
gold no longer used, stamped with glorious arms, mediaeval, 
wonderful, of vlhich the "worth" in mere modern change, sovereigns 
and half-crowns, would be great enough, but as to which, since 
there were finer \~ays of using it, such taking to pieces was 
superfluous. That was the image for the security in which it was 
open to him to rest; he vIas to constitute a possession, yet was 
to escape being reduced to his component parts. What would this 
. mean but that practically he was never to be tried or tested? 
(I, 23) 
This sheds an ironic light on the Prince's belief that the rich are on his 
side as he is on theirs: the pleasant reciprocity of that formulation yields 
to the potentially disquieting realisation that "he was to constitute a 
possession". The Prince is not unduly discomfited by this, relying 
complacently on the Ververs' sense of his "essential quality and value" to 
see him through. But the image of the coin, "wonderful" though it be, is 
1 ess fl a tteri ng even than the equa t i on of "new human acqu i s it ions" wi th "old 
Persian carpets". The coin is, paradoxically, useful to the Ververs only 
because it is "no longer used": his value to these people, who have more 
"mere modern change" than they can sensibly spend, resides in his quaint 
impotence, the decorative and historical value of "glorious arms" that no 
longer signify any real power. His own power as a Prince of an antique 
civilisation has become, like the rest of his value as a morceau de ,"usee, 
best appreciated in a room of the British r~useum, to which his wife pays 
proprietary visists (it is the sole inconvenience of the Prince's impoverished 
state that he has become separated from his certificate of authenticity). 
But again the Prince does not scrutinise his own figures of speech. 
Furthermore, he overlooks the fact that he is entering into a contract with 
a business man who did not become a millionaire on the strength of his 
American innocence alone. Adam Verver is too astute to hang on to a bad 
investment, as a later modification of the coin image indicates. The Prince, 
having drifted into adultery with Charlotte, finds more of the business man 
and less of the art collector in the mild gaze of his father-in-law: 
This directed regard rested at its ease, but it neither 1 ingered 
nor penetrated, and was, to the Prince's fancy, much of the same 
order as any glance directed, for due attention, from the same 
quarter, to the figure of a cheque received in the course of 
business and about to be enclosed to a banker. It made sUI'e of 
the amount - and just so, from time to time, the amount of the 
Prince was certified. (I, 324-25) 
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Adam Verver is, as it were, biting the antique coin assessingly; but the 
substitution of the image of the cheque for that of the coin introduces a 
more disquieting implication: the Prince realises that Mr Verver, for all 
his aesthetic fervour, would soon notice if his investment ceased to yield 
a healthy return. Later, looking at the shattered fragments of the golden 
bowl, the Prince asks Maggie: "But shall you at least get your money back?" 
(II, 198) He should know that the Ververs always get their money back. 16 
Charlotte, too, initially makes the mistake of assuming that because 
Mr Verver's use of her is so convenient to her, she has not sacrificed any 
freedom of will in consenting to be used. Like the Prince, she seems to 
think that Mr Verver's power is transferred to his possessions. 
Our first view of Charlotte after her marriage finds her glittering 
triumphantly at the grandest of official functions: 
She was herself in truth crowned, and it all hung together, melted 
together, in light and colour and sound: the unsurpassed diamonds 
that her head so happily carried, the other jewels, the other 
perfections of aspect and arrangement that made her personal 
scheme a success, the proved private theory that materials to work 
with had been all she required and that there were none too 
precious for her to understand and use - ·to which might be added 
lastly, as the strong-scented flower of the total sweetness, an 
easy command, a high enjoyment, of her crisis. (1,246) 
She is waiting for the Prince, \~ho has, "as in common kindness bound" 
(I, 245), seen his wife off to return to her father, and who "his duty 
performed, would know where to find her." Charlotte, of course, finds this 
distribution of couples, "crisis" though it may be, highly satisfactory, 
adding piquancy to the "success" of her "personal scheme". That there is 
an incongruity in her enjoyment both of Adam's riches and of his son-in-law 
does not seem to occur to her, because she can sti 11 see her presentgl ory 
as the outcome of her "personal scheme". In fact, of course, we know that 
she is throughout subject to Adam's personal scheme, or his "idea", as he 
calls it ("Isn't a man's idea usually what he does marry for?" - I, 224). 
The worker and the worked still derive their respective benefits from the 
16 In this, of course, they resemble Mrs Lowder: "'She'll get back,' 
[Lord Mark] pleasantly said, 'her money.'" (The Wings of the Dove, I, 160) 
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mutually satisfactory arrangement - Maggie and her father are presumably as 
happy at home as Charlotte and the Prince are at the reception. 
Charlotte's short-sightedness consists in an inability to see that the 
"materia1s·to work with" granted to her, precious as they are, are merely 
decorations embellishing the human materials Mr Verver works with - of which 
there are truly none too precious for him to understand and use. In acting, 
as she does here, under the illusion of freedom, she overlooks the fact that 
she, too, is merely a "representative precious object", subject ultimately 
to Mr Verver's control. The success of his personal scheme ("It's success, 
father") will eventually require her removal to America. 
Thus the Prince a~.<!._~~~~!otteare quite will ing to be mage,use of, 
because,J;.!lE'!L CaJlflot.,as.yeLse.e ... theuse that is to be. ma.de of them as 
incompatibJe .. l'ii.lb th,!!\lseJhey intend to make of their situation. Yet their 
complicity does not exculpate Mr Verver; his· standard of judgement determines 
the participants in the stifling domestic drama that he sponsors and directs, 
and his "idea" animates it throughout. Maggie, of course. holds herself 
responsible, her culpability consisting of getting married. This, however. 
is hardly reprehensible in itself, and in any case could not have happened 
without Adam's sanction. But the more important pOint is that the crucial 
step in establishing the intolerable situation is Adam's marriage to 
Charlotte, which. though to an extent engineered by Maggie, is unequivocally 
presented as his independent decision. That decision. of course, is taken 
in the interests of "putting his child at peace" -
'" and the way to put her at peace was to provide for his future 
- that is for hers - by marriage, by a marriage as good, speaking 
proportionately, as hers had been. (I, 208). 
If, as I have argued. Adam Verver's power owes part of its insidiousness 
to the compliance of its subjects, a further. and perhaps more potent reason 
for its paralysing efficacy lies in the fact that it clothes itself in the 
shining robes of righteousness. Mr Verver, "caring for precious vases only 
less than for precious daughters" (I, 188). can persuade himself that this 
one non-aesthetic passion of his 1ife 17 justifies any use to which he puts 
17 To see this quotation as implying a non-aesthetic basis to his love 
for Maggie is to give him the benefit of the doubt as to whether he 
distinguishes between his daughter and his vases in terms of kind or degree 
of preciousness. 
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whatever material, human or otherwise, presents itself for his acquisition: 
He had seen that Charlotte could contribute - what he had n't seen 
was what she could contribute to. When it. had all supremely 
cleared up and he had simply settled this service to his daughter 
well before him as the proper direction of his young friend's 
leisure, the cool darkness had again closed round him, but his moral 
lucidity was constituted. (1, 208) 
The aesthetic in Mr Verver, we note, does not preclude the utilitarian: he 
saw, as it were, Charlotte's usefulness before he saw her use. What he now 
sees her as able "to contribute to" is, of course, the greater domestic 
snugness of the Ververs. The cool insolence with which he "simply settle[s] 
this service to his daughter as the proper direction of his young friend's 
leisure" reduces Charlotte to a mere instrument. 
presumably consists of his complacent assumption 
his daughter's service is shining selflessness: 
His "moral lucidity" 
that his use of others in 
To think of just lately 
impossible. 
his child. 
it merely for himself would have been, even as he had 
felt, even doing all justice to·that condition - yes, 
But there was a grand difference in thinking of it for 
(I, 208 - 09) 
The irony in that last sentence, concluding Adam's rationalisation (and the 
chapter) with a slight swagger, is surely at Adam's expense. The se1f-
satisfied little nod with which he has settled that selfishness on his own 
account would have been "- yes, impossible", is undercut by the strong placing 
of "for his child": intended to make the "grand difference" between 
unthinkable selfishness and admirable selflessness, it only succeeds in echoing 
with an effect of identification, "for himself." For Adam, the two may well 
come to the same thing. At any rate, Maggie presents herself to him insistently 
as an extension of himself, "his child" (in the course of the paragraph just 
quoted, Maggie is referred to twice as "his child" and Once as "his daughter"). 
This extension of the parental self to the child is common enough, but in 
Adam it reaches the point of a complete identification of Maggie's own 
interests with his. The Prince discovers something of this in his reflections 
on the "services" Mr Verver has rendered him in his married life. His 
insights are worth holding on to in our reading of the second volume of the 
novel, in which the Prince is not to be given a hearing: 
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Hr Verver then in a word took care of his relation to Maggie as he 
took care, and apparently always would, of everything else. He 
relieved him of all anxiety about his married life in the same 
manner in which he relieved him on the score of his bank-account. 
And as he performed the latter office by communicating with the 
bankers, so the former sprang as directly from his good understanding 
with hi s daughter. Thi sunders tandi ng had, wonderfull y - tha t ~Ias 
in high evidence - the same deep intimacy as the commercia~the 
financial association founded, far down, on a community of interest. 
Those people ... were of the same large lucky group, as one 
might say; they were all at least of the same general species and 
had the same general instincts; they hung together, they passed 
each other the word, they spoke each other's language, they did 
each other "turns." (I, 292 - 93) 
This "large lucky group", then, but more specifically here Adam and Maggie 
Verver, can advance their "community of interest" in the beautiful belief 
that they are being selfless. Whereas selfishness in its more obvious forms 
is frowned upon, in the hallowed disguise of parental love it fills 
everybody, including those who practise it, with admiration. This is part 
of the aura of "goodness" tha t surrounds - and conceals - Adam, part, perhaps 
of the "great white curtain", the "white mist" which obscures, for the Prince, 
"the s ta te of mi nd of hi s new friends" - "that .e I ement of the impenetrable 
which alone slightly qualified his sense of his good fortune." The Prince, 
native of a country of darker but more straightforward intrigue, having 
"never known curtains but as purple even to blackness - but as producing 
where they hung a darkness intended and ominous", is at a disadvantage in 
this realm of "light, concealing as darkness conceals". (1,22-23) 
This ambiguous image, reminiscent of the illusory value of light in 
"Heart of Darkness", is central to the ironic inversion at the heart of the 
novel, whereby evil is perpetrated in the name and guise of traditionally 
hallowed values. Thus Adam's illumination as to Charlotte's proper use 
("the idea shone upon him" - I, 208) is preceded by an extraordinary 
hallucination on the terrace of Fawns: 
Light broke for him at last. just then the autumn night seemed 
whole place, everything round him 
strange midnight sun .... 
He was afterwards to recall 
to clear to a view in which 
... lay there as under some 
••. The sharp point to which all his light converged was 
how 
the 
that the whole call of his future to him as a father would be in 
his so managing that Maggie would less and less appear to herself 
to have forsaken him. (I, 207 - 08) 
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The light, then. is intimately associated with the elaborate "idea" in terms 
of which ~laggie will be deceived (in the highest of causes) and Charlotte 
will be used (in the same cause). Like that light, his "moral lucidity" is 
an hallucination. Adam is not the only creature of this deceptive light -
light permeates the novel - but he is, as it were, at the heart of light, 
unfathomable, impenetrable, the God, to recall Crews' formulation, of this 
"tiny world". 
The fact that the light surrounding t1r Verver "conceals as darkness 
conceals" effectively hides the true nature of his power, even from himself. 
Thus Adam's career is neatly, if misleadingly, described in terms of a 
progress from darkness to light: 
It was the strange scheme of things again: the years of darkness 
had been needed to render possible the years of light. (I, 144) 
The years of darkness comprise not only his years of toil and cultural 
benightedness, but also the years spent with the wife whose influence, he 
reflects with covert satisfaction, had been "in the strange. scheme of things, 
as promptly removed." (I, 143) The strange scheme of things has been good 
to ~Ir Verver: 
A wiser hand than he at first knew had kept him hard at acquisition 
of one sort as a perfect preliminary to acquisition of another .... 
(I, 144) 
We have seen the extent of this second kind of acquisitiveness; but what is 
more striking here is the blandness with which this acquisitive power is 
referred to a higher hand, how Adam's interests are seen as sanctioned by a 
beneficent scheme of things. 
The apparen t beneficence of Mr Verver' s power is admi red by a 11 who come 
into contact with it - not surprisingly, since so many of them benefit 
personally by it. But Mr Verver's bounty receives more than the tribute 
usually paid to generosity by its beneficiaries: it figures as a force from 
which a more comprehensive virtue emanates. Thus the Prince foresees in his 
alliance with this great new power, apparently so different from the often 
corrupt power of his ancestors, a moral regeneration, a belated purification 
of the taint of his race: 
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What was his frank judgement of so much of its ugliness, he asked 
himself, but a part of the cultivation of humility? What was this 
so important step he had just taken but the desire for some new 
history that should, so far as possible, contradict, and even if 
need be flatly dishonour, the old? If what had come to him 
would n't do he must make something different. He perfectly 
recognised - always inifiTs humility - that the material for the 
making had to be Mr Verver's millions. (I, 16) 
The vices that he is so ready to disown, we have just been told, are 
"arrogance and greed". The Prince's "good faith", which he later so sincerely 
defends to Maggie, in this instance consists of the reasonable belief that 
with Mr Verver's millions at his disposal he will escape these vices, because 
they wi 11 not be necessary. Hi s humil i ty cons i sts of the recognit i on that 
his only way of not being greedy is to have enough money - and his concept of 
enough is truly princely. 
Mr Verver is probably not to be held responsible for this odd 
interpretation of humility and its attendant virtues. It is merely one of 
the comfortable illusions made possible by his mild omnipotence, so different 
from the horrid excess of, for instance, "the wicked Pope, the monster most 
of all" 0, 10) whom Maggie, with considerably less humility than the Prince, 
finds so picturesque a part of the history of her fascinating new acquisition. 
One wonders, though, what beautiful sanctions, even sanctifications, the 
wicked Pope extended to himself and his allies, in the name of his sacred 
office. 
We are shown, in any case, what extraordinary self-delus'ions the Ververs 
foster, in others as in themselves. Adam and Maggie's belief that their 
devotion to each other is an absolute value sanctioning anything done in its 
name, contaminates everybody drawn into its sphere of influence. The Prince 
and Charlotte, for reasons of their own, find that the arrangement beautifully 
suits them, not only in terms of the opportunities provided them, but also in 
terms of the amiable light it sheds on their adultery: 
" ..• Tender as I am for her too," she went on, "I think I'm still 
more so for my husband. He's in truth of a sweet simpl icity - !" 
The Prince turned over---a-While the sweet simpl icity of ~1r Vet'ver. 
"Well, I don't know that I can choose. At night all cats are grey. 
I only see hOI", for so many reasons, we ought to stand tOl"ard them 
- and how, to do ourselves justice, we do. It represents for us a 
conscious care - " 
"Of every hour, literally," said Charlotte. She could rise to 
the highest measure of the facts. "And for which \'ie must trust 
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each other - !" 
"Oh as we trust the saints in glory. Fortunately," the Prince 
hastened to add, "we can." With which, as for the full assurance 
and the pledge it involved, each hand instinctively found the other. 
"It's all too wonderful." 
Firmly and gravely she kept his hand. "It's too beautiful." 
And so for a minute they stood together as strongly held and as 
closely confronted as any hour of their easier past even had seen 
them •••. "It's sacred," he said at last. 
"It's sacred," she breathed back to him .... Their lips sought 
their lips, their pressure their response and their response their 
pressure; with a violence that had sighed itself the next moment 
to the longest and deepest of stillnesses they passionately sealed 
their pledge. (I,311-12) 
The Ververs can clearly not be held responsible for the cloud of blasphemous 
euphoria on which their spouses waft beatifically into adultery. The Prince 
and Charlotte are all too evidently parading their contempt for the "sweet 
simpl icity" of the Ververs as "sacred" sol icitude; and in so far as the 
"pledge" which they seal so passionately constitutes anything beyond the 
occasion for an embrace, it amounts to an agreement not to let the Ververs 
find out the lengths to which they have taken their conjugal duties. But if 
the Prince and Charlotte are exploiting the situation and violating the 
vocabulary of righteousness, it remains a situation created by the Ververs. 
"Wonderful" and "beautiful" are the epithets, we remember, bestowed by 
Charlotte upon Adam's "idea" at the time of his proposal - the idea that she 
is now using to justify her adultery. Thus Adam's "beautiful and wonderful" 
idea leads to the "wonderful" and "beautiful" union of his wife and his son-
in-law; the devotion of father and daughter provides an absolute for others 
whereby to justify their actions. 
By a trick of perspective, everybody in the novel seems blameless - a 
point of view that Fanny Assingham valiantly defends in the face of her 
husband's scepticism. Her unintentionally comic analysis reduces to 
absurdity the moral position of all the main actors: 
"Are the 'forms' you speak of - that are two thirds of conduct -
what will be keeping [Charlotte] now, by your hypothesis, from 
coming home with [the Prince] till morning?" 
"Yes - absolutely. Their forms." 
'''Theirs' - ? 
"Maggie's and Mr. Verver's - those they impose on Charlotte and 
the Prince. Those,· she developed, "that so perversely, as I say, 
have succeeded in setting themselves up as the right ones." 
He conSidered - but only now at last really to relapse into woe. 
·Your 'perversity,' my dear, is exactly what I don't understand. 
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The state of things existing has. n't grown, like a field of 
mushrooms, in a night. Whatever they, all round, may be in for 
now is at least the consequence of what they've done. Are they 
mere helpless victims of fate?" --
Well, Fanny at last had the courage of it. "Yes - they are. 
To be so abjectly innocent - that is to be victims of fate." 
"And Charlotte and the Prince are abjectly innocent - ?" 
It took her another minute, but she rose to the full height. 
"Yes. That is they were - as much so in their way as the others. 
There were beautiful----ri1tent ions a 11 round. The Pri nce' sand' 
Charlotte's were beautiful - of that I had my faith. They were -
I'd go to the stake. Otherwise,-n--sFie added, "I should haveoeen 
a wretch. Il,nd I've not been a wretch. I've onl y been a daub 1 e-
dyed donkey." 
"Ah then," he asked, "what does our muddle make them to have 
been?" --
"Well, too much taken up with considering each other. You may 
call such.a mistake as that by whatever name you please; it at any 
rate means, all round, their case. It illustrates the misfortune," 
said Mrs. Assingham gravely, "of being too, too charming." 
(I, 391-92) 
The "abject innocence" with which Fanny credits everybody consists at most 
of an absence of deliberate malice; it is perfectly compatible with 
appointing other people to one's own use. Thus the "beautiful intentions 
all round" amount mainly to a belief that the situation should be as pleasant 
to others as it is to oneself. If these p~ople are "too much .taken up with 
considering each other", that is only because for a long time they can bel ieve 
that the interests of others are identical with their own. When it 
transpires that this is not necessarily the case, the "misfortune of being 
too, too charming" turns out to be no 1 ighter than the misfortune of being 
downright nasty. It is simply rendered more insidious by its air of 
righteousness. 
If I have been stressing this point unduly, this is because it seems to 
me so central to the ironic strategy of the novel. James is dramatising 
something more subtle than hypocrisy: he is rendering the perversion of 
values resulting from the new-found power of money being combined with a 
Puritan heritage, the conquest by philanthropy that was such a strong feature 
of the rampant success of America. Like Conrad's Holroyd, Verver is a breed 
of man with "the temperament of a Puritan and an insatiable imagination of 
conquest";18 but vlhere, in t·lrs Gould's vlords, Holroyd "looked upon his Ol'in 
18 Nostromo, p. 76. 
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God as a sort of influential partner, who gets his share of profits in the 
endowment of churches" (p. 71), and in his own words, he was working for the 
"purer forms of Christianity" (p. 80), for Verver it is "the passion for 
perfection at any price" that represents "the rel igion he ~lished to propagate" 
(I, 146). Mr Verver, in short, is recognisably the robber baron turned 
philanthropist to whom America owes so many of its cultural and religious 
institutions. 
James was quite as aware as his critics of the discrepancy between the 
large philanthropic gesture and the means that made it possible; if we need 
more explicit proof of this than is offered by The Golden Bowl, we have it 
in The Ambassadors, in the pointed ironies at the expense of Wool lett's high 
moral tone. To complain that "Mr. Verver's moral tone is far more like that 
of a benevolent Swedenborgian than it is like that of either John D. Rockefeller 
or Jay Goul d" 19 is to ignore the fact tha t it was Quenti n Anderson, not James, 
who turned Mr Verver into a Swedenborgian. 20 Similarly, to see him as "a 
visionary figure, eloquent of the difference betlveen the American mill'ionaire 
as he was and as James would have liked him to be" and then to complain that 
he is "improbable",21 seems unfair to James, when Verver is in fact quite 
"probable" as a heightened depiction of the American millionaire "as he was" 
- that is, a financially unscrupulous manipulator conspicuously returning a " 
small part of his gains to the community he gained it from. As Caroline Gordon 
says, though apparently intending it as a 'compliment to Verver, "He is the 
spiritual ancestor of the philanthropists of our day".22 
Maggie is the second-generation heir to this ethos, which is to say that 
she is far enough removed from the actual business of making money not to 
take cognisance of what it entails, and close enough to the maker of money to 
experience, without fully understanding, the kind of power required to amass 
19 Matthiessen, p. 90. 
20 The American Henry James (London: John Calder, 1958). 
21 John Bayley, The Characters of Love (London: Constable, 1960), p. 249. 
22 "Mr. Verver, Our National Hero", Sewanee Review, 63 (1955), 35. In 
the same approving vein Gordon notes thaC"Mr. Verver was tempted to take the 
little English church he so admired back to America.n City long before John D. 
Rockefeller II thought of transplanting a mediaeval abbey to the heights 
above the Hudson." (p. 35) It seems worth risking an intentional fallacy 
to wonder, as Gordon does not, what James woul d have thought of such an 
enterpri se. 
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such wealth. Her half of the novel dramatises, amongst but in relation to 
other things, her growing understanding of that power, and her successful 
suppression of her own understanding - an understanding not only of her father, 
but of what she has inherited from him, spiritually speaking. We are given 
the apparatus with which to defend ourselves against the distortions 
attendant upon this process of vision-and-revision, but we have to bring it 
with us from the first volume. Thus to believe, like Nicola Bradbury, that 
"Maggie, at least, we must trust, if we are to follow the novel at all" ,23 
is to grasp at a particularly flimsy straw, and to ignore one half of the 
novel that we are trying to follow. It also assumes that James abandons his 
ironic mode in the middle of his novel. 
In the first place, the first volume makes clear the extent to which 
Maggie is the child of her father's spirit, and shares his passion for 
collecting. We should perhaps not take too seriously her bantering assertion 
that it was the Prince's value as a morceau de musee that had attracted her 
in the first place, but she certainly shares her father's view of him as an 
acquisition, rather quaintly furnished with histories and traditions. We 
have Fanny Assingham's recollection of how Maggie's much-vaunted 
"romanticism" (a trait she shares with her .father) responded to the discovery 
of the Prince"s first name: 
" The connexion became romantic for Maggie the moment she 
it in; she filled out, in a flash, every link that might be 




Fanny finds this "a lovely note for the candour of the Ververs", which only 
shows how determined she is to see everything the Ververs do in the best 
possible light. A more disinterested observer might have reflected that a 
veneration for "old" names is supposed to be practised by corrupt Europeans 
rather than by democratic Americans. But the Ververs, of course, are no 
democrats, in spite of Adam's dedication to releasing the "grateful 
23 The Later Novels, p. 194. Bradbury sees Maggie's authority as "based 
upon this: that tneprocess is analogous for heroine and reader." How, given 
such an assumption, does one read "Daisy Miller", "The Aspern Papers", "The 
Liar", "The Turn of the Screw" - to mention only a few of the tales which 
require the l'eader to dissociate himself from the narrator/centre of 
consciousness? 
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thirsty millions" of his countrymen from "the bondage of ugliness" (1, 145). 
No democrat takes such delight in his or her ability to produce a Principino 
(I cannot recall a single occurrence of the titled infant's real name, but it 
is bound to be Amerigo). For American purposes, Amerigo must take precedence 
even of Columbus on the social register. Matthiessen makes the sound point 
that "Prince Amerigo's name symbolizes how he must be a re-discoverer of 
America, or of wha t may prove even ha rder, of Ameri cans"; 24 he coul d have 
added that this time, in fact, the Americans discover - and annex - Amerigo. 
Of course, this is not the sole ground of the Prince's appeal: he is 
also a very attractive man, and Maggie is sincerely susceptible to his virile 
charm. Nevertheless, 
she never admired him so much, or so found him heartbreakingly 
handsome, clever, irresistible, in the very degree in which he had 
originally and fatally dawned upon her, as when she saw other women 
reduced to the same passive pulp that had then begun, once for all, 
to constitute her substance. (r, 165). 
The tendency to see the value of her possessions enhanced by the envy of 
others hardly sets Maggie apart from the rest of humanity; but it does provide 
an ironic perspective on her moral posturings in the second volume of the 
novel. Her outraged reaction to her discovery of the Prince's infidelity 
disregards what the first volume suggests: that Charlotte does not so much 
alienate the Prince from Maggie as renew ~1aggie's interest in the Prince. 
~laggie's aesthetic appreciation of the Prince is quite happily compatible 
with hi s bei ng admi red by the rest of the \'lOrl d - unt i 1 she is forced to 
realise that her morceau de musee is capable of feeling neglected by his 
rightful owner and reciprocating the interest of an appreciative outsider. 
Then her sexual appreciation of him is startled into possessive self-assertion. 
Thus Maggie is, no less than any other character, a victim of her own 
inadequately considered "good faith". Even in the first volume, the trust 
she places in the Prince is easily, and we feel not unfairly, interpreted by 
him as a kind of complacent obtuseness. Whatever his motives, we can see the 
point of his resentment at 
24 The Major Phase, p. 88. 
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the extraordinary substitute for perception that presided, in the 
bosom of his wife, at so contented a vie~1 of his conduct and course 
- a state of mind that was positively like a vicarious good 
conscience cultivated ingeniously on his behalf •.. (I, 333) 
In the second volume, of course, this "substitute for perception" yields to 
the real thing. as far as the Prince's "conduct and course" is concerned. 
But this arguably leads merely to the ingenious cultivation of a "good 
conscience" on behalf of her father and herself. 
Initially she does seem capable of realising that her and her father's 
neglect of their marriage partners stemmed from exactly the same preference 
for each other's company as that shown by the Prince and Charlotte. "Hhat if 
I've abandoned them, you know?", she asks herself (II, 25) - but nevertheless 
proceeds to act 1 i ke a wronged wi fe. Or rather, and worse, she starts to 
abstain very self-consciously from acting like a ~lronged wife. Her vague 
real isation of her own responsibility is soon dissipated in hel' growing 
awareness that the Prince and Charlotte "were treating her, that they were 
proceeding with her - and for that matter with her father - by a plan that 
was the exact counterpart of her own." (I I, 41) 
Hitherto, of course, the compatibil ity of her plans (for instance the 
plan of marrying off her father to Charlotte) with theirs has not struck her, 
because it has not occurred to her that they may have plans of their own. 
Unders tandab ly, she does not enjoy the s i tuat i on of being dea It with, where 
she had imagined herself to be the one doing the dealing: 
••• she sat there in the solid chamber of her helplessness as in 
a bath of benevolence artfully prepared for her ... (11,44) 
Maggie has apparently already forgotten her eal'l ier qualms at having 
abandoned them: she is only aware that "Amerigo and Charlotte were arranged 
together" (II, 45), without asking herself who arranged them thus, and for 
what PU1-pose. 
~1aggi e' s \~ay of dea 1 i n9 wi th the bath of benevo 1 ence is not so much to 
get out of it as to pull everybody else into it, while trying not to make too 
much of a splash. The performance has something comical, not to say childish, 
about it. A good example of her over-ingenuity are the compl icatians she 
creates al-ound hey' and her father's nalve plan to "do something lovely" 
together" (I, 46), that is, go off to Europe, leaving the Prince and Charlotte 
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to mind the baby. Under the circumstances, even she now recognises that this 
would constitute "a last expression of an ecstasy of confidence" (II, 47). 
She cannot tell her father this, since she is determined that "I must do 
everything ... without letting papa see what I do - at least till it's done" 
(II, 38), like a little girl knitting her father a pair of socks for Christmas. 
She nevertheless realises that his silence about the project could constitute 
"proof conclusive that he too was n't at ease" (II, 48); but when he 
eventually does dispose of the scheme on the grounds that "it's getting so 
pleasant here" (11,53), she fails to accept this as the proof that she has 
been dreading. She tries, instead, to pass it off as, of all things, her 
father's reluctance to leave the Prince - "It's not to leave you, my dear -
for that he'll give up anything .... " (I I, 57) 
Maggie obviously does n't believe this, nor can she really expect the 
Prince to: in so far as her elaborate fantasy is intelligible at all, it is 
a manifestation 
was." (II, 57) 
of "the throb of her deeper need to know where she 'really' 
She Vlants to see whi ch way the Pri nce wi 11 jump, and he is 
trying to refrain from jumping. In the event he goes one better than Maggie, 
involving Charlotte as well in the conspiracy of benevolence by suggesting 
that she should convey to her husband Maggie's suggestion that the two men 
should go off to Europe together. This is perfectly in keeping with the 
former understanding, whereby each member of the foursome was figured as 
amenable to common use. But r~aggie has changed the rules; now that it has 
been brought home to her that Charlotte has an identity distinct from that 
granted to her by the Verver view of her usefulness, it is no longer 
permissible for the Prince to invoke her as casually as this: 
" The only person either of us needs is the other of us; so 
why as a matter of course in such a case as this drag in Charlotte?" (II,76). 
If their need of each other had indeed been so exclusive of others, Maggie 
would hardly have suggested to her husband that he take her father off for a 
holiday. Furthermore, since her plan also entails depriving Charlotte of ~er 
husband, it would seem natural to "drag in Charlotte". Not that this is 
necessarily the Prince's reasoning; but his dissembling at least assumes 
a rational guise. 
It is left to Adam to extricate himself from a European tOUl' with his 
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son-in-law, and all of them from the toils of Maggie's ingenuity, without 
giving the lie to the unaminous professions of devotion: 
The point he made was his lack of any eagerness to put time and 
space, on any such scale, between himself and his wife .... 
Therefore unless it was for the Prince himself -! (II, 89) 
Upon which poor Maggie is left with the alternatives of seeming to imply 
either that her husband is eager to get away from her, or that he has somehow 
developed a tremendous desire for his father-in-law's company. All she can 
do is to deny, at any rate, the first possibility: 
UOh I don't think it would have been for Amerigo himself. Amerigo 
and I ... perfectly rub on together." 
"Well then there we are." 
"I see" - and she had again with sublime blandness assented. 
"There we are." (II, 89) 
Where they are is exactly where they were, all avidly vlatching one another, 
having gone round in a futile circle to the crack of Maggie's whip. 
In its apparently needless elaboration of obscure motives this 
comparatively trivial incident would seem t6 represent late-Jamesian subtlety 
at its most infuriating; but we must distinguish between James' own over-
elaborateness and the self-defeating subtlety of his main character. 
Admittedly the distinction is not always self-evident; but in this instance, 
Maggie's "ingenuity" is explicitly presented as such, and serves as a 
cautionary example for the reader of the extraordinary mental processes at 
whose mercy he will be for the rest of the novel. Maggie is all the time, Ive 
need reminding, acting on the conviction "that she must never intermit for a 
solitary second her so highly undertaking to prove [to Adam] there was nothing 
the matter with her." (iI, 79-80) Since she has already recognised that 
his change of mind about their projected trip signals at least a suspicion 
on his part, her "proof" consists only pf a refusal to admit to her father 
what he suspects anyway. Since, furthermore, her way of hiding her feelings 
consists of proposing a plan for which she can advance no sensible reason, it is 
more likely to arouse suspicion than to allay it. And since Adam refrains 
from asking her the obvious question of what on earth she has in mind, it 
should be finally clear to her that he does know something. Throughout, she 
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feats of manipulation, not stopping to consider that the whole absurd 
situation has been set up by her. 
195 
What this means is that Maggie is suffering from delusions of martyrdom: 
not only is she being imposed upon, she is also nobly sparing her father the 
knowledge. What she does not recognise, is that every practical decision 
taken, is taken by her supposedly ignorant father: he decides that he and 
Maggie will not go on their European trip; he decides that nor will he and 
the Prince do so; he takes the whole family to Fawns, and, having established 
his mastery over Charlotte, takes her into exile in America'n City. All Maggie 
can do is to protect, ever more desperately, her own cherished image of her 
"divine" (II, 81) father by preventing any open confrontation from taking 
place. Whatever her "good faith" (and whatever that may be worth in a novel 
~Ihere everybody claims to have it), she is guilty of wilful blindness to her 
father's true nature - partly ·to protect her idealised view of him, and 
partly to preserve her belief in the righteousness of her own actions. If 
she ~Iere to open her eyes to what her father does know, and thus to the 
callousness that sits under his impeccable whit.e waistcoat, she could not 
face herself. 
Thus we repeatedly see t~aggie shirking the more and more awful question 
of what Adam actually knows. Fanny has said about Maggie that "She'll. know 
- about her father; everything." (II, 136) Fanny is not always right, of 
course, but in this case we do feel that Maggie knows more than she is 
prepared to acknowledge: 
No other name was to be spoken, and Mrs. Assingham had taken that 
without delay from her eyes - with a discretion still that fell 
short but by an inch. "You know how he feels." 
Maggie at this then slowly matched her headshake. "I know 
nothing." 
"You know how you feel." 
But again she aenied it. "I know nothing. If I did - !" 
"Well, if you did?" Fanny asked as she faltered. 
She had had enough, however, "I should die," she said as she 
turned away. (II, 304-05) 
~laggi e does not, we note, deny the identity of feel i n9 that Fanny by 
implication ascribes to her and her father; instead she pleads ignorance as 
to her own feelings as well as to his - because to admit to one would be to 
admit to the other, and would destrby the basis of her actions. 
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Adam's power, from her identification with him: 
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He was strong - that was the great thing. He was sure - sure for 
himself always, whatever his idea: the expression of that in him 
had somehow never appeared more identical with his proved taste 
for the rare and the true .•.. The sense that he was n't a failure, 
and could never be, purged their predicament of every meanness .... 
was n't it because now also, on his side, he was thinking of her as 
his daughter, was trying her, during these mute seconds, as the 
child of his blood? Oh then if she was n't with her little 
conscious passion the child of any weakness, what was she but 
strong enough too? It swelled in her fairly; it raised her 
higher, higher: she was n't in that case a failure either - had n't 
been, but the contrary; his strength was her strength, her pride 
was his, and they were decent and competent together. This was all 
in the answer she finally made him. 
"I believe in you more than anyone." (II, 274-75) 
This ends on another of those embraces with which various pacts, most of them 
deceitful, are sealed in this novel. In this case, the embrace marks Maggie's 
'undertaking never to allow herself to cease to believe in her father - that 
is, never to fathom her father's motives. 
The passage makes clear why her idealisation of her father is so 
necessary to her self-esteem: "his strength was her strength", which implies 
also the moral val idation of her actions: "they were decent and competent 
together." In him is contained their whole value system, based as it is on 
his "proved taste for the rare and true"; to question that would be to 
question the moral validity of their power over the Prince and Charlotte. 
This dependence on her belief in her father explains the discrepancy 
between her cIa im to Fanny to know nothi ng of how her father feels, <l.nd her 
demons tra ted ab il i ty to see through his eyes and to reconstruct hi s thought 
processes. The mos t famous ins tance of thi s abil ity is, of course, tile 
chilling vision, shortly after her declaration of faith in her father, of 
Charlotte's being led by "a long silken halter looped round her beautiful 
neck." (II, 287) This is followed by the sinister little speech she 
"overhears" : 
"Yes, you see - I lead her now by the neck, I lead her to her 
doom, and she does n't so much as know what it is, though she has 
a fear in her heart which, if you had the chances to apply your 
ear there that I, as a husband, have, you would hear thump and 
thump and thump .•.. " (II, 277-78) 
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The concomitant of her vision of her father is the imaginative sympathy which 
enables her to interpret Charlotte's "high coerced quaver" (II, 294) as "the 
shriek of a soul in pain." (II, 292) In this novel about moral blindness, 
this perception of Maggie's is an important achievement; and yet, since the 
novel is mainly concerned with demonstrating that there are none so blind as 
those who will not see, we have to ask ourselves what use Maggie makes of her 
perceptions. Acute as her insight is into Adam's smirking assertion of 
mastery over Charlotte, she oddly never wavers in her belief that "his 
strength was her strength", maintaining to the last her complicity in that 
power of her father's that is slowly revealing its true ruthlessness. 
Maggie's shying away from her own newly-awakened perceptions is 
dramatised for us most powerfully in her vigil outside the smoking-room at 
Fawns, where the others, "really charming as they showed in the beautiful 
room", are playing cards. Maggie reflects on her own suppressed "horror of 
fi nd i ng ev 11 sea ted all a t its ease where she had on ly dreamed of good; the 
horror of the thing hideously behind, behind so 
pretended, nobleness, cleverness, tenderness." 
as James' own comment on the true nature of the 
much trusted, so much 
(II, 237) This could be seen 
"charming" and "beautiful" 
society he portrays, and the final effect of the whole scene is in fact to 
reinforce that reading; but if we see in i.t such a comprehensive judgement, 
we are seeing more than Maggie allows herself to see. She is locating the 
evil exclusively in the Prince's and Charlotte's deception of her and Adam. 
But shortly after this, Charlotte joins Maggie outside and they look at the 
same scene: 
Side by side for three minutes they fixed this picture of quiet 
harmonies, the positive charm of it and, as might have been said, 
the full significance - which, as was now brought home to ~1aggie, 
could be no more after all than a matter of interpretation, 
differing always for a different interpreter. As she herself had 
hovered in sight of it a quarter of an hour before, it would have 
been a thing for her to show Charlotte - to show in righteous 
irony, in reproach too stern for anything but silence. But now 
it was she who was being shown it, and shown it by Charlotte, and 
she saw quickly enough that as Charlotte showed it so she must at 
present submissively seem to take "it. (II, 243-44) 
Again, then, Maggie arrives 
indeed, at a crucial one: 
at an important insight - in this instance, 
that Charlotte may have her own interpretation of 
the scene, that for her too, evil may be sea ted a 11 at its ease where she had 
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only dreamed of good. Maggie's realisation of this, and her grasping of the 
principle that "the full significance ••• could be no more after all than a 
matter of interpretation, differing always for a different interpreter", 
could have redeemed her from the incompleteness of vision that is such an 
important aspect of the human condition for James. But again the curious 
check operates whereby Maggie merely registers her insight without acting on 
it. Her view of Charlotte's possible view reduces itself to a matter of 
pretending to submit to the demonstration: "as Charlotte showed it so she 
must at present submissively seem to take it." She gives no real weight to 
the possible legitimacy of Charlotte's reproach. 
The rest of the scene, in fact, seems to confirm Charlotte's implied 
grievance. For Charlotte is "showing" Maggie the whole room; it is Maggie 
who fixes on Adam as the focus of Charlotte's indignation. The object of 
her own resentment, the Prince, is forgotten - not in sympathetic 
identification with Charlotte's vision, but in her interpretation of the 
demonstration as a challenge to her possession of her father: 
Not yet since his marriage had Maggie so sharply and so formidably 
known her old possession of him as a thing divided and contested. 
(II, 244) 
This is decidedly odd: Maggie, having felt aggrieved at Charlotte's bid 
for possession of the Prince, now simply loses sight of this in her sense 
that her own possession of Charlotte's husband is "a thing divided and 
contested." One might wonder exactly what Maggie expected from Adam's 
marriage - but we know, of course: .the first volume has made clear that she 
expected it to make no difference whatsoever to her possession of her father. 
Our only surprise is that at this late stage, and just after her 
"illumination", she can still show so little real insight into the 
significance of her own possessive reaction and its relevance to what 
Charlotte is showing her. Of course, any indignation on Charlotte's part 
may seem 1 ike a refinement of hypocrisy; but the point is exactly that she 
may have just as flattering a view of her own infidelity as Maggie has of 
hers. And instead of recognising that Charlotte's case is the exact 
counterpart of her own, ~laggie once again assumes the martyr's role: 
Straighter than over thus the Princess again felt it all put upon 
her .... (II, 245) 
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What she feels put upon her, presumably, is the respons ib il i ty for restori ng 
Adam to Charlotte and the Prince to herself, thereby preserving her view of 
herself as scapegoat. The rest of the novel shows us Maggie toiling to 
achieve this end. And if her sense of martyrdom depends on a certain 
blindness to the legitimate claims of others, so her sense of purpose involves 
a blindness to her own ineffectuality. She seems to be unaware of the part 
her supposedly ignorant and innocent father plays in the resolution she 
imagines she has brought about. 
Maggie's sense of her own impeccability and of her success is exposed 
in a sharp little scene with Fanny Assingham. The latter momentarily 
liberates herself sufficiently from her social thraldom to the Ververs to be 
fairly honest with Maggie. The fulsomeness is still there, but barely covers 
the sharper edge of her insights; since Mr Verver is about to depart and 
Fanny has only been tolerated for her usefulness in diluting the company 
slightly, she probably realises that she doesn't have much to lose by her 
frankness: she'll be dropped anyway: 
"You think, both of you, so abysmally and yet so quietly. But it's 
what will have saved you." 
"Oh," r~aggie returned, "it's what - from the moment they 
discovered we could think at all - will have saved them. For they're 
the ones who are saved," she went on. "~~e're the ones who are lost." 
"Lost - ?" . 
"Lost to each other - father and I." And then as her friend 
appeared to demur, "Oh yes," Maggie quite lucidly declared, "lost 
to each other really much more than Amerigo and Charlotte are; 
since for them it's just, it's right, it's deserved, while for us 
it's only sad and strange and not caused by our fault. But I don't 
know," she went on, "why I talk about myself, for it's on father 
it really comes. I let him go," said Maggie. 
"You let him, but you don't make him." 
"I take it from him," she answered. 
"But what else can you do?" 
"1 take it from him," the Princess repeated. "I do what 1 knew 
from the first I should do. I get off by giving him up." 
"But if he gives you?" Mrs. Assingham presumed to object. 
Does n't it moreover then," she asked, "complete the very purpose 
with which he married - that of making you and leaving you more 
free?" 
Maggie looked at her long. "Yes - I help him to do that." 
Mrs. Assingham hesitated, but at last her bravery flared. "Why 
not call it then frankly his complete success?" 
"Well," said t·laggie, "that's all that's left me to do." 
"It's a success," her friend ingeniously developed, "with 
which you've simply not interfered." (II, 333-34) 
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At moments like this Maggie's celebrated subtlety ("You think, both of you, 
so abysmally and yet so quietly") becomes difficult to distinguish from moral 
and intellectual stupidity. Her reasoning is certainly very eccentric. By 
what definition of "saved" can Charlotte and the Prince be said to be thus 
blessed - what definition, that is, that does not equally apply to Maggie and 
her father? And conversely, by what definition that does not equally apply 
to Charlotte and Amerigo can Maggie and her father be said to be "lost"? 
The difference for Maggie lies, of course, not in the fact of separation but 
in the justice of it: to be "saved" is to be forced into a right course of 
action, however painful, whereas to be "lost" is to suffer in innocence. 
Maggie's "lucidity", like Adam's "moral lucidity" in discovering Charlotte's 
usefulness, consists of the ability to adopt the view most flattering to 
herself. Her serene assumption that Amerigo and Charlotte are only getting 
what they deserved, whereas she and her father are like two innocent and 
be~1i1dered children, comfortably disposes of every valid insight she has had 
in the course of the novel - and this just after she has complacently told 
Fanny: "Only - you know it's my nature - I think." It does not even occur 
to her that her very habit, reasserted in this scene, of thinking of herself 
and her father as a couple opposed to the Prince and Charlotte, may have 
encouraged those two to adopt the same vie\~. But Maggie's bel ief in the 
Verver innocence is only Maggie's consistency: it is the fiction on which 
she has built her whole plan. 
It is not her only fiction, of course. Once again, as in her farcical 
project to send her father and husband off on a jaunt together, she 
apportions to herself the responsibil ity for what her father has wrought. 
Fanny Assingham relentlessly pursues this unflattering implication in this 
interchange, but without visibly ruffling the serene surface of Maggie's 
satisfaction. Nevertheless, in the course of the conversation r~aggie is 
forced, almost comically, to change the grounds of her self-congratulation 
severa 1 ti mes. 
Fanny's catechism systematically deprives Maggie of her illusion that 
"she had done all" (II, 318), even of her illusion that submission to Adam's 
actions constitutes a choice on her part. As Fanny points out, Maggie is 
not "making" Adam go, she is at most allowing him to go - a consent that is 
purely theoretical where she has not been consulted on the matter. Her 
sacr'ifice of Adam may amount to no more than Adam's sacrifice of her; and, 
for all her grand claim of planned and independent action ("I do what I kne\~ 
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from the first I should do"), all that is "left [her] to do" is to recognise 
that she has "simply not interfered" with Adam's grand design. Ultimately, 
Maggie's independence of action proves to have been as illusory as that of 
the Prince and Charlotte; she too, whose happiness Adam was trying to ensure, 
has been the puppet of "the very purpose with which he married". He is the 
unacknowledged eiron of the world he has "created"; she remains the alazon 
of an irony she dare not resolve. 
The rest of Maggie's conversation with Fanny is no less revealing of 
her motives and illusions. She yet again denies that she knows what her 
father knows; but the more important denial this time concerns the Prince. 
Having "with tears in her eyes" agreed that Charlotte is "held" in a "torment" 
by her ignorance of what Adam knows, and having stated that the Prince shares 
this ignorance, she is confronted with Fanny's last and perhaps most 
uncomfortable question: 
"But the Prince then - ?" 
"How he's held?" Maggie asked. 
"How he's held." 
NOh I can't tell you that!" and the Princess again broke off. 
(II, 336) 
Maggie is understandably unwilling to ascribe her hold over her husband to 
her father's pmyer, to the Prince's terror a t how much Adam knows. And yet 
this suggestion is perfectly consistent with the main implication of the 
whole scene, that all Maggie's efforts have been but vain splashings on the 
surface of her father's "unfathomable" power. It is also consistent with 
her earlier perception that "his strength was her strength", although in a 
less elevated sens~ than she imagined at the time: her hold on the Prince 
is ultimately dependent on Adam's money. He have seen the Prince's slightly 
uncomfortable sense of being "made sure of" by his father-in-law, shortly 
after the recommencement of his relationship \'/ith Charlotte: 
The net resul t of a 11 of wh i eh moreover was tha t the young man had 
no wish to see his value diminish .... Certainly everything 
must be kept up to it; never so much as to-night had the Prince 
felt this. (I, 325) 
"Everything" will involve the sacrifice of Charlotte, as it has done before: 
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she is the one luxury he can't afford. 
This reduces Maggie's achievement in winning back the Prince to a matter 
of letting him see that she suspects something; from that moment he toes the 
line meticulously, making up to Maggie in the only way he knows: by making 
love to her. Maggie herself realises that the Prince uses his sexuality as 
a weapon or an argument to persuade her not to tell her father. If, then, 
he is "held" by his uncertainty as to what Mr Verver knows, Maggie's master 
stroke in this guessing game is her reply to her husband's anxious question 
"Then does anyone else know?" - "Find out for yourself!" (II, 202-03) 
The Prince, at any rate, does his best to reassure Maggie by word and 
deed (but n~inly by deed, which is what he is best at) that he loves only 
her. A less ingenious thinker than Maggie might have found something 
disturbing in his readiness to betray a woman to whom he presumably also 
professed love; his denial of Charlotte is as suspect as it is heartless: 
"She's stupid," he abruptly opined. (II, 348) 
Thus Charlotte's prophecy at t~atcham, almost the last words we heard her 
speak to him, on the day that turned out to be the last day of their affair, 
has been fulfilled: 
"Ah for things I may n't want to know I promise you shall find me 
stupid." (I, 363) 
~Ihether or not the Prince makes the connection (the fact that his abrupt 
little betrayal makes him "quickly change colour", as well it might, suggests 
that he does) and realises that Charlotte may have been keeping up her own 
act; whether or not, even, he believes what he says - can the reader really 
rejoice in Maggie's retrieval, by such means, of such a man? 
But perhaps it doesn't rea 11 y rna tterwhether the reader rejoi ces or not; 
it is dear that Maggie, at any rate, is nOl1 in love with him, and if it is 
success to get what one wants, then Maggie has succeeded. But the last 
section of the novel questions even that success, severely qualified as it 
already is. The Prince's newly awakened appreciation of his wife seems to 
contain a strong element of cowed submission to her show of strength. 
Maggie herself, in another of her suppressed perceptions, recognises in the 
Prince's situation, "in his 'own' room, where he often sat now alone", 
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the virtual identity of his condition with that aspect of 
Charlotte's situation for which, early in the summer and in all the 
amplitude of a great residence, she had found with so little 
seeking the similitude of the locked cage. (II, 337-38) 
She distinguishes between the two, though, on the grounds of "his lurking 
there by his own act and his own choice" - whereas Charlotte has been forced 
into her cage. She refrains from drawing the obvious enough conclusion that 
the cage is chosen as a refuge from his wife, although she does notice "his 
starting at her entrance as if even this were in its degree an interference" 
(II, 338). "Even this" - what else can he be fleeing from but her presence? 
Maggie, at any rate, feels secure enough in Charlotte's imminent 
departure and her own power over the Prince to praise her husband's 
ex-mistress to him: "But shan't you then so much as miss her a little? She's 
wonderful and beautiful. "(II, 346) . By this stage, of course, this 
formula is so thoroughly tainted that even if we had not been told that it is 
intended as a "challenge" to the Prince, we should have doubted its s·incerity. 
It is, in fact, a fairly direct echo of the "conscious perjury" of Maggie's 
reassurance to Charlotte: "You must take it from me that I've never thought 
of you but as beautiful, wonderful and good." (II, 251) 
In this context, even the Prince's famous statement ("Evel-ything's 
terrible, cara - in the heart of man" - II, 349) is suspect: it is too 
facile to convey any very specific insight, and as a l'eply to ~laggie's "I see 
it's always terrible for women", it merely expresses the Prince's bland 
responsiveness to everything Maggie says at this stage. It also conveniently 
relegates his treatment of Charlotte to the metaphysical sphere of Man's 
Fallen State. 
Given a situation fraught with such unexpressed tensions and 
uncertainties, it remains for them to establish a basis on which to spend the 
rest of their lives together. The Prince offers something conveniently 
intangible and irrefutable: 
"If ever a man since the beginning of time acted in good faith - 1" 
But he dropped it, offering it simply for that. 
For that then when it had had time somewhat to settle like some 
handful of gold-dust thrown into the air, for that then Maggie 
showed herself as deeply and strangely taking it. "I see." And 
she even wished this form to be as complete as she could make it. 
"J see." (II, 350) 
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It is possible that "this form" is yet another of the forms that Maggie 
preserves in the interests of her elaborate pretense, and that in fact she 
only pretends to believe her husband. But whether she believes him or not, 
we at least have seen the exact extent of the Prince's good faith, culminating 
in hi s "beautiful" pact with Charlotte to commi t adultery for the Ververs' 
sake. 25 In his assurance to his wife, his good faith seems equally suspect: 
at best is he deceiving himself, at worst trying to deceive her. That there 
is, in any case, an element of deception, is hinted at by the comparison of 
his statement to "some handful of gold-dust". In a novel whose central symbol 
suggests the deceptive quality of gold, this is not a reassuring image; and 
as for dust, it is mainly known as a medium to be thrown into the eyes of 
those we wish to blind. In this context, the compound image also sounds a 
disturbing echo of Maggie's "translation" of Charlotte's "tap against the 
glass": " ... why was I myself dealt with all for deception? Why condemned 
after a couple of short years to find the golden flame - oh the golden flame! -
a mere handful of black ashes?" (II, 329-30) Maggie, at least, has gold-
dust instead of black ashes - perhaps a substitute for the "silver mist" that, 
earlier in the nov~l, she saw as no longer adequately hiding the general· 
deception: 
They would then have been all successfully throwing dust in each 
other's eyes; and it would be at last as if they must turn away 
their faces, since the silver mist that protected them had begun 
to grow sensibly thin. (II, 48) 
Such images of blindness give a certain edge to Maggie's repeated "I 
see". If she truly sees, that is, that her husband's "good faith" is an 
insubstantial foundation for their marriage, her form consists of 
"humbugging" him that she believes him, as she will have to humbug herself 
25 Fanny Assignham has had one of her more incisive interchanges with 
her husband on the subject of this good faith: 
"I think there's nothing they're not now capable of - in their so 
intense good faith." 
"Good faith?" - he echoed the Ivords, whi ch had in fact somethi ng 
of an odd ring, critically. 
"Their false position. It comes to the same thing" (I, 376) 
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for the rest of her life that her husband really loves her. If she does not 
see, and accepts that his good faith nullifies his adultery and disposes of 
Charlotte, she is already humbugging herself. In either case she is keeping 
alive a fiction about her husband, as she is keeping alive a fiction about 
herself and her father. 
Bleak as this interpretation is, it is completely consistent with the 
final scenes of the novel, which otherwise, in more bracing readings, have 
to be elaborately explained away. I am thinking in the first place, of 
course, of the final interchange between Maggie and her father, preceded by 
the description of the Prince and Chat"lotte as collector's pieces, finally 
taking their proper places in the collection, under the delighted gaze of 
the i r owners: 
The two noble persons seated in conversation and at tea fell thus 
into the splendid effect and the general harmony: Mrs. Verver and 
the Prince fairly "placed" themselves, however unwittingly, as 
high expressions of the kind of human furniture required 
aesthetically by such a scene. The fusion of their presence with 
the decorative elements, their contribution to the triumph of 
selection, was complete and admirable; though to a lingering view, 
a view more penetrating than the occasion really demanded, they 
also might have figured as concrete attestations of a rare power of 
purchase. There was much indeed in the tone in which Adam Verver 
spoke again, and who shall say where his thought stopped? "Le 
compte y est. You've got some good things." 
Maggie met it afresh - "Ah don't they look well?" (II, 360). 
This is the final comment on the "general harmony" that has been established: 
it is a matter of appearances. By this aesthetic criterion it doesn't really 
matter what the Prince and Charlotte can find to say to each other in the 
light of their knowledge of each other, just as it doesn't really matter what 
coercion has been used to reduce them to such submissive "human furniture": 
all that matters is the aesthetic requirement of "such a scene". It is the 
final restatement of the aesthetic theme that James introduced so early in 
the novel and has never lost sight of. In Maggie's concurrence with her 
father that "they look well" we have the adrni ssion of what has been imp1 icit 
all along: as long as the golden bowl looks like the real thing, it doesn't 
matter to the Ververs that it is a cracked crys ta 1. Adam's much-vaunted 
"instinct for authenticity", we have been told, ultimately consists only of 
a concern "that a work of art of price should 'look like' the master to whom 
it might perhaps be deceitfully attributed". (I, 146-471 
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What remains for Maggie to do in the general tidying-up of human 
fUrniture is to reassure her father that she does not resent his wife, and 
that he did not make a mistake in marrying for her sake: 
"Father, father - Charlotte's great!" 
It was not till after he had begun to smoke that he looked at 
her. "Charlotte's great." 
They could close upon it - such a basis as they might immediately 
feel it make; and so they stood together over it quite gratefully, 
each recording to the other's eyes that it was firm under their 
feet. (II, 364) 
The slight discomfort betrayed in Mr Verver's delay in looking at Maggie is 
soon dissipated as they get used to their new "basis" - the fiction that is 
to sustain them, their ignoring of the knowledge that he is deporting his 
wife to get her away from his daughter's husband. "Gratefully" they may well 
stand over it; it enables them to pretend to the very end: 
"You see," he presently added, "how right I ~JaS. Right, I mean, to 
do it for you." 
Thus the crooked is once again humbugged straight, and a humiliating mistake 
made into an occasion for self-congratulation. As usual in this novel, the 
moment of wilful bl indness is celebrated with declarations of clear-
sightedness all round: 
"We 11 now," he smoked, "we see." 
"Wesee." (II, 364) 
As Adam sounds, to Maggie's satisfaction, "the note of possession and 
control" in speaking of Charlotte, she finds a basis also for her parting 
ft-om him, "some last conclusive comfortable category to place him in for 
dismissal": "his ability to rest upon h'igh values", the high value, not to 
mention the high price, of Charlotte being in question. This opens up an 
equally comfortable - for t·1aggie - category to place Charlotte in for 
di smi ssa I: 
... she was n't to be wasted in the application of his plan. 
Maggie held to this then - that she was n't to be wasted. (Ir, 365-66) 
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Being wasted is, we remember, what the Ververs decided long ago Charlotte 
shoul d be saved from; now that the use then found for her has palled upon 
everybody, she will be employed "in the appl ication of his plan" - his other 
plan, the first one having developed complications. In American City 
Charlotte's "high coerced quaver" will not be audible to Maggie, nor will 
the silken loop around her neck be visible: Maggie's last murmur of 
conscience subsides under the pleasant conviction that showing off Adam's 
treasures to the inhabitants of a country she hates is just what Charlotte 
was made for. 
Maggie's last words to her father can thus emphatically reassert her 
"sense that he was n't a failure" and that "she was n't in that case a 
failure either" - a sense we have seen to be essential to her self-respect: 
"It's success, father." 
"It's success. And even this '" even this is n't altogether 
failure!" (II, 366) 
"This" is the Principino - the offspring of the union between buyer and 
bought, money and hi story, power and pi cturesqueness, Ameri ca and Europe, 
the hei r to a New Worl d dynasty. He wi 11 need all the gui dance he can get 
from Miss Bogle. 
Upon this note of wrongs covered up, of uncomfortable recognitions 
stared out of countenance, the Ververs depart, the beautiful fiction of their 
beautiful lives re-established to everybody's satisfaction - except perhaps 
to Charlotte's. Of course, her fate is no more than she accepted the 
possibility of when she married Adam, Verver: we cannot really feel that 
deportation to America is in itself an injustice done to her. The real 
cruelty of her fate lies in her coolly being reduced to an object of the 
other three's moral righteousness: she, not Maggie, is made to bear the 
guilt of the other three, and alleviate them of the burden: 
They thus tacitly put it upon her to be disposed of, the whole 
complexity of their peril ... to lift if off them and take it; 
to charge herself with it as the scapegoat of old, of whom she had 
once seen a terrible picture, had been charged with the sins of 
the people and had gone forth into the desert to sink under his 
burden and die. (II, 234) 
That fantasy is of course Maggie's vision of herself, not of Charlotte; she 
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cannot allow herself to see how much more accurately the role applies to 
Charlotte than to herself. If anyone is sent into the desert, Charlotte is -
if not quite to die, then to an obl ivion that approximates death: "I feel 
somehow as if she were dying. Not really. But dying for us - for you 
and me" says Maggie (II, 346). "Dying for us" presumably only means (as a 
reminder to the Prince?) "dying as far as you and I are concerned", but the 
ambiguity allows us to see Charlotte's "death" as a sacrifice "for" the others. 
She is not a willing victim, of course, but then, nor was the scapegoat of 
old. All three need her to believe in their own innocence: Adam can believe 
(one assumes) that the only flaw in his beautiful plan for Maggie's comfort 
was Charlotte's refusal to restrict herself to the function that they "got 
her for"; Maggi e can bel i eve (one assumes aga in) that Charlotte seduced the 
Prince, and that she herself is therefore blameless; and the Prince, whatever 
he believes, can offer Charlotte's head on a platter to Maggie as proof of 
his repentance. At the separation of the couples Charlotte is used as a 
moral justification: as long as they can all pretend to love and admire 
Charlotte, no uncomfortable qualms need arise. 
It may be the unpleasantness of this use of Charlotte that has led critics 
to explain it in allegorical terms. Rather than assume, like Matthiessen, 
that James Vias guilty, -in condoning such behaviour, of an insensitivity 
"nothing short of obscene", 26 they prefer to take the action out of the 
sphere of human judgement a ]together: 
The Ververs depart, and Maggie and the Prince are left alone. The 
allegorical meaning of this episode is that divine wisdom (Mr. 
Verver) has taken the evil-idolized human self (Charlotte) into 
captivity, thus freeing divine love (Maggie) to consummate marriage 
with natural man (the Prince). The baby Principino represents the 
humanity to come, divine-natural man.27 
The trouble vlith such an interpretation is that it casts such a very dubious 
light on the nature of "divine love" to see it as manifested 1n behaviour 
26 The Major Phase, p. 100. 
27 Francis Fergusson, "The Golden BOVil Revisited", Sewanee Review, 64 
(1955),26-27. Fergusson is here approv-ing-Iy summarising Quentin A-naerson's 
reading. He does add that such an interpretation does not reflect our actual 
experience of the final episodes, and accounts for the allegorical 
significances as "fleeting intutions [SiC] of felicity" (p. 27). 
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that we would regard as "obscene" in a human being. This is difficult 
enough to accept in as stylised a work as The Clerk's Tale, where we are 
asked to accept, in terms of religious parable, connubial behaviour that 
would be grotesque anywhere else; given the much more realistic surface of 
The Golden Bowl, the "parable" becomes a flat contradiction of the presented 
reality of the novel. It is very difficult, for instance, to make sense, 
with Dorothea Krook, of Charlotte's "punishment" in terms of "an aspect of 
the inherited Judaeo-Christian scheme of salvation (with all the necessary 
'humanist' modifications) which is perhaps more distinctively Judaeic than 
Christian and has a prominent place also in the view of the human condition 
of that other great source of spiritual wisdom in our civilisation, the 
Greek. ,,28 This portentous preamble leads to the orthodox enough contenti on 
that God is not only a God of Love, but also of Justice, and thence to the 
explanation of Charlotte's fate as "a function of the quasi-divine justice 
executed by Adam Verver by the exerc i se of hi s power." (p. 286) Krook 
seems to ivoid committing herself fully to the religious reading by granting 
Adam only "quasi-divine" status, as she else~/here buffers her religious 
interpretations with "as the rel igious would say" parentheses. This may be 
\,hat she means by "all the necessary 'humanist' modifications"; but such 
concessions to the claims of real ism only d"etract from the consistency of the 
allegorical reading, without making Adam's treatment of Charlotte any less 
repulsive in human terms. 
Even critics who accept the most obvioLIS interpretation of this behaviour 
as the correct one, and do assume that James shared the distaste felt by most 
renders, tend to regard ~'aggie as somehow exempted from the unpleasantness 
because she loves the Prince. Thus Crews can state that "[a]t the end of the 
book f1a99ie is more convinced than ever that Adam's pasty world is the on'ly 
beautiful one, and she intends to preserve it as best she can", and yet 
maintain that" [i]n spite of this, Maggie's achievement is a mora'! one. and 
indeed a great one."29 
I cannot see that such deliberate blindness as Crews implies here and 
as is in fact dramatised in the novel's closing episodes can be compatible 
with a "moral" achievement. At most, the departul'e of the Ververs simplifies 
28 I_he Or,deal of Consciou_snes~, pp. 284-85. 
29 Tragedy of ~'anners, p. 110. 
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the "forms" that have to be observed. As Maggie goes to the balcony, too late 
to see the departing carriage, she looks "only at the great grey space on 
which, as on the room still more, the shadow of dusk had fallen." {II, 366). 
The emptiness lacks, at least, the insistent light that suffuses almost all 
the other scenes of the novel. There is a new clarity as Maggie takes stock 
of "her reason for what she had done": "their freedom to be together there 
always" (II, 367). The Prince's freedom, of course, is not unlike captivity, 
since he has no choice in the matter - but with Maggie's undivided attention 
he may be less bored than he was before. Like Charlotte, he settles down to 
the terms of his contract. 
The forms have been established, at any rate, on a more workable basis 
than before. Maggie can nOl'i surrender to her husband's sexual power, which 
she has so tenaciously resisted up to now as a threat to her freedom of 
action. Where before she was acting for her father, and had to resist her 
husband's power as a threat to that allegiance, she need now no longer fear 
that power. Undistracted by the claims of her father and of Charlotte, 
unconfused by the moral intricacies of trying to justify herself in terms of 
a cause other than herself, she can indulge the "selfishness" of her passion 
for her husband. 
The "golden fruit" that looms as her "reward" is, like all things golden 
in the novel, slightly ominous; but if there is a flaw in it, Maggie has 
1 earnt not to not ice. Thei r fi na 1 embrace in the novel, 1 i ke all the others 
in the novel, takes place over abysses of deception, of suppressions, of 
betrayals; but Maggie's passion, at least, and the Prince's desire to please 
her, are genuine: 
It kept him before her therefore, taking in - or trying to - what 
she so wonderfully gave. He tried, too clearly, to please her -
to meet her in her own way; but with the result only that, close 
to her, her face kept before him, his hands holding her shoulders, 
his whole act enclosing her, he presently echoed: "'See'? I see 
nothing but you." And the truth of it had with this force after a 
moment so strangely 1 ighted his eyes that as for pity and dread of 
them she buried her own in his breast. (II, 368-69) 
What she "so wonderfully" gives is a basis for their relationship, yet 
another of her categories 
therefore be disregarded. 
for dismissal: Charlotte is "splendid" and can 
r~aggie will not make her into an occasion for 
reproach. The Prince, though trying "too clearly, to please her" seems less 
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apt than Adam to recognise the proffered basis. In short, he seems not to 
know what she means, in spite of his attempt "to meet her in her o~m way" -
so he meets her in his own irresistible way, by taking her in his arms. His 
"1 see nothing but you" is almost the last act of wilful bl indness in the 
novel: he pledges himself to ignore whatever may distract his regard from 
the wife he is to serve with his body till death them do part. 
The "truth" that Maggie reads in his eyes is thus not only, if at all, 
his devotion to her, but his submission to her power - a truth that for the 
last time in the novel Maggie evades, in a gesture that combines her love 
for him with her avoidance of facing the cost of it: "as for pity and dread 
of [hi s eyes] she buri ed her own in his breas t. " The embrace of the Pri nce 
and Maggie represents, no less than that of Densher and Kate Croy, "the need 
to bury in the dark blindness of each other's arms the knowledge of each 
other that they could n't undo. "30 If Maggie has grown from nai'vety to a 
full knowl edge of evil, she has herself succumbed to that evil by opti ng for 
its preservation under the forms of harmony and decency. Her averting of 
her eyes "as for pity and dread" is an evasion of this truth. 
The evocation of the tragic emotions at this paint is as ambiguous as 
everything else in the novel: instead of the "pity and dread" based, as 
in Sophocles, on a recognition of "the 
are given a del iberate self-bl inding. 
true· state of all us that live", we 
Following upon ~Iaggie's and Adam's 
"vJe see" and the Prince's "'See'? I see nothing but you", Maggie's avoidance 
of seeing becomes as significant to this work as Oedipus' literal self-
blinding is to King Oedipus - the significance, however, being the exact 
opposite of that of Oedipus' symbol ic release from the bl indness which 
afflicted him while he could see. In short, in the Oedipus the irony is 
resolved; here it is reinforced. 
Maggie's gesture is in effect very much like Marlow's lie in "Heart of 
Darkness", in denying every insight reached in the course of the work. The 
difference is that Marlow's lie consciously preserves something which is 
beautiful in itself, albeit based on delusion: the Intended's belief in the 
nobility of Kurtz is itself noble in its selflessness, however grotesquely 
Kurtz has betrayed that trust. Without the Intended's illusion, Marlm. feels, 
"It would have been too dark" (p. 162): we are left with something like 
30 The Wings of the Dove, II, 392, 
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Maggie's lie, on the other hand, preserves only the "forms" - forms, 
admittedly, which make possible the continuation of social relationships, but 
which in themselves have no moral content, since the social relationships in 
the novel have no moral basis. There are no grounds for believing, with 
Pearson, that the lie is "sanctified by what it salvages and the disaster it 
postpones." Marlow's unselfish lie "salvages" the nobility that makes the 
illusion possible; what Maggie's lie salvages is the illusion itself, her 
own w"illed belief in a piece of cracked crystal as a golden bowl. 
The Golden Bowl is a novel about success and its price; and in showing 
how the pursuit of success can subvert all values to the service of that 
success, it is a study of moral bankruptcy. The rhetoric of righteousness 
concealing the exercise of power is, as Euripides could see, a principle of 
all wars, from the Trojan to the Pe10ponnesian; and as Conrad could see, it 
is the moral strategy of co1onia1isation. James was not thinking of war, but 
of benign conquest, and the co10nialisation he is concerned with is more like 
Holroyd's in Nostromo than the brutal exploitation of "Heart of Darkness"; 
but all these can be seen as merely different metaphors for the same subjection 
of others. The "rare power of purchase", despite its guise of philanthropy 
and pa tronage, is as absolute as any more tradi tiona 1 form of power. James' 
exploration of the degeneration of "beautiful intentions all round" places 
his novel with the masterpieces of Conrad and Lawrence, as a profound and 
disenchanted reflection on "the hard irony of hopes and ideas. ,,32 
31 Macbeth, IV. ii. 22. 
32 :.:fl",on",le:.:.n,--,-i:..:n....:L:.:o:..:v.:::..e, p. 511. 
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To adduce The Golden Bowl as an example, indeed a masterpiece, of a 
totally unresolved irony that subverts all values proclaimed in the novel, is 
to admit that ultimately James seems to have yielded to the total scepticism 
of a Decoud or a Gudrun. The novel lacks that hope that Lawrence managed to 
sustain in Women in Love through the presence of Birkin and Ursula; it lacks 
even the consolation of illusion, severely qualified as it is, accepted by 
Marlo~1 in "Heart of Darkness". There is no "choice of nightmares" in The 
Golden Bowl, no figure like Mrs Gould to represent a disinterested idealism. 
This curtailment of human possibilities will inevitably make the moral range 
of the novel seem smaller than the comprehensive analyses of Conrad and 
Lawrence: its irony is not placed, like theirs, in a larger context. 
In insisting, then, that the late novels show nothing of the "loss of 
sureness of moral touch" that Leavis ascribes to them,1 I am not claiming 
for all of them the full "hierarchy of significance" of The Wings of the Dove. 
I am suggesting, however, that James' "sureness of moral touch" manifested 
itself in his use of "techniqLie" as an instrument of moral explol'ation, and 
that the disillusioned vision of The Golden Bowl is the result of such 
exploration. I have tried to show that in the late novels the more disturbing 
implications are never, as we at times feel with Hardy, imposed upon the 
subject as a theoretical "pessimism": they emerge, even in spite of James' 
intentions, from his pondering of his subject with all the acuteness of a 
formidable moral intell igence, the "prime sensibil ity" of a great artist. 
In the same spirit of artistic integrity, his novels do not include, in the 
interests of a theoretical "balance", those possibilities of fulfilment 
tentatively maintained by Lawrence or the "few simple notions" held on to by 
Conrad. Their novels may, in this respect, dramatise a sincere desire rather 
than a sincere conviction; if this was not James' way, that may be because, 
paradoxically, this most anxiously circumspect of novelists was, to a greater 
extent than either Conrad 01' Lawrence. at the mercy of his material - that is, 
his material as it defined itself through the explorations of technique. 
In accepting the law of such explot'ation, that is that "one's plan, alas, 
is one thing and one's result another", James freed his imagination to uncover 
implications hidden even from himself. In The Ambassadors such implications 
1 The Great Tradition, p. 176. 
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remained unacknowledged; in The Wings of the Dove they were unplanned but 
consciously observed; and in The Golden Bowl, I believe, subject and 
technique were fused from the start in a final exploration of his life-long 
belief that as any perception is but a product of the interpretation of the 
perceiver, so any "truth" is likely to be at best a selection from, at worst 
a distortion of the available perspectives. Thus the unresolved ironies 
which in the earlier two novels could be seen as the more or less rough 
edges of a novel breaking from its mould, form part of the seamless fabric 
of The Golden Bowl, the vision of a society incapable of providing a resolution 
to the conflict between its professed beliefs and its quest for power. 
If our final impression of these novels is nevertheless not quite as 
gloomy as such an outline would seem to suggest, that may be because to the 
ironist even gloom itself can become the subject of irony. The tragic gesture 
may collapse under the sceptical gaze of irony, but usually with a certain 
consciousness, on the part of the ironist, of the comic possibilities of the 
collapse. Even Gudrun in her most barren moment, when she is most conscious 
of being the alazon of her own irony, retains a flicker of the resilience of 
the eiron: 
Gudrun hid her face on Ursula's shoulder, but still she could not 
escape the cold devil of irony that froze her soul. 
'Ha, ha!' she thought, 'this is the right behaviour.' (p. 577) 
The emphasis is heavily on the constricting effect of such irony, and Gudrun's 
mirthless "Ha, ha!" is hardly the laughter of comedy: it has something of 
the desperat ion of Hedda Gabler's p 1 ayi ng a dance tune before she shoots 
herself. But it also represents, however meagre1y, something of that 
detachment that liberates man's wits from his passions and illusions. 
Perhaps irony. even if it is only rarely as exhilarating as in Antony 
and Cleopatra or The Nun's Priest's Tale, is the last victory of a human 
spirit incapable of taking itself seriously. It may be a hollow victory: we 
remember Sophia Antonovna's rejection of irony as "the negation of all saving 
instincts, of all faith, of all devotion, of all action". But irony may 
itself be a "saving instinct", a wry compromise with the inevitable. Without 
denying the cost of such a compromise, we may find something liberating in 
the lucid wit with which James anatomizes his society. Mrs Lowder's lament 
for r~i11y does, in its crass commercialism, cheapen the emotion it is 
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intended to express; but it is impossible not to delight in the acuteness 
with which it is observed. And if "the misfortune of being too, too charming" 
lacks tragic dignity, the very mordancy with which it is presented acts as an 
antidote to despair. Perhaps our final vision of James himself is best 
rendered in his own description of Maria Gostrey "sigh[ing] it at last all 
comically, all tragically away." 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Works Cited 
Primary Sources 
Aeschylus. The Oresteian Trilogy. Trans. and introd. Philip Vellacott. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956. 
Austen, Jane. Emma. Ed. and introd. ~lary Lascelles. London: Dent, 1964. 
----------. Mansfield Park. Ed. and introd. Tony Tanner. Harmondsworth: 
Pengu in, 1966. 
----------. Pride and Prejudice. Ed. and introd. Tony Tanner. Harmonds~JOrth: 
Pengu in, 1972. 
Conrad, Joseph. Lord Jim: A Tale. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1957. 
---------- Nostromo. London: Dent, 1947. 
Under Western Eyes. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1957. 
Victory. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963. 
---------- . "Youth", "Heart of Darkness" and "The End of the Tether". 
London: Dent, 1946. 
Dickens, Charles. Bleak House. Ed. Norman Page. Introd. J. Hillis Miller. 
Harmondsworth: Penguln, 1971. 
---------- Great Expectations. Ed. and introd. Angus Calder. 
Harmonds\vorth: Penguln, 1965. 
---------- Hard Times. Introd. G.K. Chesterton. London: 




----------. Our Mutual Friend. Ed. and introd. Stephen Gill. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1971. 
Eliot, George. Daniel Deronda. Ed. and introd. Barbara Hardy. 
Harmondsworth: Penguln, 1967. 
----------. Felix Holt the Radical. Ed. and introd. Peter Coveney. 
Harmondsworth: Pengllln, 1972. 
----------. Middlemarch. Ed. and introd. W.J. Harvey. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin ,1965. 
----------. The Millon the Floss. Introd. W. Robertson Nicoll. London: 
Dent, 19U8. 
Euripides. Orestes and Other Plays. Trans. and introd. Philip Vellacott. 
Harmonds\·;ortn: Penguln, f9TZ-:-
Gaskell, Elizabeth. North and South. Ed. DOl'othy Collin. Introd. Martin 
Dodsworth. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970. 
Hardy, Thomas. Jude the Obscure. Introd. Terry Eagleton. London: 
Macmillan, 19"'~ 
----------. The Mayor of Casterbridge. Ed. and introd .. Martin Seymour-
Smi th. Ha rllloriClSi:forth : Pengu in, 1978. 
---------- Tess of the d'Urbervilles. Ed. David Skilton. Introd. 
A. Alvarez. Harmondsvlorth: Penguin, 1978. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
217 
James, Henry. The Ambassadors. Vols. XXI and XXII of the New York edition 
of The Novels and Tales of Henry James. 1909; rpt. New York: 
Augustus M. Kelley, 1971. 
----------. "The Beast in the Jungle" in Vol. XVII of the New York edition 
of The Novels and Tales of Henry James. New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1909; pp. 61-127. 
----------. The Golden Bowl. Vols. XXIII and XXIV of the New York edition 
of The Novels and Tales of Henry James. 1909; rpt. New York: 
Augustus M. Kelley, 1971. 
----------. The Portrait of a lady. Vols. III and IV of the New York 
edition of The Novels and Tales of Henry James. 1908; rpt. 
Fairfield, N.J.: Augustus M. Kelley, 1976. 
----------. The Wings of the Dove. Vols. XIX and XX of the New York edition 
of The Novels and Tales o1rl{enry James. 1909; rpt. Fairfield, N.J.: 
Augustus 11. Reiley, 1976. 
lawrence, D.H. Women in love. Ed. and introd. Charles l. Ross. 
Harmondsworth: Pengul n, 1982. 
Sophocles. Ajax. Trans. and introd. John Moore. 
David Grene and Richard lattimore. Chicago: 
Press, 1957. 
In Sophocles II. Ed. 
University of Chicago 
----------. The Theban Plays. Trans. and introd. E.F. Watling. 
Harmondsworth: Pengu in, 1947. 
Secondary Sources 
Allen, Walter. The English Novel: A Short Critical History. 1954; 
rpt. Harmonaswortn: Penguln, 1958. 
Amis, Kingsley. "What Became of Jane 
(October 4, 1957), 339-40. Rpt. 
Critical Essays. Ed. Ian Watt. 
1963, pp. 141-44. 
Austen?" The Spectator, 6745 
in Jane Austen: A Collection of 
Englewood C1 iffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
Anderson, Quentin. The American Henry James. london: John Calder, 1958. 
Armstrong, Isobel. "'Middlemarch': A Note on George Eliot's Wisdom". In 
Critical Essays on George Eliot. Ed. Barbara Hardy. london: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970, pp. 116-32. 
Bayley, John. The Characters of love: A Study in the Literature of 
Personality. London: Constable, 1960. 
Bell, Michael. "Introduction: r~odern r~ovements in literature". In The 
Context of English literature: 1900-1930. Ed. Michael Cell. lonaon: 
~lethuen, 198u, pp. 1-93. 
Booth, Wayne C. The Rhetoric of Fiction. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1961. 
---------- A Rhetoric of Irony. London: University of Chicago Press, 
1974. 
Bradbury, Nicola. Henry James: The later Novels. Oxford University Press, 
1979. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
218 
Bradley, A.C. Shakespearean Tragedy. 1904; rpt. London: Macmillan, 1965. 
Brower, Reuben, A. The Fields of Light: An Experiment in Critical Reading. 
New York: Oxford Onlverslty Press, 1951. 
Chevalier, Haakon M. "Irony". In A Dictionary of World Literature. New and 
rev. ed. Ed. Joseph T. Shipley. Totowa, N.J.: Llttlefield, Adams and 
Co., 1968, pp. 233-35. 
Cioffi, Frank. "Intention and Interpretation in Criticism". Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society, 64 (1963-64),85-106. Rpt. in On Llterary 
1ntention. Ed. Davld Newton-de Molina. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1976, pp. 55-73. 
Coveney, Peter, introd. Felix Holt, the Radical. By George Eliot. 
Harmondsworth: Penguln,1972, pp. /-r;r:;:-
Crews, Frederick C. The Tragedy of Manners: Moral Drama in the Later Novels 
of Henry James. 1957; rpt. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1971. 
Daiches, David. George Eliot: Middlemarch. Studies in English Literature, 
11. London: Ed~la rd Arnold, 1963. 
Daleski, H.M. Dickens and the Art of Analogy. London: Faber, 1970. 
Dodsworth, Martin, introd. North and South. By Elizabeth Gaskell. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970, pp. 7~6. 
Donaldson, E.T., ed. Chaucer's Poetry: An Anthology for the Modern Reader. 
2nd ed. New York: Ronald Press, 1975. 
Draper, R.P., introd. Hardy: The Tragic Novels. Ed. R.P. Draper. Casebook 
Seri es. London: Macmi 11 an, 1975, pp. 11-"24. 
Eagleton, Terry, introd. Jude the Obscul'e .. By Thomas Hardy. London: 
~!acmilian, 1974, pp. 9-20. . 
Edel, Leon. Henry James: The Master, 1901-1916. Vol. V of The Life of 
Henry James. London: Rupert Rart-Davls, 1972. 
Fergusson, Francis. "The Golden Bowl Revisited". Se\1anee Review, 63 (1955), 
13-28. 
Firebaugh, Joseph J. "The Ververs". 




in Criticism, 4 (1954), 400-10. 
rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
Letter. Nation and Athenaeum, 29 March 1930. Rpt. in 
D.H. Lawrence: A Cntical Antriology. Ed. H.C. Coombs. Harmondsworth: 
Peiigu=rn;-873 . 
Fowler, Alastair. "Intention 




In On Literary Intention. Ed. 
Edlnl5urgh OnlVerslty Press, 1976, 
Fussell, Paill. The Great War and Modern Memory. London: Oxford University 
Press, 1975. 
Gaunt, William. The Aesthetic Adventure. Rev. ed. 1945; rpt. London: 
Sphere Books, 1975. 
Goode, John. "The Pervasive 
In The Air of Reality: 
London: Methuen, 1972, 
Mystery of Style: The ~Jings of the Dove". 
New Essays on Henry~s. Ed. JOnn~oode. 
pp. 244-300.-
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
219 
Gordon, Caroline. "Mr. Verver, Our National Hero". Sewanee Review, 63 (1955), 
13-47. 
Graham, Kenneth. Hanry James: The Drama of Fulfilment: An Approach to the 
Novels. Oxfor: Oxford Unlversity Press, 1975. 
Harding, D.W., introd. Persuasion. By Jane Austen. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1965, pp. 7-26. 
----------. "Regulated Hatred: An Aspect of the ~Jork of Jane Austen". 
Scrutiny, 8 (1940), 346-62. 
Harvey, W.J. "Idea and Image in the Novels of George Eliot". In Critical 
Essays on George Eliot. Ed. Barbara Hardy. London: Routledge and 
Regan Paur-;-1970, pp. 151-98. 
Heil man, Robert B • "Two-Tone Fi ct ions: Nineteenth-Century Types and 
Eighteenth-Century Problems". In The Theory of the Novel: New Essays. 
Ed. John Halperin. New York: Oxford Unlverslty Press, 1974, pp. 305-22. 
Hemstedt, Geoffrey. "The Novel". In The Context of English Literature: The 
Victorians. Ed. Laurence Lerner. London: Methuen, 1978, pp. 3-24. 
Hirsch, E.D., Jr. "Objective Interpretation". PMLA, 75 (1960), 463-79. 
Rpt. in On Literary Intention. Ed. David Newton-de Molina. Edinburgh: 
Edinburg Dnlversity Press, 1976, pp. 26-54. 
---------- Validity in Interpretation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1967. 
Ho 11 oway, John. "The Literary Scene". In The t~odern Age. 2nd. ed. The 
Pelican Guide to English Literature, 7. Ed. Bans Ford. Harmonds\'/orth: 
Penguin, 1963, pp. 51-100. 
----------, introd. Little Dorrit. By Charles Dickens. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1967, pp. 13-29. 
Hough, Graham. "An Eighth Type of Ambiguity". In ~Jilliam Empson: The titan 
and his Work. Ed. Roma Gill. London: Routledge and Kegan Pau'J, nO:cr: 
°Rpt. In On Literary Intention. Ed. David Newton-de Molina. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgn-Dnlverslty Pre~976, pp. 222-41. 
James, Henry. "The Art of Fiction". In his Partial Portraits. Introd. 
Leon Edel. 1888; rpt. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970, 
pp. 375-408. 
----------. The Art of the Novel: Critical Prefaceso Introdo Richard P. 
Blackmur. 1907; rpt. Nelv York: Charles ScriDrier's Sons, 1934. 
----------. The Notebooks of Henry James. Ed. F .0. 14atthiessen and Kenneth 
B. Murdock. New York: George Brazfller, 1955. 
---------- The Selected Letters of Henry James. Ed. and introd. Leon Edel. 
London: ~upert Hart~is, 1956. 
Jones, John. On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy. London: Chatto and Windus, 
1968. 
Kettle, Arnold. "The Early Victorian Social-Problem Novel". In From 
Dickens to Hardy. The Pelican Guide to English Literature, b.-Ed. 
Goris Forrf:-liarmondsworth: Penguin, 1958, pp. 169-87. 
K; ng, Jeannette. Tragedy i Ii the Vi c torian Nove 1: Theory and Practice in 
the Novels ofGeor:giT'JTot, Thomils Ha rdy and Henry James. Calii1Ji::rcrge: 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
220 
Cambridge University Press, 1978. 
Krook, Dorothea. The Ordeal of Consciousness in Henry James. Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univers1ty Press, 1962. 
Lawrence, D.H. "Morality and the Novel". In Phoenix: The Posthumous Papers 
of D.H. Lawrence. Ed. and introd. Edward D. McDonald 1936; rpt. 
London: Heinemann, 1961, pp. 527-32. 
Leavis, F.R. D.H. Lawrence: Novelist. 1955; rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1964. 
---------- Dickens the Novelist. 1970; rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972. 
---------- The Great Tradition: George Eliot, Henry James, Joseph Conrad. 
1948; rpt. Harmondsworth: Pengu1n, 1962. 
Lee, Brian. The Novels of Henry James: A Study of Culture and Consciousness. 
London: Edward Arnold, 1978. 
Lerner, Laurence. Thomas Hardy's The Mayor of Casterbridge: Tragedy or 
Social History? London: Chatto and Windus for Sussex University Press, 
1975. 
Lewis, C.S. "A Note on Jane Austen". Essays in Criticism, 4 (1954), 359-71. 
Lodge, David. "Strether by the River". In his Language of Fiction: Essay~ 
in Criticism and Verbal Analysis of the English Novel. London: 
"Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966, pp. 189-213. 
Lukacs, Georg. The r~eaning of Contemporary Realism. Trans. John and Necke 
Mander. Lonero-n: Mer"n Press, 1963. 
Lucas, John. The r~a1ancho1y Man: A Study of Dickens's Novels. 2nd. ed. 
Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980. 
---------- "Mrs Gaskell and Brotherhood". In Tradition and Tolerance in 
Nineteenth-Century Fiction: Critical Essays on Some Eng11s~ and 
American Novels. Ed. David Howard, John l.ucas and John Goode. London: 
RouTledge andKegan Paul, 1966, pp. 141-207. 
~1atthiessen, F.O. Henry James: The Major Phase. 1944; rpt. London: 
Oxford Univershy Press, 1946. 
Morris, James .. Farewell the Trumpets: An Imperial Retreat. 1978; rpt. 
Harmondsworth-:-Pengufil;"1979. 
I·loser, Thomas. "What is the matter with Emily Jane? Confl icting Impulses 
in Wuthering Heights". Nineteenth-Century Fiction, 17 (1962), 1-19. 
Rpt--:-:in lhe lJlct-orTan Novel: Hodern Essays 1n Cnticism. Ed. Ian 
Watt. New York:-OXford Omvers1ty PY'ess, 1911, pp. 181-197. 
r~udrick, Marvin. "The Triumph of Gentility: ~lansfield Park". In his Jane 
Austen. Berkeley: University of Ca1iforn1a Press, 1968, pp. 155-~ 
RpCln The Nineteenth-Century Novel: Critical Essays and Documents. 
Ed. Arno 1 d Ketll e, London: Hel nemann Educa t 1 ena 1 Books, 197T,pp~'tS3-
107. 
Muecke, D.C. !he Compass oT_Irony. 
---------- Irony and the Ironic. 
13. London: Methuen, 1982. 
London: Methuen, 1969. 
2nd.ed. of Iron~. The critical Idiom, 
Muir, Kenneth. The Structure of th~ __ Nov~. New ed. London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1957. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
221 
Muscatine, Charles. Chaucer and the French Tradition: A Study in Style and 
Meaning. Berkeley: Unlversity of California Press, 1957. 
Newton-de Molina, David, ed. On Literary Intention. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1976. 
Pearson, Gabriel. "The Novel to End all Novels: 
Air of Reality: New Essays on Henry James. 
Methuen, 1972, pp. 301-62. 
The Golden Bowl". In The 
Ed. John Goode. London:-
Redpath, Theodore. "The Meaning of a Poem". In British Philosophy in the 
Mid-Century: A Cambridge Symposium. London: George Allen and Unwln, 
1957, pp. 361-70. Rpt. in On Llterary Intention. Ed. David Newton-
de Molina. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1976, pp. 14-25. 
Richards, Bernard. "The Ambassadors and The Sacred Fount: The Artist Manaue". 
in The Air of ReaTlty: New Essays on Henry James. Ed. John Goode. 
London: Methuen, 1972, pp. 219-43. 
Salter, Elizabeth. Chaucer: The Knight's Tale and The Clerk's Tale. Studies 
in English Literature, 5. London: Edward Arnold, 1962. 
Schorer, Mark. "Technique as Discovery". The Hudson Review (1948). Rpt. in 
Twentieth-Century Literary Criticism. Ed. Davld Lodge. London: 
Longman, 1912, pp. 387-4~ 
Schweik, Robert. "Character and Fate in The Mayor of Casterbridge". 
Nineteenth-Century Fiction, 21 (1966-67), 249-62. Rpt. in Hardy: The 
Traglc Novels. ld. R.P. Draper, Casebook Series. London: Macmillan, 
1975, pp. 133-47. 
Tanner, Tony, introd. Mansfield Park. By Jane Austen. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1966, pp. 7-36. 
Tillotson, Kathleen. Novels of the Eighteen-Forties. London: Oxford 
University Press,-r954. 
Trilling, Lionel. The Opposing Self: Nine Essays in Criticism. London: 
Seeker and WarDurg, 1955. 
Tuchman, Barbara. The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the Horld before the War 
1890-1914. 1966; rpt. London: Macmlllan, 1980. 
Vellacott, Philip. Ironic Drama: A Study of Euripides' Method and Meaning. 
London: Cambridge Onlversity Press, 1975. 
Watson, George. "The Literary Past". In his The Study of L"iterature. 
London: Allen Lane, 1969, pp. 66-83. Rpt. ln On [lterary Intention. 
Ed. David Nevlton-de Mol ina. Edinburgh: EdinburgJiUniversity Pres-S;-
1976, pp. 158-73. 
Williams, Raymond. The English Novel from Dickens to Lawrence. 1970; rpt. 
St. Albans: PaTiioln, 1974. 
---------- "The Industrial Novels". In his Culture and Society 1780-1950. 
1958; rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963, p. 99-119. 
----------. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. GlasgO\~: 
Fontana, 1976. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
222 
---------- "Real ism and the Contemporary Novel". In his The Long Revolution. 
1961; rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965, pp. 300-16. 
Wimsatt, W.K. "Genesis: A Fallacy Revisited". In The Disciplines of 
Criticism: Essays in Literary Theory, Interpretation and Hlstory. Ed. 
Peter Demetz, Thomas Greene and Lowry Nelson, Jr. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1968, pp. 193-225. Rpt. in On Literary Intention. 
Ed. David Newton-de Molina. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1976, pp. 116-38. 
----------, and Monroe C. Beardsley. "The Intentional Fallacy", Sewanee 
Review, 54 (1946),468-88. Rpt. in On Literary Intention. Ed. David 
Newton-de Molina. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Unlversity Press, 1976, pp. 
1-13 • 
Woolf, Virginia. The Common Reader. 3rd edition. London: Hogarth Press, 
1929. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
